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This thesis examines the relation between institutional investor type (specifically, 
transient and long-term oriented institutional investors) and the discretionary 
earnings management strategies of their portfolio firms. By focusing on accruals 
management, it extends current understanding of the relation between institutional 
investor type and earnings management beyond (a) earnings management through 
real investment decisions and (b) only firms with research and development 
activities (Bushee, 1998). The association between transient (long-term oriented) 
institutional investors and portfolio firms' accruals management is first examined 
without reference to portfolio firms' specific earnings targets. Then, the association 
is investigated conditional upon portfolio firms' non-discretionary earnings relative 
to earnings targets. 
Transient institutional investors' investments in portfolio firms are transitory and 
fluctuate over a short period of time (Bushee, 1998; Porter, 1992). These investors 
create incentives for portfolio firm managers to adopt aggressive earnings 
management strategies to avoid earnings disappointment, or to take a bath when 
earnings disappointment is unavoidable. In contrast, long-term oriented institutional 
investors invest for the long-term prospects of their portfolio firms rather than focus 
on the current earnings performance of portfolio firms (Bushee, 1998; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). They actively participate in monitoring their portfolio firms and their 
presence is argued to constrain and limit portfolio firm managers' earnings 
management discretion (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). 
Using a sample of US institutional investors and US portfolio firms, the results 
support the arguments that transient institutional ownership is associated with both 
larger income increasing and larger income decreasing discretionary accruals. This 
is consistent with transient institutional ownership encouragement of managerial 
myopia (Bushee, 1998). However, evidence supporting the managerial myopic 
effects of transient institutional investors is stronger when total institutional 
ownership is predominantly transient. There is insufficient evidence to suggest that 
transient institutional investors encourage "big bath" strategies, and only very 
limited evidence of an association between transient institutional ownership and 
portfolio firms' income smoothing strategies. 
Consistent with long-term oriented institutional investors constraining portfolio firm 
managers' accruals discretion, long-term oriented institutional ownership is found to 
be associated with smaller income increasing and smaller income decreasing 
discretionary accruals. The constraining effects of long-term oriented institutional 
investors remain evident among portfolio firms that have exercised their accrual 
discretion to meet their earnings targets. For firms that fail to meet their earnings 
targets, long-term oriented institutional ownership is negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. That is, inconsistent with their long-term orientation, long-
term oriented institutional investors appear to encourage "reverse" myopic accrual 
management behaviour among portfolio firms. There is no evidence supporting 
arguments that long-term oriented institutional investors create incentives for 
portfolio firms to adopt income smoothing strategies. 
These results highlight the importance of examining different types of institutional 
ownership separately when investigating the effects of institutional ownership on 
iv 
firms' earnings management. The study also provides evidence indicating 
alternative effects of institutional ownership types on firms' discretionary accruals, 
conditional upon the position of firms' non-discretionary earnings relative to their 
earnings targets. The overall results provide evidence indicating the complexities of 
institutional ownership type effects on portfolio firms' accrual management 
strategies. The insights provided in this thesis are valuable to academic researchers, 
analysts, investors and regulators who seek an understanding of the influences and 
implications of institutional investor type on corporate financial reporting. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and purpose of the study 
The global increase in equity capital holdings by institutional investors over the past 
decades has drawn much interest to the role institutional investors can or should play 
in the corporate governance of their portfolio firms (see e.g., Black, 1992, 1998; 
Bushee, 1997, 1998; Lang and McNichols, 1997; Prentice and Holland, 1993; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Stapledon, 1996a, 1996b; Stein, 1989; Wahal and 
McConnell, 1997; among others). 1 In this' study, institutional investors are defined 
to be large investors, other than natural persons, who exercise discretion over the 
investments of others (Lang and McNichols, 1997). More specifically, institutional 
investors are those subject to the Securities and Exchange Act Section 13(f) of 1934 
reporting requirements. 2 Many critics, such as Bhide (1993) and Porter (1992), 
allege that frequent trading and fragmented ownership by institutional investors 
discourage such investors from becoming actively involved in the corporate 
governance of their portfolio firms. Similarly, Black (1998) disputes the claims that 
there is an increasing trend in institutional activism in the US that has brought about 
improvements in the shareholder wealth of the portfolio firms (see e.g., Opler and 
Sokobin, 1995; Smith, 1996). On the other hand, recent studies provide evidence 
suggesting that institutional investors are playing an active role in monitoring and 
disciplining managerial discretion as well as improving capital market information 
efficiency (see e.g., Bange and De Bondt, 1998; Bushee, 1998; Cheng and Reitenga, 
This study uses the terms "institutional investor", "institutional owner" and "institution" 
synonymously. Also, the terms "portfolio firms" and "investee firms" are used interchangeably in 
this study. 
2 	Institutions with greater than $100 million of securities under discretionary management are 
subjected to the Securities and Exchange Act Section 13(f) of 1934 reporting requirements. 
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2000; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998; El-Gazzar, 1998; Majumdar and 
Nagarajan, 1997). 
Several recent studies examine the relation between institutional ownership and 
portfolio firms' earnings management (e.g., Bange and De Bondt, 1998; Bushee, 
1998; Cheng and Reitenga, 2000; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998; Majumdar 
and Nagarajan, 1997). However, most of these studies do not explicitly investigate 
the differential effects of institutional investor type on the earnings management 
strategies of portfolio firms. Extending this line of investigation, this study examines 
the differential effects of US institutional investor types on US portfolio firms' 
earnings management strategies. 3 The two types of institutional investors examined 
are transient and long-term oriented institutional investors. Transient institutional 
investors are institutional investors with short investment horizons (e.g., quarterly) 
while long-term oriented institutional investors adopt a long investment horizon, 
generally extending over many years. 
This study addresses the general research question of how and in what manner 
different types of institutional investors are associated with their portfolio firm's 
earnings management. 
This study focuses on institutional investors instead of non-institutional investors for 
the following reasons. First, the growth in institutional activism since the late 1980s 
presents an opportunity to examine whether the growth in concentrated ownership 
among institutional investors helps to mitigate the agency conflicts arising out of the 
3 	This study is conducted in the US environment because the extensive US requirements to 
disclose institutional holdings enable classification of institutional investor into transient and long-
term oriented institutional investors. Furthermore, the US setting enables comparisons and extension 
of other US studies of the relations between institutional investors and earnings management. 
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separation of ownership and control in corporations (Berle and Means, 1968). 
Second, a growing number of studies of institutional investors' behaviour and their 
impact on portfolio firms' corporate governance, real investment decisions and stock 
prices, among others, enable more coherent theories to be developed to predict the 
associations between institutional ownership types and portfolio firms' earnings 
management (see e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 
1999; Bange and De Bondt, 1998; Bushee, 1998, 2001; Sias, Starks and Titman, 
2000). 
This study empirically estimates portfolio firms' managerial earnings management 
through discretionary accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). 
Accruals encompass most accounting techniques available to managers. They 
capture the effects of both transparent and non-transparent earnings management. 
Furthermore, accounting accruals represent a relatively low cost and less transparent 
earnings management tool as compared to other techniques such as accounting 
policy choice or R&D investment decisions (e.g., Bange and De Bondt, 1998; 
Bushee, 1998; Majumdar and Nagarajan, 1997).4 If the presence of institutional 
investors exerts sufficient pressure on managers to manage reported earnings, then 
managers are likely to adopt earnings management strategies that are subtle and 
unlikely to be unravelled by most financial statement users. 
The associations between the two institutional ownership types and accruals 
management are examined in multiple contexts. First, they are examined separately 
4 	Accruals are less costly to manage relative to R&D spending in the following manner. First, 
accruals management, in general, does not involve actual change in spending patterns as in the case of 
using R&D investment as an earnings management tool. Second, the repercussion of changing R&D 
spending for earnings management purposes rather than for strategical moves can potentially affect 
the firm's competitiveness and thus its long-term viability. 
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for portfolio firms- with income increasing or income decreasing discretionary 
accruals. Associations between institutional ownership type and accruals 
management are then examined, conditional upon the portfolio firms' earnings 
targets. Examining portfolio firm managers' earnings management depending upon 
whether portfolio firms' pre-managed earnings exceed their earnings targets allows 
tests for the different incentives created by the two types of institutional investors 
where these incentives are most likely to be present. As such, accruals management 
to achieve different objectives can be investigated (e.g., aggressive, "big bath", 
income smoothing, etc.). 
1.2 Motivation 
Several factors motivate this study. 	First, the global surge in institutional 
shareholdings in the past decades has aroused much interest amongst regulators, 
academics and the business community in the corporate governance role institutions 
can and should play. On the one hand, many critics have long alleged that the 
presence of institutional investors encourages myopic managerial behaviour because 
of their fragmented and transient ownership and frequent trading (i.e., short 
investment horizon), among other reasons (see e.g., Bhide, 1993; Froot, Perold and 
Stein, 1992; Porter, 1992). On the other hand, recent empirical results challenge this 
'accepted' economic short-termism view of the role of institutional investors. In a 
variety of settings, institutional investors have been found to improve information 
efficiency in the capital market (El-Gazzar, 1998; Eames, 1998); to encourage a 
long-term strategy of research and development investment in firms (Bushee, 1998; 
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Majumdar and Nagarajan, 1997; Wahal and McConnell, 1997); to constrain 
managers from engaging in accruals manipulation (Cheng and Reitenga, 2000; 
Jiambalvo, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1999); and to discourage adoption of 
income-increasing discretionary accruals (Cheng and Reitenga, 2000; Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam, 1998). Therefore, the manner in which institutional shareholders 
influence managerial discretionary earnings management behaviour is an empirical 
issue that warrants further investigation. 
Following the growth in institutional activism in the US since the late 1980s, many 
studies have investigated the effects of institutional activism on portfolio firms' 
performance (see Black (1998) and Karpoff (1998) for reviews of this branch of 
research). In general, both Black (1998) and Karpoff (1998) cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of institutional activism in bringing about improvement in target 
portfolio firms' future performance. However, as Karpoff (1998, Table 2) indicates, 
more than half of the studies reviewed used some accounting measures of 
performance and/or share price performance measures as evidence of institutional 
activism success. It follows that, if institutional ownership affects portfolio firms' 
earnings management strategies, then accounting measures of performance and 
possibly share price performance measures are less likely to be accurate indicators of 
the success of institutional activism. 
This study diverges from the branch of research investigating the effects of 
institutional activism on portfolio firm performance and which implicitly assumes 
that the effects of institutional investors' monitoring only manifest in the form of 
target firms' performance. That literature ignores other potential effects that 
institutional monitoring can have on target firms, including effects on target firms' 
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performance measurements, such as accounting-based performance measures. By 
investigating the effects of institutional ownership on portfolio firms' financial 
reporting behaviour, this study provides a better understanding of (a) the effects of 
institutional ownership on accounting numbers; and, possibly more importantly, (b) 
the appropriateness of using "unadjusted" accounting-based performance measures 
to proxy for target portfolio firms' economic performance. 
In an attempt to reconcile the differential views of earnings management between 
accounting academics, practitioners and regulators, Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
conclude that "understanding management's incentives is key to understanding the 
desire to engage in earnings management" (p.248). Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
encourage academics' research efforts to focus more on capital market incentives for 
earnings management given the sensitivity of managers' compensation and human 
capital to the level of their firms' stock prices, and stock price relations to key 
accounting numbers such as earnings. Consistent with their call, this study attempts 
to draw from both the traditional contracting incentives and capital market incentives 
in investigating the relation between institutional ownership type and earnings 
management. 
Bushee (1998) examines the relation between institutional ownership types and 
portfolio firms' earnings management. That study investigates a real investment 
choice (viz., whether to cut R&D expenditures or not) as the tool for earnings 
management. Extending Bushee's (1998) study, this study investigates the relation 
between institutional ownership types and portfolio firms' earnings management 
using accruals as the earnings management vehicle. Accruals management 
represents a less costly and subtler tool to manage reported earnings. One reason for 
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its lower cost is that accruals management does not directly affect the business 
operations of the firms involved. Furthermore, given the accrual accounting system, 
accruals management is not restricted to firms with R&D activities (such as Bushee's 
(1998) sample). Therefore, this study extends Bushee's (1998) investigation to a 
larger sample of firms and tests the external validity of his findings. 
A further motivation for this study emerges from two other studies that examine the 
relation between institutional ownership and portfolio firms' accruals management 
(Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998; Cheng and Reitenga, 2000). 5 Although both 
studies based their theoretical frameworks on arguments concerning differences 
between transient and long-term oriented institutional investors, neither study 
explicitly models the different types of institutional ownership consistent with their 
theoretical frameworks. As a result, the strength of their conclusions is significantly 
weakened. In contrast, this study classifies institutional ownership types into 
transient and long-term oriented categories using the classification technique 
developed by Bushee (2000,6 which is consistent with the theoretical framework of 
the study. It is, therefore, able to test the relations between institutional ownership 
type and accruals management with greater internal validity. Accordingly, it is able 
to provide more direct evidence on the association between ownership by different 
types of institutional investors and portfolio firms' accruals management. 
5 	Another paper by Jiambalvo, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1999) represent a shorter version 
of the same paper by Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998). 
6 	The classification scheme in Bushee (2001) represents an improvement to the scheme he 




Figure 1.1 presents a summary of the hypotheses developed in relation to transient 
institutional investors, and Figure 1.2 presents a summary of the hypotheses relating 
specifically to long-term oriented institutional investors. 
This study first tests the relations between institutional ownership types and income 
increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals. Transient institutional investors are 
argued to create incentives for portfolio firm managers to manage accruals to achieve 
short-term objectives. When portfolio firms have positive (negative) discretionary 
accruals, transient institutional ownership is expected to associate with larger income 
increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals (H1 and Hi a, see Figure 1.1 Panel A). 
Long-term oriented institutional investors, however, through their monitoring 
activities constrain their portfolio firm managers' discretionary accruals. Therefore, 
long-term oriented institutional ownership is expected to associate with less positive 
(income increasing) and less negative (income decreasing) discretionary accruals 
(H2 and H2a, see Panel A of Figure 1.2). 
For portfolio firms that have the greatest incentives to manage earnings upward (that 
is, portfolio firms that meet or beat earnings targets only after accruals management, 
"reversible decline" firms), the positive association between transient institutional 
ownership and discretionary accruals is expected to be more prevalent (H3, see Panel 
B of Figure 1.1). On the other hand, if long-term oriented institutional investors are 
effective in constraining portfolio firm managers' discretion, then a negative 
association between long-term oriented institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals is expected for "reversible decline" firms (H4, see Figure 1.2 Panel B). 
Figure 1.1: Summary of Hypotheses Relating to Transient Institutional 
Investors 
Panel A: General Effects of Transient Institutional Investors on Discretionary 
Accruals (Chapter 2)  
Myopic Earnings Management 
9 
"Big Bath" Earnings Management 
Strategy  
Negative association between transient 
institutional ownership and income 
decreasing discretionary accruals (H la) 
— i.e., higher level of transient 
institutional ownership is associated 
with more income decreasing 
discretionary accruals. 
Aggressive Short-term Earnings 
Management Strategy 
Positive association between transient 
institutional ownership and income 
increasing discretionary accruals (HI) 
Panel B: Specific Effects of Transient Institutional Investors on Discretionary 
Accruals (Chapter 3)  
 
"Reversible Decline" (RD) firms 
- Firms with current year non-
discretionary earnings less than 
earnings targets but which meet 
their earnings targets via positive 
discretionary accruals 
  
Aggressive Short-term Earnings 
Management Strategy  
Positive association between transient 
institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals (H3) 
   
   
   
     
     
    
"Big Bath" Earnings Management 
Strategy  
 
"Irreversible Decline" (ID) firms 
- Firms with current year non-
discretionary earnings less than 
earnings targets and reported 
earnings (post-discretionary 
accruals below earnings targets) 
  
Negative association between transient 
institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals (H5) 
   
Versus 
   
Income Smoothing Earnings 
Management Strategy  
    
    
Positive association between transient 
institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals (implicit to H5) 
     
• 
Sub-sample of "Increased" (IN) 
firms 
- "Increased" firms with current 
year reported earnings greater than 
earnings targets (that is firms with 
both current year non-discretionary 
earnings and reported earnings 
greater than earnings targets) 
Income Smoothing Earnings 
Management Strategy  
Negative association between transient 
institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals (H7) 
"Increased" (IN) firms 
- Firms with current year non-
discretionary earnings greater than 
earnings targets 
No association between transient 
institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals (no formal hypothesis) 
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Figure 1.1: Summary of Hypotheses Relating to Transient Institutional 
Investors (Continued) 
Panel B: Specific Effects of Transient Institutional Investors on Discretionary 
Accruals (Chapter 3) - Continued  
   
"Reverse" Myopic Earnings 
Management Strategy  
    
"Irreversible Decline" (ID) firms 
- Firms with current year non-
discretionary earnings less than 
earnings targets and reported 
earnings (post-discretionary 
accruals below earnings targets) 
  
Negative association between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and 




Income Smoothing Earnings 
Management Strategy  
Positive association between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals (implicit to H6) 
   
    
"Reversible Decline" (RD) firms 
- Firms with current year non-
discretionary earnings less than 
earnings targets but which meet 
their earnings targets via positive 
discretionary accruals 
Constraining Managerial Discretions 
Negative association between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals (H4) 
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Figure 1.2: Summary of Hypotheses Relating to Long-term Oriented 
Institutional Investors 
Panel A: General Effects of Long-term Oriented Institutional Investors on 
Discretionary Accruals (Chapter 2)  
Constraining Managerial Discretions 
Negative association between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and 
income increasing discretionary accruals 
(H2) 
Positive association between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and 
income decreasing discretionary 
accruals (H2a) — i.e., higher level of 
long-term oriented institutional 
ownership is associated with less income 
decreasing discretionary accruals. 
Panel B: Specific Effects of Long-term Oriented Institutional Investors on 
Discretionary Accruals (Chapter 3)  
Figure 1.2: Summary of Hypotheses Relating to Long-term Oriented 
Institutional Investors (Continued) 
Panel B: Specific Effects of Long-term Oriented Institutional Investors on 
Discretionary Accruals (Chapter 3) - Continued  
12 
"Increased" (IN) firms 
- Firms with current year non-
discretionary earnings greater than 
earnings targets 
• 
Sub-sample of "Increased" (IN) 
firms 
- "Increased" firms with current 
year reported earnings greater than 
earnings targets (that is firms with 
both current year non-discretionary 
earnings and reported earnings 
greater than earnings targets) 
Income Smoothing Earnings 
Management Strategy  
Negative association between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals (H8) 
No association between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals (no formal 
hypothesis) 
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For portfolio firms that fail to meet their earnings targets after accruals management 
("irreversible decline" firms), transient institutional investors are predicted to 
provide portfolio firm managers with incentives to take a "bath" to create accounting 
slack for future periods. Thus, a negative relation between transient institutional 
ownership and discretionary accruals is expected for these firms (H5, see Figure 1.1 
Panel B). Competing against this prediction is the income smoothing hypothesis, 
which predicts that portfolio firm managers have incentives to get as close to the 
earnings targets as possible even if firms are certain to fall short of the targets. 
Income smoothing arguments would imply a positive relation between transient 
institutional ownership and discretionary accruals. 
There is no existing literature on the relation between long-term oriented institutional 
investors and the accruals management of 'irreversible decline" firms. However, 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998) provide some empirical evidence consistent 
with "reverse" myopic behaviour when they examine the relation between 
institutional ownership, as a whole, and income decreasing accruals. "Reverse" 
myopia can be regarded as a type of conservatism bias. 7 If such apparent "reverse" 
myopic behaviour is associated with long-term oriented institutional investors, then a 
negative relation between long-term oriented institutional ownership and the 
discretionary accruals of "irreversible decline" firms is expected (H6, see Panel B of 
Figure 1.2). Once again, the income smoothing hypothesis competes with the 
"reverse" myopia hypothesis, where the former would predict a positive relation 
between long-term oriented institutional ownership and the discretionary accruals of 
"irreversible decline" firms. 
7 "Reverse" myopic behaviour in this study refers to conservative accrual management, where 
the latter is the adoption of less income increasing or more income decreasing discretionary accruals 
strategy than otherwise. This is consistent with the conservatism concept stipulated by Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No.2 (FASB, 1980) and Basu (1997). 
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In general, neither type of institutional investor is predicted to be associated with 
discretionary accruals of portfolio firms that already meet their earnings targets prior 
to managing accruals ("increased" firms). However, for "increased" firms that also 
report earnings above targets, a closer examination of the income smoothing 
hypothesis is possible. Given that incentives for meeting earnings targets no longer 
exist for these firms, evidence of a negative relation between transient (long-term 
oriented) institutional ownership and discretionary accruals can be less ambiguously 
attributed to income smoothing incentives created by institutional investors (H7 and 
H8, see Panels B of Figures 1.1 and 1.2). 
1.4 Major findings 
Overall, the results support most of the hypothesised relations between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and portfolio firms' discretionary accruals (H2, H2'?.,, 
H4 and H6). However, there is no evidence suggesting that long-term oriented 
institutional ownership encourages income smoothing behaviour (H8). More 
specifically, the results show that long-term oriented institutional ownership is 
negatively (positively) associated with income increasing (decreasing) discretionary 
accruals, consistent with the contention that long-term oriented institutional investors 
actively involve themselves in monitoring their portfolio firms, thus constraining 
portfolio firm managers' accruals discretions. This constraining effect is also 
evident among portfolio firms that have the greatest incentives to manage their 
earnings aggressively (viz., "reversible decline" firms). 
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In addition to the constraining effect long-term oriented institutional investors have 
on their portfolio firm managers, long-term oriented institutional ownership is found 
to encourage "reverse" myopic behaviour among portfolio firms faced with an 
inevitable failure to meet their earnings targets (viz., "irreversible decline" firms). 
These findings are unlikely to be an effect of measurement error in discretionary 
accruals, and are robust to different measures of institutional ownership and different 
specifications of the relation between discretionary accruals and firm size. The 
relations between long-term oriented institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals suggest there is a conservative bias in long-term oriented institutional 
investors' constraints on portfolio firm managers' accruals discretion. 
The associations between transient institutional ownership and portfolio firms' 
discretionary accruals are less conclusive. The negative relation between transient 
institutional ownership and income decreasing discretionary accruals is robust and 
consistent with transitory investment by institutional investors creating incentives for 
managers of portfolio firms to engage in myopic accruals management to create 
accounting slack for future periods. However, the hypothesised positive relation 
between transient institutional ownership and income increasing discretionary 
accruals is not evident. Similar to Bushee (1998), the association between transient 
institutional ownership and aggressive accruals management is more robust and 
consistent if transient institutional ownership dominates portfolio firms' institutional 
ownership. 
When the transient investor hypothesis is tested in an environment where it should 
be most pronounced (among "reversible decline" firms), the predicted relation is 
only significant at the 10% level in the main test. However, for "reversible decline" 
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firms with a high proportion of ownership by transient institutions, the transient 
investor hypothesis is supported at the 5% level. When constraints on the accounting 
flexibility available to portfolio firm managers are considered, no support is found 
for the transient investor hypothesis. Similar to Bushee (1998), overall evidence of 
the short-term effects of transient institutional investment is more consistent and 
robust when total institutional ownership is predominantly made up of transient 
institutional ownership. Therefore, the impact of transient institutional ownership on 
earnings management, in general, may not be as severe as has been criticised (e.g., 
Black 1998, Black and Coffee, 1994; Coffee, 1991; Levitt, 1998). 
Evidence of an association between transient institutional ownership and income 
smoothing by portfolio firm managers is very limited. Such association is only 
found within a very restricted sub-sample. Finally, transient institutional ownership 
is not found to be associated with "big bath" behaviour although this might be 
alternatively explained by the inherent characteristics of the sample firms, where the 
sample excludes loss-making firms. 
1.5 Significance of the study 
This study contributes to the literature in the following areas. First, it provides an 
understanding and empirical evidence concerning how portfolio firms' financial 
reporting behaviour is influenced by different types of institutional investors. This 
is important given that a large body of literature has focused on the effects of 
institutional activism on target firms' accounting-based performance without 
investigating the effects institutional activism can have on accounting numbers (see 
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e.g., Black, 1998; Karpoff, 1998). The results of this study suggests that if 
accounting-based performance measures are to be used as indicators of institutional 
activism success, then "adjusted" accounting numbers should be used, otherwise the 
institutional activism success measure would be biased. For example, if target firms 
are those that engage in "reverse" myopic earnings management as a results of 
institutional monitoring, then the results of this study would suggests accounting-
based performance measures are likely to be biased downwards, thus potentially 
explaining the lack of evidence supporting an improved performance in target firms 
when accounting-based performance measures are used (Karpoff, 1998). 
Furthermore, this study highlights the importance of separating institutional 
ownership type when investigating the relation between institutional ownership and 
earnings management as transient institutional ownership influences portfolio firms' 
earnings management strategies differently from long-term oriented institutional 
ownership (see also Bushee, 1998). The results extend the existing empirical 
evidence on the relation between institutional ownership and discretionary accruals. 
Previous studies have generally used the overall level of institutional ownership 
which potentially obscures the effects of different types of institutional investors on 
portfolio firm managers' earnings management incentives. This study provides 
evidence of the differential influence that transient and long-term oriented 
institutional ownership has on portfolio firm managers' accruals management 
strategies. Therefore, this study extends the very limited research into the relation 
between institutional ownership (type) and accruals management. 
Another contribution of this study is that it combines the traditional contracting 
incentives and capital market incentives in developing the hypotheses. As a result, 
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the study is able to predict different portfolio firms' accruals management strategies 
within each type of institutional ownership, namely transient and long-term oriented 
institutional ownership (see Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2), conditioned upon portfolio 
firms' non-discretionary earnings levels relative to earnings targets. Furthermore, 
income smoothing behaviour is examined among portfolio firms with incentives to 
smooth reported earnings in the absence of other incentives, such as to meet or beat 
earnings targets, and excluded portfolio firms that supposedly smoothed earnings 
downward to the extent that they missed their earnings targets. As such, this study is 
able to examine income smoothing behaviour within a "cleaner" sample, 
strengthening the findings of this study with respect to income smoothing behaviour. 
The results also collaborate and extend the evidence presented by Bushee (1998). 
First, they extend Bushee's findings on the relation between transient institutional 
ownership and earnings management. Bushee (1998) finds that portfolio firms with 
predominantly transient institutional ownership are more likely to cut their R&D 
spending to manage earnings upward. The findings of this study indicate that a 
similar association is also observed when accounting accruals are used as an earnings 
management tool. Furthermore, when using discretionary accruals as an earnings 
management tool, this relation is less rigid, with the results suggesting that transient 
institutional ownership is associated with more aggressive accruals management. 
However, the association is stronger among portfolio firms with ownership 
predominantly comprised of transient institutional ownership, consistent with 
Bushee's (1998) findings. This study also extends Bushee (1998) by predicting the 
relation between long-term oriented institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals. 
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Furthermore, the results of this study indicate that even though transient institutional 
ownership is associated with more aggressive accruals management by portfolio 
firms, the accruals management of portfolio firms, overall, seems to be dominated by 
long-term oriented institutional investors. Therefore, the alleged managerial myopia 
induced by transient institutional investors, while observable, may not as prevalent 
or severe as previously suggested (e.g., Levitt, 1998). 
The finding that long-term oriented institutional ownership is associated with 
"reverse" myopic accruals management behaviour also highlights the asymmetric 
influence of long-term oriented institutional ownership on portfolio firms' accruals 
management. In particular, although long-term oriented institutional ownership 
appears to constrain portfolio firms' discretionary accruals in general, it appears that 
the constraint is biased towards conservatism. This implication opens up an 
interesting research avenue to investigate the poteniial conservative bias effects of 
long-term oriented institutional investors on portfolio firms' accruals management. 
1.6 Thesis organisation 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. The next two chapters draw 
upon existing research to analyse the relations between different types of 
institutional investors and portfolio firms' accruals management. Chapter 2 begins 
by exploring the institutional investor's role in corporate governance. It then 
analyses and develops hypotheses predicting the general relations between different 
types of institutional investors and income increasing (decreasing) earnings 
management, without specific reference to earnings targets. Chapter 3 extends the 
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analysis in Chapter 2 by explicitly examining portfolio firm managers' earnings 
management incentives, conditional upon portfolio firms' pre-managed earnings 
levels relative to their earnings targets. Therefore, Chapter 2 provides the general 
background for an understanding of the relation between types of institutional 
investors and income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals, whereas 
analysis in Chapter 3 enables a more specific understanding of the potentially 
complex earnings management incentives created by different types of institutional 
investors. 
The classification of institutional investors into transient and long- term oriented 
investors is explained and described Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 outlines the research 
design. Chapter 6 presents the results of the empirical tests and Chapter 7 concludes 
the study with a review of the thesis, a summary of its major findings and 
implications, a discussion of the limitations of the study, and suggestions for future 
research. 
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2 Institutional Investor Type and Earnings Management 
2.1 Introduction 
The associations between different types of institutional investors and portfolio 
firms' earnings management are analysed in Chapters 2 (this chapter) and 3. 8 This 
chapter analyses and develops hypotheses predicting the general associations 
between different types of institutional investors and income increasing (decreasing) 
earnings management. The hypotheses make no specific reference to portfolio 
firms' earnings targets. Chapter 3 then extends the analysis of this chapter by 
explicitly examining portfolio firm managers' earnings management incentives 
conditional upon their firms' earnings targets. Chapter 2 provides the general 
background for our understanding of the relation between types of institutional 
investors and income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals; whereas 
analysis in Chapter 3 enables a more specific understanding of the potentially 
complex earnings management incentives created by different types of institutional 
investors. Following recent developments in the literature on the relation between 
institutional investors and earnings management (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Cheng and 
Reitenga, 2000), this study assumes portfolio firms can have both transient and long-
term oriented institutional investors rather than only one or the other. Furthermore, 
recognising that managers of portfolio firms are likely to face different incentives to 
manage income increasing discretionary accruals and income decreasing 
discretionary accruals, hypotheses regarding the effects of different types of 
8 	This study uses the terms "institutional investor", "institutional owner" and "institution" 
.synonymously. More specifically, institutional investors are those subject to the Securities and 
Exchange Act Section 13(1) of 1934 reporting requirements. That is, all institutions with greater than 
$100 million of securities under discretionary management. Also, the terms "investee firms" and 
"portfolio firms" are used interchangeably in this study. 
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institutional investors on income increasing and income decreasing discretionary 
accruals are examined separately. 
This chapter begins by exploring the institutional investor's role in corporate 
governance. Hypotheses developed in Section 2.3 extend from the existing literature 
on the two types of institutional investors' influence on managerial earnings 
management incentives. In particular, Section 2.3.1 examines the influence of 
transient (short-term oriented) institutional investors on portfolio firms' income 
increasing (decreasing) earnings management whilst Section 2.3.2 investigates the 
effects of long-term oriented institutional investors on portfolio firms' income 
increasing (decreasing) earnings management. 
Because their investments in portfolio firms are transitory and fluctuate according to 
the portfolio firms' current earnings performance, transient institutional investors 
create incentives for portfolio firm managers to adopt aggressive earnings 
management strategies to avoid earnings disappointment, and to take a bath when 
earnings disappointment is unavoidable. In contrast, long-term oriented institutional 
investors are institutional investors who invest for the long-term rather than focus on 
current earnings performance of portfolio firms. Therefore, long-term oriented 
institutional investors tend to be informed and involved investors who actively 
participate in monitoring their portfolio firms. Their presence constrains and limits 
portfolio firm managers' earnings management discretion. Section 2.4 summarises 
and concludes this chapter. 
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2.2 Institutional investors and corporate governance 
Evolution of the corporate business environment means that the single owner-
manager firm structure has given way to modern corporations where capital from a 
dispersed pool of shareholders and the operational skills of professional management 
teams are combined. Berle and Means (1968) 9 have long suggested that there is a 
divergence between ownership and control, with ownership being vested in the 
shareholders and control in the management team. Such separation of ownership 
and management functions enables corporations to access a much larger pool of 
capital than is available to other forms of business arrangement such as partnerships 
or sole proprietorships. Therefore, corporations can pursue ventures or projects of a 
larger scale to take advantage of the economies of scale. Both shareholders and 
managers can benefit from the corporate form of business organisation. On the. one 
hand, shareholders can participate in the gains from the ventures without the 
necessary management skills; while managers can pursue profitable business 
opportunities without large personal wealth as starting capital. 
A principal-agent relationship is created when shareholders delegate decision-
making authority to managers. As the agents of shareholders, managers are charged 
with decision making that will enhance shareholders' wealth. Shareholders provide 
the capital but have only limited influence over the firm's day-to-day operations. 
They view firms as investment vehicles and employ managers to diligently and 
efficiently manage the firms with the goal of maximising equity value. In contrast, 
managers regard share ownership as only one facet of their relationship with the 
firm. Managers also view the firm as a source of salary, perquisites, self-esteem, 
9 
	
First published in 1932. 
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and/or recognition, and as a means of creating value for their human capital (Berle 
and Means, 1968). To protect and enhance these multiple sources of benefits to 
managers, only one of which is equity value, managers sometimes make decisions 
that benefit them personally at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meekling, 
1976; Healy, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
The potential divergence or conflict of interest between shareholders and managers 
gives rise to agency costs. In the first instance, shareholders incur monitoring costs 
in reviewing the actions of managers. m These costs are then transferred, either in 
full or in part, to managers as part of ex ante price-protection, or ex post settling up 
for dysfunctional behaviour. Rational managers would seek to reduce the 
monitoring costs transferred to them. Therefore, managers incur bonding costs with 
the aim of assuring shareholders that the shareholders' interests are being pursued." 
Managers would only incur bonding costs to the extent that bonding costs reduce the 
monitoring costs they bear, and would stop incurring bonding costs when the 
marginal cost of bonding equals the marginal reduction of the monitoring costs they 
bear. Inevitably, some potential for divergence of interest between shareholders and 
managers remains and this is referred to as residual loss. 
Agency costs represent the sum of the monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual 
loss. Such costs can become more prevalent with the presence of diffuse outside 
shareholders who do not have sufficient incentives to monitor the managers. This is 
because if diffuse outside shareholders do not have incentives to monitor managers, 
to 	Examples of monitoring costs are costs of mandatory audit, costs to establish management 
compensation plans, budget restrictions, etc. (Jensen and Meekling, 1976). 
Examples of bonding costs include contractual guarantees to have the financial statements 
audited, explicit bonding against malfeasance on the part of managers and contractual limitations on 
the manager's decision power (Jensen and Meekling, 1976). 
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then there will be limited (or no) monitoring and bonding mechanism to ensure 
managers act in the interests of the owners. Without sufficient monitoring and 
bonding mechanisms in place, managers have leeway to pursue their personal 
interests knowing that their dysfunctional behaviours are unlikely to be punished, 
other than through ex ante price protection. Thus, although it might appear that the 
lack of monitoring by diffuse outside shareholders reduces monitoring and bonding 
costs, the residual loss (resulting from the divergence of interests between 
shareholders and managers) is likely to be very large and to outweigh the savings in 
monitoring and bonding costs. The lack of incentives to monitor managers can result 
from high information search costs, organisation costs and heterogeneity of interests 
among the outside shareholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
By investing through institutions, individual investors' resources are pooled. Also, 
as share ownership becomes more concentrated among smaller numbers of investors, 
such as institutional investors, the costs of information search and information 
analysis, among others, are reduced. Therefore, investing through institutional 
investors can mitigate the disincentives faced by diffused outside shareholders to 
monitor portfolio firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, institutional 
investors with their greater resources and skills can often better and more effectively 
monitor portfolio firm managers than individual investors. This, in turn, aids in 
reducing the agency costs between shareholders and managers. Therefore, the 
involvement of institutional investors in corporate governance can have a direct 
bearing on the agency costs resulting from separation of ownership and control 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
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The increase in share ownership by institutional investors across time is evident. For 
example, Gompers and Metrick (1998), investigating institutions governed by the 
SEC Section 13(0, 12 find that these institutions' shareholdings grew from $375 
billion in 1980 to $3.98 trillion in 1996. Percentage-wise, these institutions held 
27.6% of the total market capitalisation of the publicly traded shares in 1980 and 
51.0% in 1996. 13 A similar trend is observed in the UK, where financial institution 
share ownership has increased from 22.1% of the listed UK companies in 1963 to 
61.3% in 1990 (Davies, 1993). 
There is a growing interest in institutional investors' roles in corporate governance." 
Recent times have seen an emergence of increased institutional activism carried out 
by large pension funds such as the California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS), and the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), among others. 15 A 
variety of institutional investor organisations also exist, such as the Council of 
Institutional Investors (CII), to organise and coordinate third party monitoring 
activities. Despite this institutional activism, institutional investors continue to be 
criticised for doing too little and the demand for a more active role for institutional 
investors with respect to corporate governance and managerial monitoring activities 
is ongoing (e.g., Black, 1998; Porter, 1992). 
12 	Under the Securities and Exchange Act Section 13(f) of 1934, all institutions with greater 
than $100 million of securities under management are required to report their share holdings to the 
SEC on a quarterly basis. 
13 	After controlling for the expansion of the share market over time, these institutional holdings 
increased from $365 billion (26.9% of the total market capitalisation) in 1980 to $3.77 trillion 
(48.2%) in 1996 (Gompers and Metrick, 1998). 
14 	Corporate governance deals with mechanisms by which stakeholders of a firm (specifically 
in this study, institutional investors) exercise control over corporate managers such that their interests 
are protected (John and Senbet, 1998). This definition of corporate governance excludes managers 
from "stakeholders" and looks at the relation between stakeholders and managers. 
15 	See for example Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and survey studies by Black (1998) and 
Karpoff (1998). The forms of institutional activism include exercise of voting rights, routine and 
extraordinary actions by institutional investors. Examples of these actions are provided in later 
discussions. 
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The manner in which institutional investors can be involved in the corporate 
governance of their portfolio firms includes the normal exercising of voting rights, 
routine and extraordinary actions. Routine actions include regular one-to-one 
meetings with chief executive and/or finance directors of the portfolio firms, 
attending post-results presentations, brokers' lunches, etc. Extraordinary actions 
include attempting to influence the outcome of proposed large transactions requiring 
shareholder consent, and intervention to change the composition of the 
underperforming (or otherwise unacceptable) board of an investee firm. 16 The term 
"monitoring" is used in this study to include the exercising of voting rights, routine 
and extraordinary actions by institutional investors. I7 That is, institutional 
monitoring in this study includes both public and "behind closed doors" 
interventions. 18 
2.3 . Hypothesis development: influence of institutional investor type on earnings 
management incentives 
Financial statements can play an important role in restricting opportunistic behaviour 
by portfolio firm managers and in reducing agency costs. For example, managerial 
compensation packages often include financial performance measures such as 
accounting earnings as one of the determinants of managerial remuneration 
16 	For a detailed discussion of routine, extraordinary actions, and issues relating to the exercise 
of voting rights, see Stapledon (1996b) Chapter 8. 
17 	"Intervention" and "monitoring" are used interchangeably in this study. 
18 	"Behind closed doors" interventions include informal direct discussion with management or 
public announcements, and explanatory letters (e.g., voting "no" or withholding a vote with an 
explanatory letter to the firm's CEO and/or directors), among others. 
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(Murphy, 1999). 19 Generally accepted accounting principles provide portfolio firm 
managers with considerable discretion in determining the final accounting numbers 
such as earnings. This discretion presents opportunities for managers to choose 
accounting techniques to serve a particular objective, be it to opportunistically 
transfer wealth from the firm to themselves, or to more accurately reflect the 
performance and the position of the firm they are managing. Therefore, there is 
considerable scope for managers to incorporate their incentives, ex post, into the 
financial reporting decision making process. 2° 
How the presence of different types of institutional ownership affects the earnings 
management strategies of their portfolio firms depends upon the trade-off between 
the expected benefits to be derived by the institutional investors from institutional 
monitoring and the costs of such monitoring actions, as well as the expected benefits 
of alternative courses of action (Pozen, 1994). 21 The effects of institutional 
ownership on portfolio firms' earnings management strategies are also affected by 
the portfolio firm managers' perceptions of the likelihood, extent and nature of 
institutional intervention to rectify or prevent dysfunctional behaviour. The manner 
in which institutional investors influence portfolio firm managers' financial reporting 
discretion is an empirical issue as it is possible to mount a case for both a passive 
hands-off policy (e.g., Bhide, 1993; Porter, 1992) and an active monitoring policy by 
19 	Using a proprietary survey of bonus plan conducted in 1996, Murphy (1999) finds that 91% 
of his sample firms explicitly use at least one measure of accounting profit in their annual bonus plan. 
Furthermore, his analysis is consistent with a general bonus scheme formula detailed by Healy (1985). 
This formula takes the form of B t =Pt {min{ U, max{ (Et — I-4),O }}} , where p, defines the percentage 
that can be allocated to a bonus pool (B e) with an upper limit of U t , and an earnings target or lower 
bound of L. E t represent a variant of reported earnings. 
20 	Such scope in managing reported earnings according to managers' incentives remains unless 
contractual specifications completely and effectively constrain managers' financial reporting choices. 
However, this is generally not possible or feasible (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
21 	An example of an alternative course of action is for the institutional investor to offload its 
shareholdings in the portfolio firm instead of engaging in intervention activity. 
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institutional investors (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Majumdar and Nagarajan, 1997) 
depending on the types of institutional investor. 
This thesis uses accruals manipulation as a proxy for earnings management by 
portfolio firm managers. Accruals manipulation represents a less costly and more 
subtle earnings management technique compared to the research and development 
(R&D) investment decision that has been widely used as a proxy for earnings 
management in the studies investigating the effects of institutional ownership on 
earnings management carried out thus far (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Majumdar and 
Nagaraj an, 1997). 22 It is also more wide ranging in its incorporation of earnings 
management techniques than single accounting policy choice or portfolio of 
accounting policy choice (Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001; Francis, 2000) 
Furthermore, examining accruals manipulation as a proxy for earnings management 
extends the current understanding of the effects of institutional investor type on 
earnings management beyond firms with research and development activities. 
The following sections examine the relation between two institutional investor types 
(transient and long-term oriented) and portfolio firms' earnings management 
behaviour respectively. The hypotheses about the relations between institutional 
investors and portfolio firms' income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals 
are separately developed and discussed within each type of institutional investors 
(viz., transient and long-term oriented) to capture the differential effects each 
institutional investor type has on portfolio firms' discretionary accruals. 23 In 
22 	See Chapter 5 for further discussions of the relative merits of discretionary accruals versus 
R&D investment decision as proxies for earnings management. 
23 	A hypothesised relation between transient institutional ownership and portfolio firms' 
discretionary accruals does not necessarily imply an opposite relation between long -term oriented 
institutional ownership and portfolio firms' discretionary accruals is true. This is due to the existence 
of non-institutional investors. 
30 
particular, Section 2.3.1 develops hypotheses about the relation between transient 
institutional investors and income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals, 
whilst Section 2.3.2 develops hypotheses about the relation between long-term 
oriented institutional investors and income increasing (decreasing) discretionary 
accruals. 
2.3.1 Short-term oriented (transient) institutional investors' impact on 
earnings management 
This sub-section develops the hypotheses in relation to the impact of short-term 
oriented institutional investors on portfolio firm managers earnings management 
decisions. It begins by examining the reasons for the lack of incentives for short-
term oriented institutional investors to be involved in portfolio firms' corporate 
governance matters (Section 2.3.1.1). Such lack of incentives to monitor portfolio 
firms creates opportunities for portfolio firm managers to manage reported earnings. 
Section 2.3.1.2 then discusses the incentives for portfolio firm managers to manage 
earnings as a result of the short investment horizon of transient institutional 
investors. The formal hypotheses for the associations between transient institutional 
investors and income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals are detailed in 
Section 2.3.1.3. 
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2.3.1.1 Short-term oriented (transient) institutional investors and their 
involvement in portfolio firms' corporate governance 
Short-term oriented institutional investors are often referred to as myopic, or 
transient, investors, who focus excessively on current earnings rather than long-term 
earnings in determining stock prices (Bushee, 1998; Porter, 1992). Several reasons 
have been forwarded to explain the short-term focus of these institutional 
shareholders. First, it has been argued that institutional shareholders face several 
economic disincentives to actively govern their portfolio firms. For example, 
quarterly assessments of institutional investors' performance together with relative 
performance assessments, via industry performance ranking of institutional 
investors, have created incentives for institutional investors to adopt a short 
investment horizon (see Black and Coffee, 1994; Coffee, 1991; Stapledon, 1996a, 
1996b; Bushee, 1998; El-Gazzar, 1998; Hessel and Norman, 1992; among others). 
Such a short time horizon deters institutional investors from incurring monitoring 
costs as the benefits of governing the portfolio firms are unlikely to accrue to the 
investors in the short run (Black and Coffee, 1994; Coffee, 1991; Porter, 1992). In 
his 1998 speeches, Mr. Arthur Levitt, the then Chairman of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), repeatedly expressed his concerns over the culture of 
unforgiving investors severely penalising their portfolio firms' stock value as a result 
of their portfolio firms' failure to meet or beat Wall Street earnings projections. 24 
Bushee (2001) finds evidence that transient institutional investors exhibit strong 
preference for near-term earnings and this preference translates into misvaluation of 
24 	Among the speeches are those delivered to the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) in December 1998, the Financial Executives Institute in November 1998, and 
at the New York University's Center for Law and Business in September 1998. 
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stock prices, where near-term (long-term) earnings are over-weighted (under-
weighted). 
Moreover, the need for liquidity to rebalance their portfolio to maintain or to 
improve their own performance does not allow sufficient time for transient 
institutions to actively involve in monitoring their portfolio firms (Black and Coffee, 
1994; Coffee, 1991; Ramsay and Blair, 1993; Stapledon, 1996a, 1996b). For 
example, any monitoring of a portfolio firm generally requires a time horizon 
beyond the investing institutions' own performance evaluation cycles (e.g., 
quarterly) and requires continuous resource commitment (financial and non-
financial) from the institutions involved to the portfolio firms being monitored. In 
order to carry out such monitoring activities, a portion of the funds available to the 
institutions is tied to the portfolio firm (in which monitoring is carried out) for a 
period longer than their performance assessment cycle. This decreases the liquidity 
of the funds under institutional investors' management and can potentially limit the 
portfolio rebalancing strategy available to them. In turn, this can affect the 
institutional investors' short-term performance. At the extreme, the monitoring 
effort may have to be abandoned in order to maintain or achieve institutions' own 
performance targets in the short-term. Under this scenario, the institutions have to 
bear the monitoring costs incurred so far that will not generate any future benefits for 
the institutions. 
Other economic factors that discourage institutional shareholders from actively 
monitoring their portfolio firms include the institutional investors' limited financial 
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resources; 25 the free-rider problem (Black, 1992; Pozen, 1994), and the conflicts of 
interests arising from institutional monitoring that can potentially cause the loss of 
other business that the monitoring institutions have with the portfolio firm being 
monitored (Black, 1992; Coffee, 1991; Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1988), etc. 26 
The US legal environment in which the institutions operate represents another barrier 
to institutional involvement in corporate governance. Various studies indicate that 
institutions subject to strict fiduciary duties (e.g., "prudent man" law) have 
incentives to sell stocks with declining earnings and tilt towards high quality stocks 
(Badrinath, Gay and Kale, 1989; Del Guercio, 1996; Eakins, Stansell and Wertheim, 
1998).27 "Prudent man" laws are intended to protect beneficiaries by allowing them 
to seek damages from a fiduciary who fails to invest in the beneficiaries' best 
interest. However, prudence standards as accepted by courts are based upon the 
characteristics of isolated assets rather than upon the individual assets' marginal 
effects on a portfolio - inconsistent with the modem portfolio theory (Del Guercio, 
1996). Such assessment of prudence by courts can thus encourage institutional 
investors to focus on the short-term performance of the firms they invest in and to 
unload the shares of "non-performing" firms. Bushee (2001) finds evidence 
25 	Although institutional investors, in general, have more financial resources relative to 
individual investors, they do not have infinite resources. Nor do they have unlimited resources 
dedicated to monitoring activities. Black (1998) finds that only a small number of institutional 
investors in the US spend a trivial amount of money on monitoring efforts, while others spend none. 
He also finds that institutional investors that employ active money management strategy spend 100 
times more on stock picking than institutional investors who are actively involved in portfolio firms' 
corporate governance spend on corporate governance issues. In general, most advisory fees 
institutional investors charge their clients are based on the assumption that they will usually function 
as passive investors rather than as activists. Thus, such fees do not cover the costs of heavy 
intervention on the part of the institutional investors (Pozen, 1994). 
26 	See Coffee (1991) and Stapledon (1996a) for further discussions of economic factors 
affecting institutional investors' participation in corporate governance. 
27 	Standard and Poor's Earnings and Dividend Rankings on Common Stocks has generally been 
used as a proxy for quality, for example, Badrinath et al. (1989) and Del Guercio (1996). 
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consistent with institutional investors subject to strict fiduciary standards (e.g., 
banks) exhibiting strong preference for near-term earnings. 
Other practical and political disincentives for institutional monitoring include 
information asymmetry between the institutional investors and management; the lack 
of expertise by the institutions, in general, to intervene (Black, 1998; Pozen, 1994; 
Stapledon, 1996a); 28 and the heterogeneity of institutional investors' approaches to 
monitoring (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). 
Taken together, the above analysis suggests that there is generally a lack of 
incentives for transient institutional investors to become actively involved in 
corporate governance. Rather, this type of institutional investor is likely to take a 
non-interventionist approach to the management of public companies and to prefer 
the 'Wall Street Walk' when portfolio firms are not performing up to =their 
expectations (e.g., Black, 1998; Black and Coffee, 1994; Coffee, 1991). In short, 
transient institutional investors have strong incentives to trade on reported earnings 
rather than actively engage in corporate governance activities. 
28 	It has been a widely accepted assumption that institutional investors, in general, have the 
required skills to monitor and govern the day-to-day operation of the portfolio firms that they are 
intervening. However, Black (1998) comments that "[p]articular  institutional investors may have the 
skill to improve the performance of their portfolio companies.., but this skill may be scarce among 
institutional investors as a whole." Even if the institutional investors have the necessary skill to 
monitor or improve the performance of the portfolio firms, they might lack the skills necessary to run 
an intervention campaign (Stapledon, 1996b). 
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2.3.1.2 Earnings management incentives created by transient institutional 
investors 
Portfolio firm managers have incentives to manage earnings to avoid an earnings 
disappointment that could trigger a large-scale institutional investor selling and a 
temporary misvaluation of the firm's shares (Porter, 1992; Graves and Waddock, 
1990) if the following conditions are satisfied: (a) managers have incentives to avoid 
temporary misvaluation caused by earnings disappointment; and (b) institutional 
shareholder trading is sensitive to current earnings news and can cause a temporary 
misvaluation (see Bushee, 1998). 
Incentives for portfolio firm managers to avoid earnings disappointment exist 
because portfolio firm managers' compensation packages are generally tied to both 
the current reported earnings performance of the portfolio firms as well as the 
portfolio firms' share price performance (Murphy, 1999). Matsunaga and Park 
(2000) find that managers of firms that report an earnings decline suffer a reduction 
in compensation equivalent to approximately 6.8% of their cash salary. Therefore, 
an earnings disappointment can have a significant direct impact on portfolio firm 
managers' compensation. 
In addition, portfolio firm managers' compensation is indirectly affected by earnings 
disappointments through the impact of earnings disappointments on share prices. As 
noted above, there exists a culture whereby investors severely penalise their portfolio 
firms' stock values when portfolio firms fail to meet or beat market earnings 
expectations. Pound and Shiller (1987) find evidence indicating that 55% of the 
institutional investors they surveyed would choose to sell their shareholdings solely 
36 
based on bad news about current or near-term earnings appearing in the Wall Street 
Journal (e.g., short-term disappointment in earnings performance). When poor 
current earnings performance causes an undervaluation of the firm's share price, then 
portfolio firm managers' compensation declines. Furthermore, the threat that a 
raider can exploit a temporary undervaluation represents another incentive to avoid 
earnings disappointment that can potentially lead to such undervaluation (Porter, 
1992; Graves and Waddock, 1990). 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Myers and Skinner (1999) provide empirical 
evidence indicating that managers have incentives to avoid earnings decreases or 
losses, especially when there is an established pattern of earnings growth/positive 
earnings. Barth, Elliott and Finn (1999) find that the market rewards earnings 
growth and that the earnings of firms with continual growth are valued more highly 
than those of firms with the same level of, but more erratic, growth. Furthermore, 
about 60% of the 400 CEOs (drawn from the Business Week Top 1000) surveyed by 
the Business Week Harris Poll indicate that institutional investors exert most pressure 
on companies to focus on short-term performance (Nussbaum, 1987). In addition, 
the managerial labour market disciplines managers based on the firm's reported 
performance (Fama, 1980). As such, firms' reported earnings are one piece of the 
evidence of managerial performance used both in the internal and external 
managerial labour markets. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) find that CEO turnover 
occurs when firms' earnings performance is below expectation and that CEO 
turnover decisions are based on current year earnings performance. 
Prior research finds that increased institutional shareholding is associated with higher 
trading volume (Kim, Krinsky, and Lee, 1997) and stock return volatility around 
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quarterly earnings announcements (Potter, 1992), as well as temporary 
undervaluations (Brown and Brooke, 1993; Sias, Starks and Titman, 2000). When 
asked in a survey how they put together their current portfolio or the portfolios they 
manage, 95% of the institutional investors surveyed indicated that expectation of an 
unusual profit opportunity in that stock at the time of purchase was their primary 
motivation for purchasing each stock (Pound and Shiller, 1987). Also, as discussed 
earlier, institutional investors have incentives to trade based on reported earnings. 
This empirical evidence, together with the findings in Barth et al. (1999), suggests 
that institutional shareholder trading is sensitive to current earnings news and can 
cause a temporary misvaluation in share prices. In addition, Bushee (2001) finds 
that transient institutional investors' preferences for near-term earnings lead to over-
(under-) weighting of near-term (long-term) earnings and a trading strategy 
exploiting this weighting scheme generates significant abnormal returns. 
The above analysis indicates that short-term oriented institutional investors' trading 
is sensitive to current earnings performance of their portfolio firms. This short-term 
orientation of institutional investors, coupled with incentives for portfolio firm 
managers to avoid earnings disappointment, creates an environment that encourages 
portfolio firm managers to manage reported earnings aggressively to achieve 
earnings targets. In addition, the hands-off approach to corporate governance by 
institutional shareholders also provides more scope for the portfolio firm managers 
to manage their reported earnings. 
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2.3.1.3 Formal Hypotheses 
From the above, transient institutional investors are characterised as short-term 
oriented, impatient investors, who prefer current or near-term earnings to long-term 
earnings and prefer the "Wall Street Walk" when their portfolio firms are under-
performing (e.g., Black, 1998; Bushee, 1998, 2001; Pound and Shiller, 1987). In 
launching the SEC's effort to crack down on the practice of corporate earnings 
management, Mr. Arthur Levitt, the immediate past Chairman of the SEC, 
repeatedly points out an unforgiving culture of the Wall Street market punishing 
firms that fail to meet their earnings target. 29 In a Business Week Harris Poll of 400 
CEOs, 60% of the respondents cite institutional investors as a prime source of short-
term performance pressure (Nussbaum, 1987). As Fox (1997, 77) puts it, "...the 
simplest, most visible, most merciless measure of corporate success in the 1990s. has 
become this one: Did you make your earnings last quarter?" 
Consistent with these observations, Bushee (2001) finds that transient institutional 
investors' strong preference for near-term earnings translates into myopic mispricing 
by transient institutional investors. 30 Furthermore, Bushee (1998) finds that when 
transient institutional investors dominate portfolio firms' equity ownership, 
managers of these portfolio firms are more likely to cut R&D expenditure to bolster 
current year reporting earnings. Empirical evidence also supports a view that 
portfolio firm managers have incentives to avoid earnings decreases or losses, 
29 	Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999), Myers and Skinner (1999) and Burgsthaler and 
Dichev (1997) all find empirical evidence that managers have incentives to avoid earnings decreases. 
Consistent with these findings, this study assumes that firms' earnings targets will be at least the same 
level of earnings as prior year earnings. The next chapter further examines the relation between 
institutional ownership and discretionary accruals by conditioning portfolio firms' pre-managed 
earnings upon their earnings targets. 
30 	In particular, transient institutional investors are found to overweight near-term earnings 
potential while underweighting long-run value (Bushee, 2001). 
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especially when there is an established pattern of earnings growth/positive earnings 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Myers and Skinner, 1999). The market is also found 
to reward continual earnings growth and this premium reduces when the earnings 
string ends (Barth et al., 1999). Therefore, transient institutional investors' near-
term earnings preference and overvaluation of near-term earnings create incentives 
for portfolio firm managers to inflate current reported earnings, through income 
increasing discretionary accruals, to help meet or even better their earnings targets in 
order to avoid a potential off-loading of large blocks of their firms' stock by transient 
institutional investors. Consistent with this line of argument, transient institutional 
ownership is expected to be positively associated with income increasing 
discretionary accruals. 
Hl: Within portfolio firms with income increasing discretionary accruals, those 
firms with high levels of transient institutional ownership have LARGER 
income increasing discretionary accruals than other firms. 
However, an alternative scenario arises when portfolio firms face a "certain" 
prospect of falling short of their earnings targets. Under this scenario, traditional 
"big bath" arguments (e.g., Healy, 1985) would suggest that managers have 
incentives to maximise negative discretionary accruals when the portfolio firm is 
unlikely to achieve a specific earnings target via the available positive discretionary 
accruals. 31 This line of argument suggests that, when faced with a certain short-fall, 
managers of portfolio firms have strong incentives to write off as much negative 
discretionary accruals as possible and save current year positive discretionary 
31 	For example, Healy (1985), in the context of managerial bonus plan, argues that when a 
manager cannot achieve the lower bound of earnings level (where bonus will be paid out) through 
discretionary accruals, the manager has incentives to incur negative discretionary accruals to "save" 
up current year accruals for future years. 
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accruals for future periods, thereby creating the greatest possible amount of 
accounting slack for future periods. 
For portfolio firms with negative discretionary accruals, the incentives to incur 
income decreasing discretionary accruals are enhanced as transient institutional 
ownership increases. The anecdotal evidence on the "missing by a penny" scenario 
(e.g., Levitt's 1998 speeches) is that if a company can't find that "extra penny" to 
satisfy Wall Street, then the company must be in trouble, and since missing by a 
penny is going to significantly dampen the stock price, a portfolio firm is better off 
missing by "a dime or two and saving those earnings for the next quarter" (Fox, 
1997, 78). When transient institutional investors systematically off-load portfolio 
firms that under-perform (based on current earnings performance) regardless of the 
magnitude of the short-fall, then managers of portfolio firms have incentives tc-take 
a "big bath" whenever their earnings targets cannot be met through accruals 
management. Therefore, 
Hla: Within portfolio firms with income decreasing discretionary accruals, those 
firms with high levels of transient institutional ownership have LARGER 
income decreasing discretionary accruals than other firms. 
One assumption underlying this hypothesis is that all portfolio firms that engage in 
negative discretionary accruals fail to meet their earnings targets. However, 
portfolio firms can engage in negative discretionary accruals when they already 
outperform their earnings targets in order to save more current year accrual for future 
years consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis. Hence, the assumption is 
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relaxed in Chapter 3 discussions that more specifically examine the "big bath" and 
income smoothing hypotheses. 
2.3.2 Long-term oriented institutional investors' impact on earnings 
management 
This sub-section develops hypotheses concerning the relations between long-term 
oriented institutional investors and their portfolio firms' income increasing 
(decreasing) discretionary accruals. Section 2.3.2.1 examines the incentives for 
long-term oriented institutional investors' involvement in portfolio firms' corporate 
governance. It investigates how this involvement affects portfolio firm managers' 
earnings management discretion and incentives to manage reported earnings. 
Section 2.3.2.2 formalises the hypotheses predicting associations between long-term 
oriented institutional investors and income increasing (decreasing) discretionary 
accruals. 
2.3.2.1 Long-term oriented institutional investors' involvement in 
corporate governance and their impact on portfolio firm managers' 
earnings management 
As firms' share ownership becomes more concentrated among smaller numbers of 
institutional investors that are actively involved in their portfolio firms' governance, 
problems caused by the separation of ownership and control outlined in the previous 
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section are likely to be less prevalent. Recent studies investigating the effects of 
institutional ownership on earnings management behaviour of managers in various 
contexts suggest that institutional investors are not necessarily myopic (see e.g., 
Bushee, 1998; Majumdar and Nagarajan, 1997; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998). 
Bushee (1998) finds that, in general, institutional ownership reduces managerial 
incentives to manage earnings upward through R&D spending cuts while Majumdar 
and Nagarajan (1997) find evidence that the level of total institutional ownership in 
firms is associated positively with relatively higher spending on R&D and capital 
expenditures. In addition to finding a positive relationship between R&D 
expenditure and institutional ownership, Wahal and McConnell (1997) document a 
positive relation between expenditure for property, plant and equipment and 
institutional share ownership. Such relations are found to be robust to a variety of 
specifications, thus indicating that institutional shareholders encourage long-term 
investment by portfolio firm managers in property, plant and equipment and R&D. 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) also find that the presence of large outside 
blockholders (who own more than 5% of the equity) mitigates managerial incentives 
to report aggressively. Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998) find that institutional 
ownership, as a whole, is associated with a smaller magnitude of discretionary 
accruals, and with less income-increasing discretionary accruals. Combined, all 
these results support the view that institutional investors monitor their portfolio firms 
and their presence reduces the incidence of earnings management. 
High levels of monitoring by sophisticated, large long-term oriented institutional 
investors reduce managerial incentives for earnings management. As such, the 
presence of long-term institutional investment in a portfolio firm can constrain 
43 
managerial opportunistic behaviour as well as help enforce managerial behaviour 
that will enhance shareholder value and the long-term prospects of firms. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986, 1997) and Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) suggest that 
institutions have sufficient economic incentives to protect their significant stake in 
the portfolio firms by active monitoring. The large equity ownership stakes by 
institutional investors create a "simple but overwhelming economic incentive" for 
institutional investors to become informed and involved owners (Pound, 1992). 
Reasons for involvement by institutional investors in the corporate governance of 
their portfolio firms include the fact that as institutional shareholding grows, the exit 
option becomes more expensive since a large block sale generally entails large 
discounts (Black and Coffee, 1994; Coffee, 1991; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 
1998).32 Therefore, when the exit option is "...effectively blocked, dissatisfaction 
with a firm's performance must be expressed through voice" (Hawley, 1995, 420). 
Furthermore, given the large monetary value tied to these large shareholdings, 
institutional investors stand to lose more than investors with small shareholding 
stakes if they remain passive or choose to be less informed of their portfolio firms 
when their portfolio firms are under-performing. In Pound's words, 
"[t] he sheer size of this stake and the trading costs associated with 
selling make the institution "captive." For large investors, it is 
cheaper to become informed and attempt to change corporate 
policy than it is to sell." (Pound, 1992, 87). 
32 	The growth in equity ownership by institutional investors in the 1990s has increased the 
inelasticity of demand for large-volume sales of under-performing firms. The would-be institutional 
sellers are likely to find themselves offering the under-performing shareholdings to institutional 
would-be buyers whose portfolios and interests mirror one another, making meaningful sale unlikely 
(Hawley, 1995). Therefore, institutional investors are unlikely to be able to sell their under-
performing shareholding without depressing the market, thereby taking a loss. 
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Also, collective actions by institutions become less costly as share ownership 
concentrates on a smaller number of shareholders. Thus, incentives for group action 
increase as the group size decreases. The ability to form a small and relatively 
homogenous group of institutional investors can facilitate the monitoring process as 
well as sharing the monitoring costs among the group members, thus reducing the 
demand on individual institutional investors' limited financial resources. One 
avenue for such a coordinated exercise is through a third party monitoring 
organisation such as the Council of Institutional Investors (CII). Such organisations 
provide a forum for their members to share information and to jointly monitor their 
portfolio firms (Opler and Sokobin, 1995). 33 Relative to individual investors, 
institutional investors have economies of scale in information gathering and analysis 
as well as the needed skills to engage in corporate governance actions (Black, 1992). 
The growth in index funds, which rules out the sale of shares as a response to poor 
share performance, has encouraged institutions to follow buy and hold strategies. 34 
Buy and hold strategies can motivate institutions to take a more active role in 
corporate governance (Carleton et al, 1998; Pozen, 1994; Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam, 1998; Wahal, 1996). 35 
Recent institutional investor involvement in portfolio firms' corporate governance 
has been seen as a natural response to the decline in the takeover market and the rise 
33 	Opler and Sokobin (1995) find that "behind closed doors" governance activities coordinated 
by the Council of Institutional Investors improve target firms' operating and stock market 
vrformance. 
Pozen (1994) argues that the "Wall Street Walk" is not a viable option for institutional 
investors employing a passive indexed strategy due to the size of their shareholdings. 
35 In contrast, Bushee (1997) argues that buy and hold strategies exacerbate managerial myopia 
because the institutional investors' passive and fragmented ownership causes them to gather little 
information on the portfolio firms and provides little incentives to monitor managers of the portfolio 
firms. However, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) find that heavily indexed funds (e.g., CalPERS, 
CalSTRS, and NYC) do engage in monitoring actions even though their activism strategies differ 
from funds adopting different types of investment strategies. Stapledon (1996b) provides further 
discussion on the effects of indexing or buy and hold strategies on institutional investor incentives to 
monitor. 
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of informed institutional investors (Pound, 1992). 36 Black (1992) and Pound (1992) 
argue that institutional investor activism is an evolution from the market- and 
transaction-based model of corporate governance (as characterised by hostile 
takeovers) to the political-based model (as characterised by relationship investment). 
This political model of corporate governance is more flexible in addressing specific 
issues, far less expensive than hostile takeovers, and it focuses on the long-term 
interest of the target firms (Pound, 1992). 37 In addition to the highly publicised 
proxy contests, ample evidence exists to indicate that institutional investors engage 
in "behind closed door" negotiation and monitoring of their portfolio firms (e.g., 
Carleton et al, 1998; Opler and Sokobin, 1995; and Smith, 1996). This suggests that 
institutional investors are not "functionally fixated" on their portfolio firms' current 
earnings performance in their investment decisions. Hand (1990), Utama and 
Cready (1997), El-Gazzar (1998) and Bartov, Radhalcrishnan and Krinsky (2000), 
among others, use institutional ownership as a proxy for the type of sophisticated 
investor that would not be 'functionally fixated' on earnings. Furthermore, Bushee 
(2001) finds that only transient institutional investors exhibit a preference for near-
term earnings but not long-term oriented institutional investors. 
All the above arguments indicate that long-term oriented institutional investors 
engage in relationship investment with a commitment to provide long-term capital 
(Dobrzynslci, 1993; Porter, 1992). Accordingly, through their involvement with 
portfolio firms' governance and their monitoring activities, long-term oriented 
institutional investors are likely to set boundaries on portfolio firm managers' 
36 	Examples of institutional activisms can be found in Carleton et al. (1998) study on TIAA- 
CREF, Smith (1996) study on CalPERS, among others. 
37 	In contrast, the market-based model generally involves drastic measures at high costs, and 
disruptive changes. It is often viewed with suspicion and subject to retaliation from the management 
and/or political retaliation in the form of antitakeover legislation (Pound, 1992; Wahal, 1996). 
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accruals discretion such that the levels of discretion exercised by managers within 
those boundaries are acceptable to the long-term oriented investors, and the investors 
do not need to incur costs to unravel the discretion in addition to the monitoring 
costs already incurred.38 Thus, long-term oriented institutional investors limit the 
accruals discretion available to portfolio firm managers and serve to constrain 
portfolio firm managers from managing earnings (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 
1998; Cheng and Reitenga, 2000). 39 
Schipper (1989, 98) argues that Icloncentrated user groups with substantial 
financial sophistication, material sums at stake, and no contractual friction to inhibit 
their behaviour are, for example, likely candidates for undoing earnings 
management." Bushee (1998) argues that given the size of institutional investors' 
investments and their use of buy-side analysts, institutional investors could be one of 
these concentrated user groups and serve to reduce managerial incentives for 
managing earnings to meet short-term earnings targets. Moreover, El-Gazzar (1998) 
finds that institutions have incentives to search for predisclosure information and are 
able to incorporate such information into share prices prior to firms' earnings 
announcements. He also finds that the greater the institutional ownership, the less 
information is contained in the earnings announcements. This evidence indicates 
that information asymmetry between institutional shareholders and managers of the 
38 	Long-term oriented institutional investors' involvement in limiting accruals discretion may 
be motivated by their desire to prevent misrepresentation of their portfolio firms' financial affairs. 
39 	Furthermore, according to this view of institutional investors as sophisticated long-term 
shareholders, long-term oriented institutional investors' presence does not provide specific incentives 
for portfolio firm managers to adopt an aggressive earnings management strategy in contrast to 
transient institutional investors. It is noted that it can be argued that long-term oriented institutional 
ownership may create incentives for portfolio firm managers to manage earnings in a particular 
manner, within the limited discretion available to the portfolio firm managers, to achieve certain 
objectives such as income smoothing. However, such incentives are likely to exist under specific 
circumstances which are investigated further in Chapter 3. This section focuses on the overarching 
effects of long-term institutional investors on portfolio firm managers' accrual discretions. 
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portfolio firms is reduced as institutional ownership increases. It suggests that 
institutional investors are likely to be informed investors. 
While examining how the presence of information asymmetry affects management 
incentives to manage earnings, Richardson (1998) finds that as the level of 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders increases, firms are 
more likely to manage accruals. Taken together, the findings in El-Gazzar (1998) 
and Richardson (1998) suggest that as long-term oriented institutional ownership in a 
firm increases, information asymmetry between management and shareholders 
decreases and portfolio firms are less likely to manage earnings to meet short-term 
earnings performance targets. This, in conjunction with long-term oriented 
institutional investors' involvement in portfolio firms, suggests that their presence 
reduces the likelihood of earnings management by their portfolio firm managers 
(Bushee, 1998; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998; Cheng and Reitenga, 2000). 
2.3.2.2 Formal Hypotheses 
The above discussions imply that long-term oriented institutional investors are likely 
to have a good understanding of the operating environment of their portfolio firms. 
Furthermore, they do not exhibit a preference for near-term earnings, as do transient 
institutional investors (Bushee, 2001). Therefore, they are less likely to penalise 
portfolio firms solely on the basis of under-performing current earnings which are 
not a result of poor management. Through their monitoring activities, long-term 
oriented institutional investors are likely to restrict the earnings management 
discretion available to portfolio firm managers and are unlikely to exert pressure for 
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managers of portfolio firms to aggressively manage discretionary accruals to meet 
short-term earnings targets (e.g., Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998). 
If long-term institutional ownership constrains portfolio firm managers' earnings 
management discretion, then for portfolio firms that engaged in income-increasing 
discretionary accruals, long-term oriented institutional ownership is expected to 
negatively associate with discretionary accruals. On the other hand, for portfolio 
firms that engaged in income-decreasing discretionary accruals, a positive 
association between long-term oriented institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals is expected.4° Formally, 
40 	In a similar study, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998) find that institutional ownership, as a 
whole, is negatively associated with income increasing discretionary accruals (i.e., positive 
discretionary accruals) after controlling for other factors affecting discretionary accruals. This is-
consistent with long-term oriented institutional investors limiting managerial acctual discretion as 
predicted by this study (H2). In addition, they also find a negative relation between institutional 
ownership, as a whole, and income decreasing discretionary accruals (i.e., negative discretionary 
accruals). They conclude that these results are inconsistent with the transient institutional investor 
arguments. An alternative interpretation of this result is that long-term oriented institutional investors 
create incentives for managers of portfolio firms to engage in overtly conservative accruals 
management through their monitoring activities. This thesis refers to such conservative accruals 
management as "reverse" myopic behaviour because it involves managers of portfolio firms focusing 
on managing reported earnings over a short-term via discretionary accruals. Conservative accruals 
management in this study refers to the adoption of less income increasing or more income decreasing 
discretionary accruals strategy than otherwise. This is consistent with the conservatism concept 
stipulated by Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) 2 (FASB, 1980) and Basu (1997). 
The difference between "reverse" myopia and myopia in its traditional form is that the former 
involves managing earnings downwards whilst the latter involves managing earnings upwards. 
As argued above, long-term oriented institutional investors are expected to constrain 
portfolio firm managers' discretion over accruals management. As such, a positive relation between 
long-term oriented institutional ownership and income decreasing discretionary accruals is expected 
(H2a). Therefore, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998) findings are not strictly consistent with the 
long-term oriented institutional investor argument. Given that they did not distinguish between the 
different types of institutional ownership, it is difficult to reach an unambiguous interpretation of their 
findings. For example, the negative relation between institutional ownership, as a whole, and income 
decreasing discretionary -accruals can be interpreted as either consistent with "big bath" behaviour 
induced by transient institutional ownership or consistent with long-term oriented institutional 
ownership inducing a "reverse" myopic behaviour on portfolio firm managers' part, or a combination 
of both. It should be noted that it is difficult to distinguish between "big bath" and "reverse" myopia 
behaviour as they both yield the similar outcome. Further examination of this potential influence of 
long-term oriented institutional investors is conducted in the next chapter. 
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H2: Within portfolio firms with income increasing discretionary accruals, those 
firms with high levels of long-term oriented institutional ownership have 
SMALLER income increasing discretionary accruals than other firms. 
H2a: Within portfolio firms with income decreasing discretionary accruals, those 
firms with high levels of long-term oriented institutional ownership have 
SMALLER income decreasing discretionary accruals than other firms. 
It can be argued that even though an overarching effect of long-term oriented 
institutional investors is to restrict portfolio firm managers' accrual discretion, it is 
possible that their presence can create incentives for portfolio firm managers to 
manage earnings, within the limited accruals discretion available to portfolio firm 
managers, over multiple periods (e.g., via income smoothing). Such a multiple 
period earnings management strategy would be consistent with the long-term 
orientation of long-term oriented institutional investors. However, any theory 
relating to long-term institutional investors and income smoothing behaviour 
requires specific reference to an earnings target. Given that the hypothesis 
development in this section examines only the relation between long-term oriented 
institutional ownership and income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals 
without specifically conditioning upon an earnings target, it does not address issues 
relating to income smoothing behaviour. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 in Chapter 3 
specifically investigate the potential income smoothing incentives created by long-
term oriented institutional investors. 
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2.4 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter discusses the relation between institutional investors and earnings 
management by first examining the relation between institutional investors and 
corporate governance. Then the effects of each of two types of institutional investor 
(transient versus long-term oriented) on portfolio firms' earnings management 
behaviour are discussed in detail. In particular, hypotheses are developed to predict 
the relation between the types of institutional ownership (transient versus long-term 
oriented) and (a) income increasing discretionary accruals; and (b) income 
decreasing discretionary accruals. 
Transient institutional investors are argued to create incentives for managers of 
portfolio firms to focus on short-term performance and for these managers to manage 
their current earnings to meet short-term earnings targets. Specifically, transient 
institutional ownership is predicted to be (a) positively associated with income 
increasing discretionary accruals to maximise current year reported earnings; and (b) 
negatively associated with income decreasing discretionary accruals, thereby 
creating accounting slack for future periods. 
In contrast, long-term oriented institutional investors do not myopically focus on 
portfolio firm' current earnings performance. Rather, they invest to benefit from the 
long-term prospects of their portfolio firms and are active in monitoring their 
portfolio firms. This long-term orientation and active involvement suggest that the 
presence of long-term oriented institutional investors constrains managerial earnings 
management discretion. As such, long-term oriented institutional ownership is 
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expected be negatively (positively) associated with income increasing (decreasing) 
discretionary accruals. 
The next chapter extends the analysis and hypotheses developed in this chapter. In 
particular, the effects of the two institutional ownership types on discretionary 
accruals are examined with reference to a common earnings target identified by the 
extant literature. Comparing portfolio firms' pre-managed earnings with their 
earnings targets enables less ambiguous predictions in relation to the effects of 
institutional ownership on accruals management. 
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3 Influence of Institutional Investor Type on Earnings 
Management: Effects of Earnings Targets 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the Chapter 2 analysis of the relations between different types 
of institutional ownership and portfolio firms' income increasing and income 
decreasing discretionary accruals. In particular, this chapter investigates how 
different types of institutional investors are associated with portfolio firm managers' 
incentives for accruals management, conditional upon the portfolio firms' earnings 
targets. Such consideration enables more refined predictions than those proposed in 
Chapter 2. Also, it provides a better understanding of the effects of different types of 
institutional investors on portfolio firms' earnings management behaviour under 
specific circumstances. The analysis acknowledges and incorporates considerations 
such as (a) firms' pre-managed earnings relative to their earnings targets and their 
capacity to achieve those targets; 41 (b) the heterogeneity of institutional investors; (c) 
the potential diversity of the effects of different types of institutional ownership on 
accruals management. Given that no known study explicitly treats earnings targets 
as a factor affecting the relation between institutional ownership types and accruals 
management, and earnings management in genera1,42 this thesis extends the current 
understanding of the relation between institutional ownership types and accruals 
management by portfolio firm managers. 
41 	The term "capacity" is used to refer to discretionary accruals available to managers of 
portfolio firms as constrained by factors such as existing business operations. 
42 	Bushee (1998) is the only known study that explicitly investigates the relation between 
institutional ownership types and earnings management. Bushee (1998) investigates the relation 
between institutional ownership types and earnings management through real investment decisions, 
viz., R&D expenditure, rather than accruals management. 
53 
While Chapter 2 provides a general understanding of the relations between types of 
institutional investors and income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals, this 
chapter provides a more specific understanding of the relations between types of 
institutional investors and discretionary accruals management. For example, while 
Chapter 2 predicts an overarching constraining effect of long-term oriented 
institutional investors on portfolio firm managers' accruals discretion, Chapter 3 
examines whether long-term oriented institutional investors create incentives for 
portfolio firm managers to manage earnings, within the limited accruals discretion 
available to them. 
Section 3.2 discusses recent evidence on the importance and effects of earnings 
targets on firm managers' earnings management incentives. This section then 
classifies portfolio firms into three categories, namely "reversible decline", 
"irreversible decline" and "increased", according to the relative position of their 
earnings targets and pre-and post-managed earnings. 43 The effects of different types 
of institutional ownership on portfolio firms' discretionary accruals are then analysed 
within each of these categories in three separate sections. In particular, Section 3.3 
provides a closer examination of transient and long-term oriented institutional 
investor arguments underpinning hypotheses 1 and 2 (detailed in Chapter 2) using 
"reversible decline" firms. Section 3.4 discusses the characteristics of the 
"irreversible decline" and "increased" firm classifications that enable a close 
examination of income smoothing behaviour among these firms. Section 3.5 
investigates the "big bath" ("reverse" myopia) versus income smoothing incentives 
43 	"Reversible decline" category includes portfolio firms with pre-managed earnings less than 
their earnings targets but achieve post-managed earnings greater than their earnings targets through 
positive discretionary accruals. "Irreversible declines" category encompasses portfolio firms with 
both pre- and post-managed earnings less than their earnings targets. Finally, portfolio firms with 
pre-managed earnings greater than their earnings targets are included in the "increased" category. 
See Section 3.2 below for detail discussions of the classification. 
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of transient (long-term oriented) institutional investors among "irreversible decline" 
firms. Section 3.6 examines the accruals management incentives created by the two 
types of institutional investors among "increased" firms. Income smoothing 
incentives are also examined in Section 3.6 among "increased" firms that also 
reported an increase in current year reported earnings. Finally, Section 3.7 
summarises and concludes this chapter. 
3.2 Earnings targets 
Recent research by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) finds 
that small declines in reported earnings are unusually rare while small increases in 
reported earnings are unusually common. Their evidence suggests that managers 
have incentives to avoid earnings decreases. Furthermore, incentives to avoid 
earnings decreases are higher when there is an established pattern of earnings 
growth/positive earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). In addition, Barth et al. 
(1999) find that, ceteris paribus, firms reporting continuous growth in annual 
earnings (a) are priced at a premium relative to other firms; (b) this premium 
increases with the length of the earnings growth string; and (c) the premium reduces 
when the earnings growth string ends. Degeorge et al. (1999) also find empirical 
evidence supporting a hierarchical ranking of earnings targets, whereby sustaining 
the prior year earnings level is more important than meeting analysts' consensus 
earnings forecasts. Furthermore, Murphy (1999), while examining actual 
compensation contracts, notes that prior year earnings are explicitly included as one 
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of the performance measures in compensation contracts." Based on the findings of 
these studies, this thesis assumes that the prior year earnings level represents the 
main earnings targets of portfolio firm managers. 45 ' 46 
This study also recognises that not all portfolio firm managers have both the 
incentives and capacity to manage earnings in their intended manner. For example, a 
manager who wishes to manage reported earnings upwards to avoid earnings 
decreases might not have sufficient positive discretionary accruals available to 
achieve the intended earnings outcome. 47 To address this concern and to specifically 
take into consideration firms' earnings targets, three specific sub-categories of 
portfolio firms are created. These sub-categories are based on the portfolio firms' 
current year non-discretionary earnings (NDE) relative to the prior year reported 
earnings (earnings target). 48 This categorisation technique based on firms' distance 
from their earnings targets is consistent with Baber, Fairfield and Haggard (1991). 
The first category includes those firms with current year non-discretionary earnings 
less than prior year reported earnings but which achieved an increase in current year 
44 	However, Murphy (1999) makes no reference to analyst forecasts as one of the performance 
measures explicitly stated in compensation contracts. 
45 	Sustaining prior year reported earnings levels and/or avoiding earnings decreases implies 
that prior year earnings levels are generally the lower bound of firms' earnings targets. If the sample 
firms have earnings targets higher than the last year's earnings level, then using prior year earnings as 
the earnings target will bias against the predictions for all three partitions of sample firms discussed 
later in the text, namely "reversible decline", "irreversible decline" and "increased". 
46 	This study uses earnings deflated by total assets in favour of earnings per share (EPS) to 
ensure consistency in scaling with accruals that are deflated by total assets rather than total shares 
outstanding. Furthermore, Myers and Skinner (1999) find evidence that managers manage shares 
outstanding (i.e., the denominator of EPS) in addition to earnings (i.e., the numerator of EPS) to 
increase EPS. The main assumption underlying Myers and Skinner (1999) arguments is that 
managers have stronger incentives to report increases in EPS than increases in earnings. Given that 
this study focuses only on earnings management via reported earnings, by using earnings scaled by 
total assets, it avoids confounding any potential effects of earnings management via shares 
outstanding to improve EPS (as found in Myers and Skinner, 1999). A limitation of not using EPS is 
that any systematic earnings management via shares outstanding will not be captured by this study. 
47 	Insufficient positive discretionary accruals may be due to the firm's business operations 
during that period or due to close monitoring that restricts managers' accruals discretion. 
48 	Non-discretionary earnings (NDE) are non-discretionary with respect to accruals 
management only. That is, non-discretionary earnings are derived by excluding the estimated 
discretionary accruals (estimated through the cross-sectional version of modified Jones model) from 
current year reported earnings. See Chapter 5 for further detail on discretionary accruals estimation. 
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reported earnings via positive discretionary accruals. Firms within this category are 
referred to as "reversible decline" firms (RD). 49 The second category consists of 
firms whose current year non-discretionary earnings are below the prior year's 
reported earnings but by an amount that is NOT fully reversed by the current year's 
estimated discretionary accruals. 5° These firms are referred to as "irreversible 
decline" firms (ID). 51 Finally, firms with current year non-discretionary earnings 
greater than prior year earnings are included in the category labelled "increased" 
firms (IN). 
The above categorisations provide unique classifications to specifically examine and 
test the existence of various incentives created by different types of institutional 
investors for portfolio firms' accruals management decisions. For example, a 
significant positive relation between transient institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals among the "reversible decline" (RD) firms would provide 
strong support for arguments that transient institutional ownership creates incentives 
for portfolio firm managers to aggressively manage their accruals. In contrast, a 
significant negative relation between long-term oriented institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals by the "reversible decline" (RD) firms would strongly support 
the overarching constraining effects of long-term oriented institutional investors. 
The "irreversible decline" (ID) firms provide unique circumstances to test (a) the 
"big bath" versus income smoothing incentives provided by transient institutional 
investors, and (b) the "reverse" myopic versus income smoothing incentives 
provided by long-term oriented institutional investors. Finally, the "increased" (IN) 
49 	By definition, all firms within the "reversible decline" category engaged in positive 
discretionary accruals. 
50 	By definition, these "irreversible decline" firms failed to meet their earnings targets, viz., 
prior year's reported earnings, after accruals management. 
51 	The term "irreversible" used here only implies the decline is not reversible by using positive 
discretionary accruals alone. 
57 
firms with an increase in current year earnings enable more specific tests for income 
smoothing effects of both types of institutional ownership. 
3.3 Institutional ownership type effects on discretionary accruals amongst 
"reversible decline" firms 
As mentioned, prior research provides empirical evidence suggesting that managers 
have strong incentives to avoid unnecessary earnings decreases (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Barth, et al., 1999; Degeorge et al., 1999; Myers and Skinner, 1999; 
Matsunaga and Park, 2000) but not all portfolio firm managers have both the 
incentives and capacity to manage their earnings to achieve their intended earnings 
outcomes. "Reversible decline" (RD) firms are firms with pre-managed earnings 
below the prior year's earnings levels (earnings- targets) and which exercise their 
accruals discretion to achieve their earnings targets. Their post-managed earnings 
are greater than the prior year's earnings levels. 
If transient institutional investors create incentives for portfolio firm managers to 
adopt aggressive myopic earnings management strategies to meet earnings targets, 
then it is likely that such incentives for portfolio firm managers to avoid earnings 
decreases will be greatest among firms that can exercise their accruals discretion to 
achieve an increase in reported earnings, such as "reversible decline" firms (Bushee, 
1998). Furthermore, "reversible decline" firms have the capacity to meet their 
earnings targets via accruals management. Therefore, the presence of both the 
incentives (created by transient institutional investors) and capacity for managers of 
portfolio firms to at least maintain prior year earnings levels allows closer 
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examination of the transient institutional investor argument underpinning hypothesis 
I detailed in Chapter 2. Within the sub-sample of "reversible decline" firms, a 
positive relation between transient institutional ownership and portfolio firms' 
discretionary accruals would provide evidence strongly supporting the view that 
transient institutional investors encourage myopic behaviour among portfolio firm 
managers. 
H3: Transient institutional ownership in "reversible decline" firms is 
POSITIVELY associated with these portfolio firms' discretionary accruals. 
Consistent with the analysis in Chapter 2, long-term oriented institutional investors 
are institutional investors who are informed, involved and interested in the long-term 
prospects of the portfolio firms. They are not functionally fixated on the current 
earnings performance of the portfolio firms. As posited in Chapter 2, long-term 
oriented institutional investors, through their involvement in the portfolio firms, 
serve to restrict portfolio firm managers' earnings management discretion. Given 
that "reversible decline" firms exercise their accruals discretion to meet their 
earnings targets, strong support for the argument that long-term oriented institutional 
investors effectively constrain managerial earnings management discretion can be 
established if long-term oriented institutional ownership is significantly negatively 
related to "reversible decline" firms' discretionary accruals. 
H4: Long-term oriented institutional ownership in "reversible decline" firms is 
NEGATIVELY associated with these portfolio firms' discretionary accruals. 
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3.4 Characteristics of the "irreversible decline" and "increased" firm 
classifications with respect to income smoothing 
This section discusses some of the characteristics inherent within the "irreversible 
decline" and "increased" firm classifications that render these firms suitable for 
examining income smoothing behaviour. The characteristics allow stronger 
conclusions to be drawn in relation to whether either of the institutional ownership 
types is associated with income smoothing or other competing hypotheses. 
Within the extant income smoothing literature, a firm is said to be smoothing income 
if the firm's post-managed earnings is closer to its pre-determined earnings targets 
than pre-managed earnings (e.g., Ronen and Sadan, 1981; Moses, 1987; Godfrey and 
Jones, 1999; Carlson and Bathala, 1997) regardless of whether the post-managed 
earnings exceed or fall below the earnings targets. However, recent research on 
earnings targets has shown that the relative position of post-managed earnings levels 
to earnings targets matters. In particular, this research finds that (a) the number of 
firms that just meet their prior year's earnings is unusually large compared to firms 
that just fall short of their prior year's earnings (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Degeorge et al., 1999); (b) the capital market rewards firms with continuous growth 
in earnings and punishes them when the growth is broken (e.g., Barth et al., 1999; 
Levitt, 1998);52 and (c) managers suffer a reduction in compensation of 
approximately 6.8% of their salary when they fail to meet prior year earnings levels 
(Matsunaga and Park, 2000). 
52 	The severity of these costs is best illustrate by Fox's (1997, 77) comment, "...the simplest, 
most visible, most merciless measure of corporate success in the 1990s has become this one: Did you 
make your earnings last quarter?" Levitt's (1998) concerns in initiating the SEC crack down on 
corporate earnings management are that firms seem to be able to meet their earnings targets 
continually, and for those that are unable to do so, the capital market will severely punish the firm 
value. 
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Incorporation of the recent development in capital market incentives studies into 
existing income smoothing literature emphasises that, for two subsets of firms that 
manage earnings towards their earnings targets, incentives can no longer be 
unambiguously attributed to income smoothing incentives. The first subset involves 
firms with pre-managed earnings below their earnings targets and with subsequently 
reported earnings levels equal to or greater than their earnings targets. For this 
subset of income smoothers, incentives to manage reported earnings can be 
attributed to income smoothing incentives and/or incentives to meet or beat their 
earnings targets. 53 Therefore, the earnings management strategy of these firms 
cannot be unambiguously attributed to income smoothing incentives. 
Income smoothing tests that exclude the above subset of firms would incorporate the 
capital market incentives for firm managers to manage earnings, and are likely to 
represent more powerful tests than the existing income smoothing methodology. 
"Irreversible decline" firms possess these characteristics as they include only 
portfolio firms with both pre- and post-managed earnings below earnings targets. 
The second subset of firms comprises those firms with pre-managed earnings 
greater than their earnings targets but with post-managed earnings below their 
earnings targets. This second subset of income smoothers is unlikely to achieve the 
objective of reporting smoother income streams to improve firm value (Ronen and 
Sadan, 1981) given the loss of firm value associated with missing earnings targets 
53 	Although existing studies such as Barth et al. (1999), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), 
Degeorge etal. (1999) and Myers and Skinner (1999) may suggest the latter incentives are likely to 
dominate managers' incentives, it remains an empirical issue as to which incentive dominates. 
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(e.g., Barth at al., 1999). Therefore, it is arguable whether income smoothing 
incentives drive these firm managers' earnings management decisions. 54 
Once again, income smoothing tests that exclude firms that managed their earnings 
downwards to the extent that they miss their earnings targets incorporate the capital 
market incentives literature, and are likely to represent more powerful tests than the 
existing income smoothing methodology. When income smoothing behaviour is 
examined within "increased" firms with an increase in current year earnings (i.e., 
pre- and post-managed earnings greater than earnings targets), then it excludes firms 
that manage their earnings downwards such that they miss their earnings targets. 
Examining institutional investor type effects on accruals management within 
"increased" firms with an increase in current year earnings thus incorporates both the 
capital market incentives literature and the income smoothing literature. 
From the above, "irreversible decline" firms and "increased" firms with an increase 
in current year reported earnings possess characteristics that increase the test power 
of the income smoothing hypothesis against competing hypotheses. Consequently, 
stronger conclusions can be drawn with respect to whether either of the institutional 
ownership types is associated with income smoothing behaviour. 
54 	Recent developments in the capital market incentives literature focus on (1) the incentives 
for firm managers to meet or beat their earnings targets; (2) the capital market reward for meeting or 
beating earnings targets; and (3) the associated costs of missing earnings targets (see e.g., Barth et al. 
(1999), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge et al. (1999) Matsunaga and Park (2000), and 
Myers and Skinner (1999)). However, there is no known study investigating the reasons and 
incentives for firm managers to manage earnings downward such that they miss their earnings targets. 
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3.5 Institutional ownership type effects on discretionary accruals amongst 
"irreversible decline" firms 
In contrast to "reversible decline" firms, "irreversible decline" (ID) portfolio firms 
are firms with current year non-discretionary earnings (NDE) below prior year 
reported earnings but which do not achieve an increase in current year reported 
earnings via discretionary accruals alone. That is, "irreversible decline" portfolio 
firms are those firms that failed to avoid earnings decreases (i.e., failed to meet their 
earnings targets) after exercising their accrual discretion, either income increasing or 
income decreasing discretionary accruals. 
An implicit assumption underpinning hypothesis la about the relation between 
transient institutional ownership and income decreasing discretionary accruals is that 
all portfolio firms that engage in income decreasing discretionary accruals failed to 
meet their earnings target. By focusing on "irreversible decline" portfolio firms, this 
section no longer assumes that all portfolio firms with income decreasing 
discretionary accruals fail to meet their earnings targets. This section extends and 
refines the previous analysis by focusing solely on portfolio firms that fail to meet 
their earnings targets, viz, prior year reported earnings. This enables a more accurate 
examination of "big bath" and "reverse" myopic effects of transient and long-term 
oriented institutional ownership, respectively. Income smoothing effects compete 
with both the "big bath" and "reverse" myopic effects. Therefore, examining "big 
bath" and "reverse" myopic effects of transient and long-term oriented institutional 
ownership, respectively, concurrently examines the income smoothing effects of 
both transient and long-term oriented institutional ownership. 
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Furthermore, examining the effects of long-term oriented institutional investors on 
portfolio firms' discretionary accruals within the "irreversible decline" classification 
enables investigation of the portfolio firms' accruals management incentives created 
by long-term institutional investors, within the limited accruals discretion available 
to portfolio firm managers. 
3.5.1 "Big bath" effects of transitory institutional investment? 
Since "irreversible decline" firms can engage in either income increasing or income 
decreasing discretionary accruals, 55 they allow closer examination of which of the 
competing earnings management incentives (namely "big bath" versus income 
smoothing incentives) are created by transient inst4utional investors among portfolio 
firm managers. The "big bath" argument predicts that firms minimise reported 
earnings when they cannot meet their earnings targets (e.g., Healy, 1985; Fox, 1997; 
Loomis, 1999). Therefore, "irreversible decline" firms can take a bath in the current 
year to save current year accruals for future year(s). By taking a bath in the current 
year, a firm is likely to achieve two things. First, it can reset the earnings target for 
future years, leading to lower earnings targets for future years. Second, by delaying 
current year positive accruals into future years while moving forward future year 
negative accruals into the current year, a firm has more (less) positive (negative) 
accruals available in the future years, making it easier to meet its future earnings 
targets. 
55 	It should be noted that the "irreversible decline" categorisation includes both firms that incur 
positive or negative discretionary accruals, thus it differs from the treatment adopted in developing 
hypothesis la as per Section 2.3.1. 
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Based on the transient institutional investor argument, the big bath strategy is a 
feasible option for "irreversible decline" firms. When transient institutional investors 
systematically sell off their shareholdings in under-performing firms (based on their 
current earnings performance) regardless of the magnitude of the short-fall, then 
managers of portfolio firms have incentives to take a bath whenever their earnings 
targets cannot be met through accruals management. This is consistent with the 
unforgiving culture of capital markets punishing firms that fail to meet their earnings 
targets (e.g., Fox, 1997, Levitt, 1998, Loomis, 1999). By virtue of portfolio firms' 
failure to meet their earnings targets, transient institutional investors would off-load 
shareholdings in these portfolio firms, with the associated consequences as detailed 
in the preceding chapter. The presence of transient institutional investors among 
"irreversible decline" portfolio firms is expected to further enhance the incentives for 
managers of these firms to take a bath. As such, within "irreversible decline" firms, 
a negative association between transient institutional owner -ship and discretionary 
accruals is expected. 
It may be argued that even though portfolio firms are unable to meet their earnings 
targets, their managers still have incentives to incur positive discretionary accruals in 
order to be as close to the target as possible to minimise the negative effects of 
failing to meet their earnings targets. This income smoothing argument implies 
findings similar to those found by Gayer, Gayer and Austin (1995). 56 The practice of 
income smoothing among public firms is common and has even been proclaimed by 
a prominent FORTUNE 500 CEO as "the number 1 job of management" (Loomis, 
56 	In particular, Gayer et al. (1995) find that managers select income increasing discretionary 
accruals when their non-discretionary earnings fall below the lower bound of their bonus plans. They 
attribute this result as being consistent with income smoothing. This is in contrast to Healy (1985) 
who finds managers select income decreasing accruals under the same environment, as predicted by 
"big bath" arguments. 
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1999). The income smoothing hypothesis would predict a positive relation between 
transient institutional ownership and discretionary accruals of "irreversible decline" 
firms,57 in direct contrast to the "big bath" prediction above. 
Given the anecdotal evidence of the negative market sentiments attached to missing 
earnings targets (see e.g., Levitt, 1998; Fox, 1997), and consistent with the "big 
bath" arguments, this study expects that: 
H5: Transient institutional ownership in "irreversible decline" firms is 
NEGATIVELY associated with these portfolio firms' discretionary accruals. 
3.5.2 "Reverse" myopia: undesirable effects of long-term oriented institutional 
ownership? 
Examination of the association between long-term oriented institutional ownership 
and "irreversible decline" firms' discretionary accruals enables investigations of 
whether long-term oriented institutional investors create incentives for portfolio firm 
managers to manage accruals, within the accruals discretion available to portfolio 
finn managers. 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998) find that institutional ownership, as a whole, is 
associated with more income decreasing discretionary accruals (i.e., negative 
discretionary accruals) after controlling for other factors affecting discretionary 
57 
	
Income smoothing behaviour is further investigated in Section 3.6.1. 
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accruals. 58 They conclude that these results are inconsistent with the transient 
institutional investor arguments. An alternative interpretation of this finding is that 
institutional investors, as a whole, create incentives for managers of portfolio firms 
to engage in overtly conservative accruals management akin to the "big bath" effect, 
through their monitoring activities. 59 However, given that Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (1998) did not distinguish between the different types of institutional 
ownership, it is difficult to reach an unambiguous interpretation of their findings. 
For example, institutional ownership, as a whole, associated with more income 
decreasing discretionary accruals can be interpreted as either consistent with "big 
bath" behaviour induced by transient institutional ownership or consistent with long-
term oriented institutional ownership inducing a conservative accruals management 
behaviour ("reverse" myopia) on portfolio firm managers' part, or a combination of 
both. 
Furthermore, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998) also find that institutional 
ownership, as a whole, is negatively associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. These two findings of Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998) 
indicate that long-term oriented institutional investors may have different influences 
58 	This negative association between institutional ownership as a whole and income decreasing 
discretionary accruals is not found by this study (see Table 6.5). The differences might be due to the 
different sample periods of the two studies. In particular, the sample periods of Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (1998) span from 1989 to 1995 inclusive. In contrast, the sample periods of this study 
are from 1995 to 1998 inclusive. Thus, the two studies only overlapped in 1995. Furthermore, this 
study's sample excludes loss-making firms which are more likely to have income decreasing 
discretionary accruals. 
59 	This study refers to such conservative accruals management as "reverse" myopic behaviour 
because it involves managers of portfolio firms focusing on managing reported earnings over a short-
term via discretionary accruals. Conservative accruals management in this study refers to the 
adoption of less income increasing or more income decreasing discretionary accruals strategy than 
otherwise. This is consistent with the conservatism concept stipulated by Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No.2 (FASB, 1980) and Basu (1997). The difference between 
"reverse" myopia and myopia in its traditional form is that the former involves managing earnings 
downwards whilst the latter involves managing earnings upwards. Given that "big bath" and 
"reverse" myopia both lead to the same outcome, this study does not attempt to distinguish the two 
hypotheses. "Reverse" myopia in this case can also be seen as a conservative bias. 
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on their portfolio firms' earnings management under different circumstances. Under 
general circumstances, long-term oriented institutional ownership can have an 
overarching effect of reducing managerial discretion over accruals management, 
through their monitoring activities (see hypotheses 2 and 2a, and Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (1998)). However, long-term oriented institutional ownership may 
also lead to a different accruals management strategy, exercised within limited 
discretion, adopted by portfolio firms under specific circumstances. 
The fact that "irreversible decline" firms include firms that engage in both income 
increasing and income decreasing discretionary accruals enables an examination of 
other effects of long-term oriented institutional investors on portfolio firms' earnings 
management strategies in addition to the overarching effects of long-term oriented 
institutional investors in constraining portfolio firms' earnings management as 
predicted in the preceding chapter. Examining the association of long-term oriented 
institutional ownership with "irreversible decline" firms can help to isolate situations 
where incidents of "reverse" myopic behaviour among portfolio firms might occur, 
thus providing greater insight into the results found by Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
(1998). 
"Reverse" myopia is inconsistent with the argument that long-term oriented 
institutional investors constrain managerial earnings management as posited by the 
existing literature (e.g., Black, 1992; Bushee, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
There is no known theory that explains or predicts the association between "reverse" 
myopic behaviour and long-term oriented institutional ownership. Therefore, the 
explanation and prediction for such behaviour forwarded by this study are purely 
exploratory in nature. 
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Similar to the "big bath" argument, "reverse" myopia may occur when managers of 
portfolio firms have strong incentives to create accounting slack for future periods, 
within the limited discretion available to them.6° Such incentives are created when 
firms are unable to avoid missing their earnings targets, as is the case for 
"irreversible decline" firms. 
Potential reasons why long-term oriented institutional investors might systematically 
motivate conservative accounting treatments among "irreversible decline" firms can 
be found by examining the effects of "reverse" myopic accruals management. The 
first effect is that future earnings targets are reset to a lower level, and the second 
effect is that more (less) positive (negative) accruals are available in the future years, 
making it easier to meet future earnings targets. Long-term oriented institutional 
investors might prefer these outcomes because as their portfolio firms are able to 
meet the earnings targets in future years, long-term oriented institutional investors 
are able to enjoy any benefits associated with meeting those earnings targets. These 
benefits include capital appreciation through capital markets paying a premium on 
firm value (e.g., Barth et al., 1999), or increases in dividend payouts as a result of 
improving earnings levels in the future periods. It is conceivable that long-term 
oriented institutional investors can communicate such preferences to portfolio firm 
managers through their involvement in the portfolio firm's governance. 
If long-term oriented institutional investors' involvement in portfolio firms' 
corporate governance leads to conservative accounting treatments, then their 
presence among "irreversible decline" firms provides stronger incentives for 
60 	However, dissimilar to "big bath" behaviour, "reverse" myopic accruals management is not 
restricted to negative discretionary accruals. Given that "reverse" myopia is similar to conservative 
accruals management, it encompasses more negative as well as less positive discretionary accruals to 
create accounting slack for future periods. 
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managers of portfolio firms to engage in conservative discretionary accruals 
management than "irreversible decline" firms without long-term oriented 
institutional investors. Therefore, the "reverse" myopia hypothesis predicts a 
negative association between long-term oriented institutional ownership and the 
discretionary accruals of "irreversible decline" finals.61 
H6: Long-term oriented institutional ownership in "irreversible decline" firms is 
NEGATIVELY associated with these portfolio firms' discretionary accruals. 
In contrast to the "reverse" myopia hypothesis, an income smoothing hypothesis 
would predict that even though "irreversible decline" firms are unable to meet their 
earnings targets, long-term oriented institutional investors might still prefer an 
earnings trend that is closer to the earnings targets. However, smoothing income by 
"irreversible decline" firms in the current period may lead to failure to meet earnings 
targets in the subsequent period(s). This may occur especially if these firms need not 
only to use up all positive accruals in the current period but also to borrow future 
periods positive accruals. A positive relation between long-term oriented 
institutional ownership and the discretionary accruals of "irreversible decline" firms 
would be consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis. 
61 	Given that "big bath" and "reverse" myopic behaviours lead to the same prediction of a 
negative association between long-term oriented institutional ownership and "irreversible decline" 
firms' discretionary accruals, evidence supporting this negative association can be attributable to 
either of these hypotheses. That is, the tests of the relation between long-term oriented institutional 
ownership and discretionary accruals using the "irreversible decline" sub-sample cannot distinguish 
unambiguously whether the negative relation, if found, is due to "reverse" myopia or "big bath" 
strategy. A negative relation, if found, supports the basic thesis of H6 that although long-term 
oriented institutional investors in general limit managerial discretion over accruals, their presence also 
leads to different behaviour under specific circumstances. Moreover, both "big bath" and "reverse" 
myopia arguments are very similar, thus this study does not attempt to distinguish between the two. 
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3.6 Institutional ownership type effects on discretionary accruals amongst 
"increased" firms 
The last category of portfolio firms consists of firms with current year non-
discretionary earnings (NDE) that already exceed their earnings target, namely, prior 
year reported earnings. Firms in this category can achieve their current year earnings 
target (i.e., maintain their prior year reported earnings level) even without managing 
their accruals. Since "increased" portfolio firms will at least maintain their prior 
year earnings level in the current year, institutional ownership is generally not 
expected to have any significant influence on portfolio firms' accruals management 
strategies, regardless of the composition of institutional ownership in the portfolio 
firms. 
Due to their short-term orientation, transient institutional investors create strong 
incentives for portfolio firm managers to manage reported earnings to meet earnings 
targets. However, such incentives are unlikely to be present where "increased" 
portfolio firms have already met their earnings targets before earnings management. 
Therefore, transient institutional ownership is NOT expected to be associated with 
discretionary accruals of "increased" portfolio firms. Similarly, the overarching 
effects of long-term oriented institutional investors are that, through their monitoring 
activities, portfolio firm managers' accruals discretion is restricted. In the context of 
"increased" portfolio firms where these firms have already met their earnings targets, 
long-term oriented institutional investors are NOT expected to be associated with 
"increased" portfolio firms' discretionary accruals. 
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Therefore, this thesis predicts that there is no association between institutional 
ownership (for either transient or long-term oriented institutional investors) and 
discretionary accruals for firms within this category.62  Given the "no effect" 
predictions, no formal hypothesis is forwarded although tests are conducted to 
provide descriptive comparisons. 
3.6.1 Examination of income smoothing behaviour 
If managers of "increased" (IN) portfolio firms take a multiple period timeframe in 
making their earnings management decisions, then they can choose to "save" current 
year accruals for future periods through one of three approaches. First, portfolio 
firm managers can choose not to engage in any discretionary accruals management. 
Second, they can engage in minimum positive discretionary accruals to indicate 
"growth" in earnings - in addition to any growth arising from current year non-
discretionary earnings (NDE) greater than prior year earnings. Third, they can 
choose to employ negative discretionary accruals if unfavourable circumstances are 
foreseen for the immediate future periods. 
There are potential costs associated with earnings decreases, such as downward share 
price pressure resulting from a block sell off of shares and loss of share price 
premium when an earnings growth string is broken, as discussed in Chapter 2. Also, 
there are incentives for managers to avoid earnings decreases, such as a reduction in 
compensation. Hence, it is unlikely that "increased" portfolio firms will employ 
62 	Carlson and Bathala (1997) find that institutional ownership, as a whole, is positively 
associated with the probability of a firm being an income smoother. Income smoothing behaviour is 
further investigated later, among "increased' firms that reported an increase in current year earnings. 
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negative discretionary accruals management to the extent that they produce a 
decrease in current year reported earnings. 63 
Although both types of institutional ownership generally are not expected to affect 
"increased" firms' discretionary accruals, further partitioning of the "increased" 
portfolio firms provides a unique category to examine specific incentives created by 
different types of institutional investors on portfolio firm managers' accruals 
management decisions. Since "increased" firms have current year non-discretionary 
earnings greater than prior year earnings, they potentially include both firms that 
eventually report an increase in current year earnings compared to last year's 
earnings and those reporting a decrease. 64 Given that incentives to meet earnings 
targets no longer exist for "increased" firms that reported an increase in current year 
earnings (both prior to and after accruals management), these firms provide a sample 
that is conducive to examining whether institutional investor type creates incentives 
for their portfolio firm managers to smooth reported earnings. 65 
Income smoothing represents an attempt by firm managers to reduce reported 
earnings variation and to increase the predictability of reported earnings trends (e.g., 
63 	If an "increased" portfolio firm chose to engage in negative discretionary accruals 
management to the extent that results in a decrease in current reported earnings, then this firm 
represents an exception to the prediction and an exception to the theoretical frameworks and empirical 
findings of recent studies such as Barth et al. (1999), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Degeorge et al. 
(1999) and Myers and Skinner (1999). 
64 	As discussed above, "increased" firms that engaged in negative discretionary accruals to the 
extent that they report a decrease in current year earnings represent an exception to the theoretical 
frameworks and empirical findings of recent studies. Therefore, although a sub-sample including 
"increased" firms with a decrease in current year earnings enables a closer examination of the 
characteristics of firms that engaged in negative discretionary accruals to the extent that they report a 
decrease in reported earnings even though their non-discretionary earnings already exceeded their 
earnings targets, it is not expected that there are many firms that would be in this position. 
Furthermore, there is no clear theoretical ground to predict the relation between the types of 
institutional ownership and discretionary accruals among "increased" firms with a decrease in current 
year reported earnings. Therefore, no specific hypothesis is developed. Subsequent result analysis 
reveals that a small number of "increased" firms reported a decrease in current year earnings (n=390). 
65 	See also discussions in Section 3.4. 
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Carlson and Bathala, 1997; DeFond and Park, 1997; Ronen and Sadan, 1981; 
Trueman and Titman, 1988). 66 Meeting earnings targets through earnings 
management and reporting smooth and predictable earnings are used to satisfy 
investors (e.g., Fox, 1997; Levitt, 1998; Loomis, 1999). 67 The practices of 
continuously meeting earnings targets over a long period of time are so common 
among public firms that the immediate past Chairman of the SEC, Mr. Arthur Levitt, 
has publicly criticised such practices several times, and he launched an SEC crack-
down on corporate earnings management (e.g., Levitt, 1998; Loomis, 1999). 68 
Using the transient institutional investor arguments, Carlson and Bathala (1997) 
predict and find that institutional ownership, as a whole, is positively related to the 
probability of a firm being an income smoother. 69 However, given that they do not 
segregate transient institutional ownership from long-term oriented institutional 
ownership, it is difficult to unambiguously conclude that transient institutional 
investors encourage portfolio firms to smooth income. Their results do not rule out 
the explanation that (a) high institutional ownership (regardless of the types of 
institutional ownership) is associated with the probability of income smoothing; or 
(b) only one type of institutional ownership is associated with the probability of 
income smoothing. 
66 	See Ronen and Sadan (1981) for a detail discussion of issues involving smoothing earnings 
figures, including motivations for income smoothing, means of smoothing income, among others. 
67 	A prominent FORTUNE 500 company CEO even proclaimed that "[Ole No.1 job of 
management is to smooth out earnings" (Loomis, 1999). 
68 	Meeting earnings targets over a long period of time represents a more specific form of 
income smoothing than existing income smoothing studies (e.g., Carlson and Bathala, 1997; Moses, 
1984; Ronen and Sadan, 1981). The existing income smoothing studies have generally defined 
income smoothing as a general reduction in deviation from earnings target regardless of post-
managed earnings levels. In contrast, income smoothing that takes the form of meeting earnings 
targets over a long period of time takes into consideration (1) the capital market response to missing 
versus meeting earnings targets post-earnings management; (2) the impact on managerial 
compensation of missing earnings targets post-earnings management; and (3) the empirical evidence 
of firms avoid missing earnings targets. 
69 	To provide a comparison for Carlson and Bathala (1997) findings, tests are carried out to 
investigate the relation between institutional ownership, as a whole, and the level of discretionary 
accruals among this group of firms, although no formal hypothesis is formed. 
74 
A more refined test of whether transient institutional investors create incentives for 
income smoothing can be performed within the category of "increased" firms which 
report an increase in current year reported earnings." Since these firms have already 
achieved their earnings targets both prior to and after accruals management, their 
accruals management strategies can provide a clear indication of the existence of 
income smoothing incentives. If transient institutional investors create incentives for 
these portfolio firm managers to smooth reported earnings while meeting or 
exceeding earnings targets, then a negative relation between transient institutional 
ownership and the level of discretionary accruals is predicted. 
As discussed at the beginning of this section, managers of "increased" firms have 
three major options with respect to their accruals management strategies: (1) no 
accruals management; (2) to incur positive discretionary accruals to indicate earnings 
growth in addition to the growth already achieved from non-discretionary earnings 
greater than last year's reported earnings; and (3) to incur negative discretionary 
accruals. Given that this study assumes firms' earnings targets are last year's 
reported earnings (i.e., managers of portfolio firms seek to avoid earnings decreases), 
adoption of the third option is consistent with income smoothing as it brings the 
post-managed earnings levels closer to the earnings target than pre-managed 
earnings levels while still meeting or exceeding earnings targets. The partitioning of 
"increased" firms with increased reported earnings is likely to include portfolio firms 
that engage in any of these three options. A significant negative relation between 
70 	Since this study classifies institutional ownership into transient and long-term oriented 
ownership, it can separately tests whether these two types of institutional ownership individually 
encourage income smoothing behaviour. 
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transient institutional ownership and discretionary accruals among these firms 
provides strong evidence supporting income smoothing behaviour. 71 
H7: Transient institutional ownership in "increased" firms with an increase in 
current year earnings is NEGATIVELY associated with these portfolio firms' 
discretionary accruals. 
Long-term oriented institutional investors are assumed to be concerned about the 
long-term economic fundamentals of their portfolio firms, and they are expected to 
constrain potential undesirable earnings management behaviour by portfolio firm 
managers. If long-term oriented institutional investors truly focus on the economic 
fundamentals of their portfolio firms, then they are not expected to create incentives 
for portfolio firm managers to smooth their reported earnings. 72 This is because 
tong-term oriented institutional investors are informed investors who monitor their 
portfolio firms and are likely to rely on information in addition to earnings to assess 
portfolio firm managers' performance. 
It is possible that even though long-term oriented institutional investors are generally 
concerned about the long-term prospects of their portfolio firms, they may also 
prefer a smooth earnings trend that continuously meets earnings targets for one or 
more of the following reasons. Since long-term oriented institutional investors hold 
their investment over a longer time horizon, any premium on firm value resulting 
71 	The predicted negative relation between transient institutional ownership and discretionary 
accruals is further tested by including only "increased" firms with increased current year earnings that 
have negative discretionary accruals. This additional test enables examination of whether transient 
institutional ownership encourages income smoothing among "increased" firms with increased current 
year earnings that have negative discretionary accruals. It should be noted this additional test 
provides weaker test of the income smoothing hypothesis than if all "increased" firms with increased 
current year earnings are used (the main test for H7). 
72 	This does not preclude managers of portfolio firms from smoothing their reported earnings in 
response to other factors. 
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from continuously meeting earnings targets generates unrealised capital appreciation. 
Furthermore, dividend payments to the long-term oriented institutional investors by 
portfolio firms with smooth earnings trends are more predictable. The unrealised 
capital appreciation and predictable dividend income will in turn reflect more 
favourably on these long-term oriented institutional investors' own performance. 
Thus, if long-term oriented institutional ownership encourages income smoothing 
behaviour among portfolio firms within this partition, then a negative relation is 
expected between long-term oriented institutional ownership and the level of 
discretionary accruals of "increased" firms with an increase in current year reported 
earnings. Using firms that potentially have incentives and capacity to smooth 
income (i.e., firms that meet their earnings targets both prior to and after accruals 
management), the impact of long-term oriented institutional ownership on portfolio 
firms' accruals management can be investigated to identify situations where long-
term oriented institutional investors might exert pressure for portfolio firm managers 
to manage discretionary accrual in a particular manner. A negative relation between 
long-term oriented institutional ownership and the level of discretionary accruals 
would provide evidence suggesting that although long-term oriented institutional 
investors limit portfolio firm managers' discretion over accruals management, their 
presence does create incentives for portfolio firm managers to smooth reported 
income. A negative relation also suggests that the findings in Carlson and Bathala 
(1997) cannot be solely explained by the transient institutional investor arguments. 
An income smoothing hypothesis predicts: 
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H8: Long-term oriented institutional ownership in "increased" firms with an 
increase in current year reported earnings is NEGATIVELY associated with 
these portfolio firms' discretionary accruals. 
3.7 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter extends the analysis in Chapter 2. In particular, this chapter examines 
the association between different types of institutional ownership and portfolio 
firms' discretionary accruals, with specific reference to portfolio firms' earnings 
targets. Existing literature suggests that managers have strong incentives to manage 
earnings first to avoid reporting losses, then to avoid earnings decreases, and finally 
to meet analysts' forecasts (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 
1999; Myers and Skinner, 1999). This study assumes that sustaining prior year 
reported earnings levels is the earnings target. Firms are then categorised into three 
groups based on their level of non-discretionary earnings relative to their earnings 
targets. This categorisation of firms provides groupings that are conducive for 
analysing (a) the myopic, "big bath" and income smoothing effects of transient 
institutional ownership; and (b) the "reverse" myopic, and income smoothing effects 
of long-term oriented institutional ownership which have not been investigated by 
prior studies. By explicitly examining the complexities in the relation between types 
of institutional ownership and discretionary accruals, this thesis diverges from the 
extant literature's general treatment of this relationship, and can extend current 
understanding on this issue. 
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Chapter 4 discusses the institutional investor classification methodology, developed 
by Bushee (2001), which is employed by this study. Chapter 5 describes the 
research design used to test the hypotheses developed in this chapter and Chapter 2. 
It includes discussion of the discretionary accruals measure and control variables to 
account for other factors that affect portfolio firm managers' discretionary accrual 
decisions. 
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4 Classification of Institutional Investors 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology and process of institutional investor 
classification. As defined earlier, institutional investors are large investors, other 
than natural persons, who exercise discretion over the investments of others (Lang 
and McNichols, 1997). This definition is consistent with the SEC Rule 13(f) 
definition of institutional investors as entities, other than natural persons, with 
investment discretion over equity securities of at least $100 million. Institutional 
investors in this study include only institutions that file the 13F form with the SEC, 
13F institutions. Examples of 13F institutions are banks, insurance companies, 
corporate and private pension funds, investment advisers or companies, universities 
and private foundation endowments. 
In this study, the classification technique developed by Bushee (2001) is used to 
classify institutional investors into transient investors, dedicated investors and quasi-
indexers based on institutional investors' portfolio management characteristics. 73 
Long-term oriented institutional investors are classified to include both dedicated 
and quasi-indexer institutional investors since both hold their investment as a long-
term strategy rather than for short-term trade. Section 4.2 describes the specific 
portfolio management characteristics used in the institutional investors classification 
process (Bushee, 2001). Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively explain the factor analysis 
of these characteristics and the cluster analysis of institutions based on the outcome 
73 	Brian Bushee's advice on his classification scheme is gratefully acknowledged. The 
institutional investor classification scheme in Bushee (2001) is adopted as it represents a refinement 
of the institutional investor classification scheme first developed in Bushee (1998). 
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of the factor analysis. This is followed in Section 4.5 by a description of the 
institutional ownership measurements used in this study. Section 4.6 summarises 
and concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Institutional investor portfolio management characteristics 
The institutional investor classification technique developed by Bushee (2001) 
categorises institutional investors as transient investors, dedicated investors or quasi-
indexers based on individual institutional investors' past portfolio management 
characteristics. 74 It involves three main steps First, based on prior research, seven•
variables are constructed to capture institutions past investment behaviour. Factor 
analysis is then performed on these variables to obtain the common factors that 
describe institutional investors' past portfolio management characteristics, 
specifically, portfolio diversification of each institutional investor (BLOCK) and 
portfolio turnover of each institutional investor (PTURN). Finally, cluster analysis is 
performed on the factor scores obtained in step 2 to classify institutional investors. 
The following discussions focus on the first step of the classification process. 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 discuss the factor analysis and cluster analysis respectively. 
In step one, seven variables are used to capture characteristics that reflect the choices 
the institutions have made in terms of portfolio diversification and portfolio turnover 
(Bushee, 2001). Transient institutional investors are expected to have high portfolio 
turnover with relatively high portfolio diversification. Dedicated institutional 
74 	This study does not attempt to improve on Bushee's classification technique, which is 
beyond the scope of this study. Rather, the technique is accepted as the best available. It adopts 
Bushee's variable acronyms as much as possible for ease of comparison. However, certain acronyms 
are modified to avoid confusion with other variables used in the hypothesis testing models. 
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investors, on the other hand, are expected to have low portfolio diversification and 
low turnover. Quasi-indexer institutions are expected to exhibit characteristics 
consistent with indexed, buy-and-hold strategies: relatively high diversification with 
low turnover. 
Four variables are used to proxy for the level of portfolio diversification of each 
institution (see Table 4.1 for variable definitions). The first is the level of portfolio 
concentration (PFCONC) variable which measures the average percentage of an 
institution's total equity holdings invested in each portfolio firm. Specifically, 
PFCONC is calculated as an institution's total equity investment divided by the total 
number of the institution's portfolio firms. The average percentage holding (APH) 
measures the average size of the institutional investor's ownership position in its 
portfolio firms. It is calculated as the sum of the size of an institution investment in 
individual portfolio firms divided by the institution's total equity investment. Two 
large block holding variables attempt to capture the percentage of an institutional 
investor's investment in portfolio firms in which it has an influential ownership 
position. In particular, the percentage of total holdings held in large blocks (LBPH) 
measures the percentage of an institutional investor's investment in firms where it 
has greater than 5 percent ownership, calculated as the sum of an institution's large 
block equity investments (i.e., > 5% ownership) divided by its total equity 
investment. The percentage of portfolio firms held in large blocks (LBPF) measures 
the percentage of the institution's portfolio firms held in large blocks (i.e., > 5% 
ownership), calculated as the number of firms in which an institution has greater than 
5% ownership divided by the total number of the institution's portfolio firms. 
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Table 4.1: Institutional Investor Portfolio Management Characteristics * 
Variable Definition 
Portfolio concentration (PFCONC) E wig / NSTKg 
Average percentage holding (APH) (E wiq Pflig) / E wiq 
Percentage of total holdings held in large 
blocks (LBPH) 
(E wig LBig) / E wiq 
Percentage of portfolio firms held in large 
blocks (LBPF) 
NLBq / NSTKg 
Percentage of total holdings held 
continuously for two years (STAB 1) 
(E wiq LTiq) / E wig 
Percentage of portfolio firms held 
continuously for two years (STAB2) 
NLTq / NSTIci 
Portfolio turnover (PT) E IA w iq 1 / (E wiq + E wi,q_i) 
NSTKg 	= number of portfolio firms whose stock is owned by institutional 
investor at the end of quarter q 
wiq 	= portfolio weight (shares held times stock price) in firm i - at the end of 
quarter q 
L w iq 	=Z wiq - E 
percentage of total shares in firm i held by institutional investor at the 
end of quarter q 
1 if Pfliq > 0.05; 0 otherwise 
number of stock with greater than 5% ownership at the end of quarter 
1 if institutional investor held firm i continuously for the prior eight 
quarters; 0 otherwise 
number of stock with held continuously for the prior eight quarters 
The characteristics are calculated at the end of each calendar quarter for every 
institution on the Spectrum database. The quarterly values are averaged over all 
quarters available for the calendar year to get end-of-year average values of each 
characteristic for each institution. These average annual values are used in the 







The degree of portfolio turnover is captured by three variables. The first is the 
portfolio turnover (PT) variable which measures the institutional investor's average 
absolute change in its ownership positions in its portfolio firms over a quarter 
divided by the total ownership position of the institutional investor over the same 
quarter. The other two variables measure the relative stability of the institutional 
investor's holding in its portfolio firms. Percentage of total holdings held 
continuously for two years (STAB 1) is calculated as an institution's investment in 
portfolio firms continuously held for the prior two years divided by its total equity 
investment. Percentage of portfolio firms held continuously for two years (STAB2), 
on the other hand, is calculated as the number of firms an institution has held 
continuously for the past two years divided by its total number of portfolio firms. 
The above seven variables are constructed for all the institutional investors that are 
included in the Spectrum database from 1994-1998, inclusive.75 The Spectrum 
database comprises all institutions that filed the 13F form with the SEC. 
4.3 Factor analysis 
Given the nature of the selection and construction of the variables identified in the 
preceding section, these portfolio management characteristic variables are highly 
correlated with each other, making it difficult to draw conclusions based on a single 
variable or to include multiple variables in the same analysis. To mitigate this 
problem, Bushee (2001) performs a factor analysis on these variables. Factor 
75 	Institutional ownership information is restricted to between 1994-1998 due to the high cost 
in obtaining the Spectrum database for any additional period(s). 
84 
analysis is a statistical technique used to identify a relatively small number of 
common factors that can be used to represent relationships among sets of interrelated 
variables. The main portfolio management characteristics, namely, portfolio 
diversification (BLOCK) and portfolio turnover (PTURN), are identified via 
principal factor analysis with an oblique rotation. Standardised factor scores are then 
calculated for subsequent cluster analysis. 
Table 4.2 summaries the results of the factor analysis The BLOCK factor captures 
the level of portfolio diversification of an institution. As expected, LBPH, LBPF, 
APH and PFCONC load positively on the BLOCK factor. That is, high (low) 
BLOCK factor scores characterise institutions having a larger (smaller) average - 
investment size in their portfolio firms. Therefore, a high (low) BLOCK score 
indicates an institution holds a less (more) diversified portfolio. 
On the other hand, the PTURN factor measures the institution's portfolio turnover. 
Consistent with expectations, STAB 1 and STAB2 load negatively on the PTURN 
factor while PT loads positively on PTURN factor. That is, institutions that trade 
more (less) frequently are associated with high (low) PTURN factors scores, and are 
less (more) likely to hold their portfolio firms continuously for two years. 
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Table 4.2: Factor Analysis of Institutional Investor Portfolio Management 
Characteristics 
Factors 
Variable BLOCK PTURN 
LBPH 0.9405 0.0025 
LBPF 0.8781 0.0595 
APH 0.8127 -0.0174 
PFCONC 0.4018 -0.1031 
STAB1 0.0240 -0.9555 
STAB2 0.0089 -0.9521 
PT -0.0091 0.7481 
Variance Explained 36.24% 33.38% 
LBPH 	= the percentage of the institution's iota] holdings held in large blocks 
(greater than 5%) 
LBPF 	= the percentage of the institution's portfolio firms held in large blocks 
(greater than 5%) 
APH 	= the institution's average percentage ownership in its portfolio firms 
PFCONC = the institution's average investment size in its portfolio firms 
STAB1 	= the percentage of the institution's total holdings held continuously for 
two years 
STAB2 	= the percentage of the institution's portfolio firms held continuously 
for two years 
PT 	= the institution's portfolio turnover percentage 
BLOCK = Portfolio Diversification Factor 
PTURN = Portfolio Turnover Factor 
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4.4 Cluster analysis 
A cluster analysis performed on the factor scores enables the final classification of 
institutions into the three groupings, namely transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexer 
institutions. Cluster analysis is a statistical technique for grouping observations into 
clusters so that institutions within the same cluster are more similar among 
themselves than institutions in other clusters. Transient institutional investors are 
characterised as having high portfolio turnover in conjunction with highly diversified 
portfolio holdings (Bushee, 2001; 1998). Quasi-indexers and dedicated institutional 
investors provide stable, long-term ownership in investee firms as they focus more 
on the long-term prospects of investee firms. Dedicated institutional investors are 
characterised as having highly concentrated portfolios, and low portfolio turnover 
(Bushee, 2001; 1998). Finally, highly diversified portfolio holdings and low 
portfolio turnover, consistent with buy-and-hold, passive index investment strategies, 
characterise quasi-indexers (Bushee, 2001; 1998). 
Table 4.3 reports the outcome of the cluster analysis performed on the factor scores 
derived from the factor analysis described in the preceding section. Based on the 
mean standardised factor scores, transient institutional investors (TRA) hold a highly 
diversified portfolio (low BLOCK factor) and have the highest portfolio turnover 
(high PTURN factor). Dedicated institutional investors (DED) have highly 
concentrated portfolio holdings (high BLOCK factor) associated with low portfolio 
turnover. Consistent with passive index strategies, quasi-indexer institutional 
investors (QIX) have low portfolio turnover and diversified holdings. 
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Table 4.3: Cluster Analysis of Institutional Investor Portfolio Management 
Characteristics 
Factor Score 
Clusters (Institutional Investor Groups) 
TRA DED QIX 
BLOCK Mean -0.2498 2.1202 -0.1854 
Std. Dev. 0.2993 0.7331 0.3605 
PTURN Mean 0.7992 0.0953 -0.9805 
Std. Dev. 0.4662 0.9523 0.4749 
3097 454 2568 
% of total N 50.61% 7.42% 41.97% 
TRA 	= transient institutional investors 
DED 	= dedicated institutional investors 
QIX 	= quasi-indexer institutional investors 
BLOCK = Portfolio Diversification Factor 
PTURN = Portfolio Turnover Factor 
Transient institutions make up 50.61% of the institution-year dui ing the period of 
1995-1998, inclusive. On the other hand, dedicated and quasi-indexer institutions 
make up 7.42% and 41.97% of the sample institution-year, respectively. The 
proportion of institution-year in each group is different from that reported in Bushee 
(1998) and Bushee (2001). However, the distributions from these three studies are 
not directly comparable as the sample periods are between 1981-1994, 1980-1997 
and 1995-1998, inclusive, for Bushee (1998), Bushee (2001) and this study 
respectively. It is conceivable that the distribution of these three types of 
institutional investors varies over time. For example, the growth in recent concerns 
about, and criticisms of, the short-term orientation of institutional investment 
provides anecdotal evidence of the growth of transitory institutional investment over 
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the years. This is consistent with the growth in the relative proportion of transient 
investors to the other two types of institutional investors from 43.2% in 1995 to 
54.6% in 1998 (not tabled). Overall, the relative distribution of institutions across 
the groups is consistent with Porter's (1992) argument that institutions are more 
likely to have small, highly diversified ownership in firms and/or turnover their 
positions frequently. 
4.5 Measuring institutional ownership 
This section details the variables used to measure institutional share ownership. The 
percentage of institutional ownership (PISH) is calculated as the total number of 
shares held by 13F institutional investors (as defined in the introduction section of 
this chapter) divided by total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fourth 
quarter. The percentages of ownership by transient institutional investors (TRA) and 
by long-term oriented institutional investors (LTPISH) are calculated, respectively, 
as the total number of shares held by transient and long-term oriented institutional 
investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding in the portfolio firm. 
Long-term oriented institutional investors include both institutions that are classified 
as dedicated and quasi-indexer institutional investors in the preceding sections. 
Quasi-indexers are included because, as discussed in Chapter 2, these investors are 
considered to be long-term oriented in their shareholdings as they cannot trade solely 
on the basis of current earnings performance. 
Existing literature has generally ignored the effects of concurrent equity ownership 
by both transient and long-term oriented institutional investors on earnings 
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management.76 However, it is very likely that these two types of institutional 
investors both have investments in the same firms. This study relaxes the mutual 
exclusivity assumption implicit to the extant literature and extends Bushee's (1998) 
treatment by considering the relative ownership stakes of these two types of 
institutional investor. The relative ownership position of transient and long-term 
oriented institutional investors within portfolio firms is used to account for the 
effects of the joint presence of both types of institutional investors on portfolio 
firms' discretionary accruals. TRARELPISH is a measure of transient institutional 
ownership relative to total institutional ownership, which is calculated as 
TRA/PISH. 77 
A summary of the institutional ownership measures is presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Institutional Ownership Measures 
Variable Definition 
Percentage of institutional ownership (PISH) TO; / TOS; 
Transient institutional ownership (TRA) TIC); / TOSi 
Long-term oriented institutional ownership (LTPISH) LTIO; / TOS; 





total number of shares owned by institutional investors in firm i 
total number of ordinary shares outstanding of firm i 
total number of shares owned by transient institutional investors in firm i 
total number of shares owned by long-term oriented institutional investors in firm i 
76 Bushee (1998) is the only known exception to this treatment in the literature, where the 
ownership stake of different types of institutional investor is explicitly considered using indicator 
variables. This study differs from Bushee (1998) by using a continuous measure of relative 
institutional ownership by the two types of institutional investors. 
77 	A measure of long-term oriented institutional ownership relative to total institutional 
ownership is not introduced because the measure TRA/PISH is equal to (1 - LTPISH/PISH). 
Therefore, LTPISH/PISH is redundant when TRA/PISH is already introduced. Furthermore, 
inclusion of both TRA/PISH and LTPISH/PISH measures in a single regression leads to perfect 
multicollinearity in the regression. 
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4.6 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter describes the process of classifying institutional investors as transient, 
dedicated, or quasi-indexer institutional investors using the techniques developed by 
Bushee (2001). The chapter begins by discussing the variables constructed to 
capture institutional investors' portfolio management characteristics. Factor analysis 
of these variables is then performed to obtain the common factor scores to measure 
the level of institutional investors' portfolio diversification and portfolio turnover. A 
cluster analysis on the factor scores derived in the factor analysis completes the 
classification process. Section 4.5 discusses the various institutional ownership 
measures used in this study. Chapter 5 discusses the research design for testing the 
hypotheses developed in Chapters 2 and 3. A mong other things, it discusses the 
accrual model used in estimating the discretionary accruals; other confounding 
factors that affect discretionary accruals; and hypothesis testing model specifications. 
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5 Research Design 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discusses how institutional investors are classified based on 
Bushee's (2001) classification scheme, as well as the various institutional ownership 
measures to be used in the hypothesis testing phase. This chapter describes the 
research design used to test the hypotheses generated in Chapters 2 and 3. Sample 
selection criteria are documented in Section 5.2, while Section 5.3 details the model 
used to obtain the proxy for discretionary accruals. In particular, Section 5.3 
describes the discretionary accruals estimation process using the cross-sectional 
modified Jones model (see Dechow et al., 1995 and Bartov, Gul and Tsui, 2000). A 
discussion of the variables controlling for other confounding factors that affect 
discretionary accruals appears in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 specifies the models. for 
hypothesis testing while Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Sample selection and test period 
The sample comprises firm-year observations for non-finance related firms listed on 
Standard and Poor's Compustat from 1995 to 1998 inclusive, that do not change 
their financial year-end during the sample period (n = 16,641). 78 The sample period 
is restricted to 1995-1998 due to the high cost of obtaining the Spectrum database for 
an extended period. Institutional ownership information is collected from the 
78 	Firms with primary SIC two-digit classification codes of 60 to 67 are regarded as finance 
related firms. 
92 
Spectrum Database which contains SEC Form 13F information. Furthermore, the 
test period is restricted to the post Financial Accounting Standards Board's FAS 95, 
Statement of Cash Flows period so that cash flows from operations, used in 
calculating total accruals (see variable definitions for equation (1) below) can be 
directly and consistently obtained using comparisons of earnings with companies' 
Statements of Cash Flows. This avoids measurement errors that may be introduced 
in using balance sheet data to estimate total accruals. 
Collins and Hribar (1999) demonstrate that the balance sheet approach to accruals 
estimation introduces measurement errors into the discretionary accruals estimates 
derived from the modified Jones model, as used in this study. 79 The direction of the 
bias depends on the three nonarticulation problems they investigated: mergers-and 
acquisitions (positive bias), divestitures (negative bias), and foreign currency 
translation (moderate negative bias). They also find that between 38.6% and 46.5% 
of their sample firms have one or more of these three events over the period between 
1988 and 1997 inclusive. 80 Given that this study's and Collins and Hribar's (1999) 
sample periods overlap, measurement errors in accruals as found by Collins and 
Hribar (1999) can be avoided by using the cash flow approach in calculating 
accruals. The Financial Accounting Standards Board's FAS 95, Statement of Cash 
Flows, requires firms to prepare cash flow statements for fiscal years ending after 
July 15, 1988. 
79 	Examples of studies that used the balance sheet approach to estimate accruals include Jones 
(1991); Dechow et al. (1995), Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a; 1998b), Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998), 
Kasznik (1999) and Cheng and Reitenga (2000). 
80 	Furthermore, they find that balance sheet approach to total accruals computation introduces a 
measurement error of greater than 10% of earnings before extraordinary items in 78.4% of their 
sample firms. Although they do not provide measurement errors for discretionary accruals under the 
balance sheet approach, material measurement errors in discretionary accruals are likely to follow 	• 
through from measurement errors in total accruals. In addition to the nonarticulation events, Collins 
and Hribar (1999) also find that there is a positive bias across all firms under the balance sheet 
approach. 
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Table 5.1 summarises the sample section criteria of this study. Firms with 
insufficient data to estimate discretionary accruals (n = 2,345) or to calculate 
independent variables (n = 1,661) are excluded. The sample also excludes firms 
without institutional shareholding data on the Spectrum database (n = 3,865). Firms 
in industries with less than ten observations in a year are excluded (n = 497) to 
ensure some efficiency in accruals model estimation (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 
1991; Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998a; 1998b). These sample selection criteria 
generate a sample of 8,273 firm-year observations and 155 industry-years for the 
OLS estimations of the accruals model. 
Table 5.1: Sample Selection Criteria 
Criteria No. of Firm-Years 
Non-finance related Compustat firm-years 1995-1998 
Less: 
Firms with insufficient data to estimate 
16,641 
discretionary accruals (2,345) 
Firms with insufficient data to calculate 
independent variables (1,661) 
Missing Spectrum institutional shareholding data (3,865) 
Industry-year combinations with fewer than 10 
observations (497) 
8,273 
Less: firms reporting losses 	 (3,011) 
Final test sample 	 5,262 
Sources: Compustat and Spectrum databases 
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Degeorge et al. (1999) find that there is a hierarchical importance attached to firms' 
earnings targets. Examining three earnings targets, they find that the most important 
earnings target is to avoid losses. The second most important earnings target is to 
maintain prior period earnings levels and the least important earnings target of the 
three is to meet analysts' forecasts. Degeorge et al. (1999) conclude that the 
hierarchical importance of earnings targets suggests that firms will try to avoid 
reporting losses first before considering the other two earnings targets. If firms are 
reporting a profit, then these firms have cleared the most important of the three 
earnings targets examined by Degeorge et al (1999), and their immediate earnings 
target will be to maintain prior year's earnings before considering meeting analysts' 
forecasts. Given that this study adopts the second threshold (i.e., maintaining prior 
period earnings level) as the earnings target, it is essential to ensure that all sample 
firms are reporting a profit such that the immediate earnings target for the sample 
firms is the prior year's earnings. Therefore, the final test sample is further reduced 
to exclude firms that reported a loss during the sample period (n = 3,011). The final 
test sample consists of 5,262 firm-year observations. 
The sample selection criteria suggest that the results found and conclusions drawn by 
this study may not be generalisable to loss-making firms and finance related firms. 
5.3 Measuring earnings management 
This study uses a measure of discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings 
management (see e.g., Kasznik, 1999; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998). In 
contrast, recent US studies investigating institutional ownership effects on earnings 
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management generally use R&D spending as a proxy for earnings management (e.g., 
Bange and De Bondt, 1998; Bushee, 1998; Majumdar and Nagarajan, 1997). 
Accruals manipulation represents first, a much less expensive manner to manage 
reported earnings than changing R&D investment from year to year. For example, if 
a cut in R&D investment is used as an earnings management tool to boost current 
reported earnings rather than as a result of strategic business planning, such 
reduction in R&D spending can jeopardise the firm's market competitiveness and 
thus its long-term viability. 81 Moreover, cutting R&D involves real cash flows and 
is readily observable by market participants. In addition, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) 
find that R&D expenditures are, in general, associated with greater subsequent 
earnings and R&D capital is positively associated with subsequent stock returns. 
Hence, market participants are likely to interpret a cut in R&D expenditure as a 
negative signal regarding firm value. Also, accruals manipulation is often less 
transparent than changing R&D expenses as there is no direct disclosure of most 
discretionary accruals or changes in accrual estimation methods. 82 
Changes in accruals (other than via accounting policy choices) are also less 
transparent to financial statement users than accounting policy changes since firms 
are required to disclose the nature and reasons for the change as well as to quantify 
the change (APB Opinion No. 20). Furthermore, accruals management incorporates 
a wide range of earnings management techniques available to managers when 
preparing financial statements (Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001; Francis, 2000). 
Therefore, if managers have incentives to manipulate reported earnings, it is possible 
81 	The extent to which a cut in R&D spending affects a firm's market competitiveness depends 
on, inter alia, the nature of the project(s) being cut or discontinued, the number of periods in which 
cutting R&D spending is used as an earnings management tool rather than based on strategic business 
decisions. 
82 	Some exceptions include disclosures relating to change in accounting policy and/or adoption 
of new accounting standards. 
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for them to select an earnings management technique that, relative to actual 
investment decisions and accounting policy choice, is subtler, less costly and less 
likely to be unravelled by outsiders. Finally, using accruals management as a proxy 
for earnings management enables generalisation of results to firms and/or industries 
that do not engage in research and development activities. 
Given the above arguments, an accrual approach to examining the effects of 
institutional investors on managerial incentives to manage reported earnings is 
appropriate. It can provide stronger and more general indications of reporting 
behaviour than studies of changes in real investment policies or accounting policies 
only. 
The time-series modified Jones model has been identified as the most powerful 
model for estimating discretionary accruals among the existing accruals models, 
although it is not without imprecision or flaws (Dechow et al., 1995; Bernard and 
Skinner, 1996; Guay, Kothari and Watts, 1996; Healy, 1996; Hansen, 1998, 1999; 
McNichols, 2000). Recent evidence suggests that the cross-sectional modified Jones 
model out performs its time-series counterpart in detecting accruals management 
(Bartov et al., 2000). 83 Accordingly, and consistent with recent studies, this study 
uses the cross-sectional variation of the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
to obtain a proxy for discretionary accruals (e.g., Subramanyam, 1996; Teoh, et al., 
1998a, 1998b; Kasznik, 1999). 
Compared to the time-series accruals model, the cross-sectional version has several 
advantages. First, it generates a larger sample size to facilitate hypothesis testing. 
83 	Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) also find that the cross-sectional Jones and modified Jones 
models to be well specified and are capable of generating relatively powerful tests for accruals 
management, although their study focuses only on working capital accruals. 
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Second, the number of observations per model is greater for the cross-sectional 
model, which enhances the efficiency and precision of the estimates. Third, the 
time-series model suffers potential survivorship bias as it generally requires a 
minimum of 10 years of observations to achieve a reasonable level of estimation 
efficiency (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991, DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). 
Finally, given the lengthy time period required by the time-series model, it is 
possible for the model to be misspecified due to non-stationarity. However, the main 
disadvantage of the cross-sectional accruals model is that the coefficients are 
assumed to be the same for all firms within a particular two-digit SIC industry code 
and fiscal year combination. 
The modified Jones discretionary accruals proxy for firm i in year t is obtained in 
three stages. First, coefficients a1, a2 and a3 in equation (1) below are estimated for 
each industry (defined by two-digit SIC industry classification code) and fiscal year 
combination. 
TACCi,t = oc1(1/A1,t-i) + a2(AREV1, t/A1,t_i) + a3(PPE1,t/A1,t-1) + Ei,t 	 (1) 
Where: 
TACCi,t = (Income before extraordinary items (item 123) — cash flows from 
operations (item 308))/A1ki 
Ai,t_i 	= Total assets for firm i in year t-1 (item 6) 
AREVi,t = Change in operating revenue of firm i between years t and t-1 (item 12) 
PPEI, = Gross property, plant and equipment of firm i in year t (item 7) 
Ei,t 	= error term 
Table 5.2 provides the summary descriptive statistics for the 155 cross-sectional 
OIS estimations of the accruals model. Consistent with existing literature (e.g., 
Jones, 1991; Dechow et al, 1995; Kasznik, 1999; Bartov et al., 2000), the estimated 
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coefficients on change in revenue are generally positive while the estimated 
coefficients on gross property, plant and equipment are generally negative. The 
cross-sectional accruals model explains a significant portion of the variation in total 
accruals, as evident by the mean (median) adjusted R2 of 0.4207 (0.4334). 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for OLS Estimations of the Accruals Model 
TACCi, t = a1(1/A1,t_i) + a2(AREV1, t/A1, t-1) + a3(PPEilA1,t-t) + 
N* Mean Std. Dev. Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 
155 -0.2488 3.2049 -0.9689 -0.1110 0.5998 
t-statistic 155 -0.6252 2.9593 -1.9115 -0.3024 0.7313 
az 155 0.0274 0.1685 -0.0302 0.0312 0.1287 
t-statistic 155 0.9546 3.5792 -0.6075 0.8741 2.6650 
a3 155 -0.0725 0.0833 -0.1119 -0.0693 -0.0374 
t-statistic 155 -2.8842 2.6514 -4.1018 -2.6853 -1.3685 
No. of 
observations** 155 54.1871 62.8468 18.0000 32.0000 54.0000 
R2 155 0.4790 0.2553 0.2633 0.4816 0.6929 
Adjusted R2 155 0.4207 0.2785 0.2018 0.4334 0.6412 
* N is the number of industry-years over the sample period, 1995-1998. 
** This refers to the number of observations within each industry-year combination. 
TACCi3 = (Income before extraordinary items (item 123) - cash flows from 
operations (item 308))/A 1 , t_i 
= Total assets for firm i in year t-1 (item 6) 
AREVi3 = Change in operating revenue of firm i between years t and t-1 (item 12) 
PPE, t = Gross property, plant and equipment of firm i in year t (item 7) 
Ei,t 	= error term 
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Second, using the estimated coefficients above, the non-discretionary accruals 
(NDACC) for firm i in year t are the fitted values based on the Dechow et al. (1995) 
modification of the Jones (1991) model (see e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Teoh et al., 
1998a, 1998b; and Bartov et al., 2000): 
NDACCo = eli(1/A13-1) + a 2({AREVi,t - ARECi,t}/A0-1 + a3(PPEi,t/A0_1) 	(2) 
Where: 
AREC0 = Change in net receivables of firm i between years t and t-1 (item 151) 
Finally, a discretionary accruals proxy (DACC) for earnings management, is 
obtained by taking the difference between non-discretionary accruals and total 
accruals. 
DACCi, t = TACC0 - NDACCo 	 (3) 
Income increasing discretionary accruals are captured by the variable DACC + for 
DACC > 0. The variable DACC captures income decreasing discretionary accruals, 
where DACC <0. 
5.4 Control variables 
Given that institutional ownership is unlikely to be the sole determinant of portfolio 
firm managers' discretionary accounting choices, several control variables are 
introduced to isolate other contracting incentives that have been found to influence 
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managers' discretionary accounting choices. Each of the control variables is 
discussed below. 
Firm size has traditionally been associated with political costs (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990). The size hypothesis is based on the argument that 
larger firms attract greater political attention than smaller firms. Managers of large 
firms are deemed more likely to exploit latitude in accounting discretion to reduce 
this political attention, for example via income decreasing earnings management 
techniques. However, the association between firm size and discretionary accruals is 
ambiguous. The reason for the ambiguity is that although large firms have 
incentives to reduce political costs by reducing reported earnings, they are likely to 
be under closer scrutiny by outsiders, such as financial/investment analysts, auditors, 
or institutional shareholders, than are small firms. Such close scrutiny by outsiders 
can potentially reduce managers' opportunities to exercise their accounting 
discretion. 84 While the size measure is included to proxy for political exposure, it 
may reflect other factors. 85 This study uses the natural logarithm of the market value 
of equity (item 25 x item 199) as a proxy for firm size, SIZE. 
Managers are more likely to exercise the accounting discretion granted by GAAP 
when they are closer to default on debt covenants (Press and Weintrop, 1990; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1986). Further, Beneish and Press (1993, 1995) indicate that 
84 	In a recent study, Sloan (1996) finds the relation between size and total accruals to be non- 
linear. Specifically, they exhibit an inverted U shape association. Given that total accruals is 
positively correlated with discretionary accruals, it is likely that size and discretionary accruals exhibit 
the same non-linear relation. The effects of this potential non-linear relation between firm size and 
discretionary accruals are examined later as part of the robustness tests. 
85 	See Ball and Foster (1982) for an early discussion of alternative interpretation of the size 
measure. 
101 
technical default on debt covenants is costly. 86 As such, it creates incentives for 
managers to prevent unnecessary technical violation of debt agreements via earnings 
management. Consequently, a positive relationship between discretionary accruals 
and leverage is predicted where the leverage ratio (LEV) is measured as the ratio of 
total debt (item 9 + item 34) to total assets (item 6). 
Recent studies have found that firms manage earnings at the time of issuing equity to 
influence prospective investors' assessments about their performance and financial 
stability (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a and 1998b). 
Firms' reported earnings are found to be unusually high at the time of equity 
issuance and these high reported earnings can be attributed to unusually high 
discretionary accruals. EQISS is introduced to control for managers' incentives to 
manage earnings at the time of issuing equity. It is measured as the amount of new 
equity issued (item 108) divided by the market value of equity (item 25 x item 199). 
Skinner and Sloan (1999) document that growth stocks experience a 
disproportionately large negative stock price response to earnings disappointment 
(the 'torpedo' effect). That is, when growth stocks report a small earnings 
disappointment, it leads to large stock price declines. Based on this observation, 
Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2000) argue and find that managers of high growth 
firms have incentives to manage earnings upward to avoid earnings disappointments. 
On the other hand, it is possible that managers of high growth firms faced with 
inevitable earnings disappointment have incentives to manage reported earnings 
downwards to create accounting slack for future periods. Consistent with Dechow et 
86 	Beneish and Press (1993) find that the average cost of technical violation ranges between 
1.2% and 2% of the market value of the firm's equity; or losses of between 4.4% and 7.3% of the 
outstanding balances of the violated debt agreements. 
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al. (2000) the market-to-book ratio, MKTBV (calculated as the market value of 
equity (item 25 x item 199) divided by book value (item 216)), is used to capture the 
'torpedo' effect. 
In a recent study, Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam (1998) investigate 
the relation between auditor quality (proxied by Big 6 auditors) and earnings 
management (proxied by discretionary accruals). They find that clients of non-Big 6 
(now, non-Big 5) auditors report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5- 
2.1% of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big 
6 auditors. Further, lower audit quality is also found to be associated with a greater 
level of "accounting flexibility". Therefore, a dichotomous variable, AUD (1 when a 
firm is audited by a Big 6 auditor; 0 otherwise), is used to control for the effect of 
auditor quality on discretionary accruals. Consistent with Becker et al. (1998), 
auditor quality is expected to be negatively associated with discretionary accruals. 
Furthermore, Bartov et al. (2000) find that auditor opinions are associated with 
discretionary accruals. In particular, they find that qualified auditors' opinions are 
associated with greater magnitudes of discretionary accruals. Consistent with 
Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (1999), a clean unqualified opinion is assigned a 
value of 0 for the auditor's opinion variable (AUDOP) and a value of 1 for any other 
types of opinion, such as qualified, adverse or unqualified opinion with explanatory 
language. 
Extreme earnings performance has been found to affect discretionary accruals and 
failure to control for this variable may lead to erroneous inferences (Dechow et al., 
1995). EXPERF takes a value of 1 if a firm's return on assets (item 237/item 6) lies 
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within the top decile and 0 otherwise. 87 Furthermore, a measure of cash flows from 
operations, CFO, is introduced to control for its effects on discretionary accruals. 
Extant literature indicates that cash flow from operations and accruals are negatively 
correlated (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Dechow et al., 1995; Sloan, 1996). CFO is 
measured as cash flows from operations (item 308) divided by sales (item 12). 
Finally, a series of dummy variables for fiscal years (YEAR) is used to control for 
potential year specific events that impact on discretionary accruals. 
Table 5.3 provides the definitions of the dependent variables, and control variables 
used in this thesis together with the sign of their predicted association with 
discretionary accruals where appropriate. 88 
87 	Only positive extreme earnings performance is controlled for as the sample consists of only 
firms with positive reported earnings (see sample selection section (Section 5.2) above for further 
details). 
88 	Institutional ownership variable definitions can be found in Table 4.4. 
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Table 5.3: Variable Definitions* 
Variable ', Definition Expected Sign 
Discretionary accruals (DACC) TACC — NDACC Dependent 
Variable 
Income increasing discretionary 
accruals (DACC) 
DACC > 0 Dependent 
Variable 
Income decreasing discretionary 
accruals (DACC) 
DACC <0 Dependent 
Variable 
Size (SI7P) Natural logarithm of market value of 
equity (#25 * #199) 
No prediction 
Leverage (LEV) Total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6) + 
Equity issues (EQISS) Amount of new equity issued (#108) 
divided by market value of equity (#25 * 
#199) 
+ 
Market-to-book ratio (MKTBV) Market value of equity (#25 * #199)  
divided by book value (#216) 
Auditor (AUD) 1 if audited by Big-6 auditor; 0 otherwise - 
Auditor's opinion (AUDOP) 0 if a firm received a clean unqualified 
opinion; 1 otherwise 
+ 
Extreme earnings performance 
(EXPERF) 
1 if a firm's ROA (#2371#6) is within the 
top decile; 0 otherwise 
+ 
Cash flows from operations (CFO) Cash flows from operations (#308) divided 
by sales (#12) 
- 
Year in which the firm-year 
observation is drawn from 
(YEARk) 
A series of dummy variables where 1 if the 
firm is drawn from year k; 0 otherwise 
No prediction 
= Total accruals calculated as: [(Income before extraordinary items (#123) — cash flows 
from operations (#308))/ A1,i-1] 
NDACQ4 = Non-discretionary accruals calculated as: a 1 (1/A13_ 1 ) + a 2({6,REVL , - 
1) + a  3(PPEi,rn1,t-1) 
Total assets for firm i in year t-1 (#6) 
Change in operating revenue of firm i between years t and t-1 (#12) 
Change in net receivables of firm i between years t and t-1 (#151) 
Gross property, plant and equipment of firm i in year t (#7) 
*Institutional ownership variable definitions are presented on Table 4.4. 




ARECL , = 
PPE13 = 
105 
5.5 Model specifications for hypothesis testing 
The statistical significance of the association between discretionary accruals and 
different types of institutional ownership is assessed via pooled cross-sectional 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. Model specifications for various 
hypothesis tests are detailed below. 89 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 investigate the relation between income increasing discretionary 
accruals and different types of institutional ownership (viz., transient versus long-
term oriented). The models used to test these two hypotheses are as follows, where 
model 4 is used to test the effects of the two types of institutional ownership on 
income increasing discretionary accruals and model 5 tests the effects of relative 
institutional ownership on income increasing discretionary accruals: 
DACC+ = 130 + I32TRA + 133LTPISH + I3 5SIZE + 136LEV + 13 7EQISS + 13 8MKTBV + 
y13 9AUD + 1310AUDOP + 1311EXPERF + 1312CF0 + 	YEARk + E (4) 
k=1996 
DACC+ = 130 + P I PISH + 134TRARELPISH + 135SIZE + 13 6LEV + 13 7EQISS + 
138MKTBV + 13 9AUD + 1310AUDOP + I31LEXPERF + 13 12cF0 + 
1998 
[31, E YEARk +E 	 (5) 
k=1996 
Where: 
DACC+ 	= Income increasing (positive) discretionary accruals 
PISH 	= Total institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding 
TRA 	= Transient institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding 
LTPISH 	= Long-term oriented institutional ownership as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding 
TRARELPISH = Transient institutional ownership relative to total institutional 
ownership, measured as TRA/PISH 
89 	Firm subscripts for all variables are omitted for ease of presentation. 
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SIZE 	= Natural logarithm of market value of equity (#25 * #199) 
LEV 	= Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6) 
EQISS 	= Amount of new equity issue (#108) divided by market value of 
equity (#25 * #199) 
MKTBV 	= Market-to-book ratio (#25 * #199)/(#216) 
AUD 	= Auditor dummy variable (1 if audited by Big-6 auditors, 0 
otherwise) 
AUDOP 	= Auditor's opinion (0 if a firm received a clean unqualified report, 1 
otherwise) 
EXPERF 	= Extreme earnings performance (1 if a firm's ROA is within the top 
decile, 0 otherwise) 
CFO 	= Cash flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#12) 
YEARk 	= Dummy variables for years 1996-1998 
Coefficients 131, 132, and 133  measure the incremental effects of various institutional 
ownership types on portfolio firms' discretionary accruals, over and above the 
effects of non-institutional ownership. Hypothesis 1 predicts positive estimated 
coefficients for 132 and 134. Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative estimated coefficient for 
133. 
For hypotheses la and 2a, the following models test the association between 
different types of institutional ownership and income decreasing discretionary 
accruals:9° 
DACC = Po + 132TRA + 133LTPISH + 1355IZE + 136LEV + I37EQISS + f38MKTBV + 
1998 
139AUD + 1310AUDOP + 131, EXPERF + 1312CF0 + 13k YEARk + ei (6) 
k=1996 
DACC =13  + [31PISH + 134TRARELPISH + [35SI7E + 136LEV + 13 7EQISS + 
138MKTBV + 13 9AUD + f3, 0AUDOP + 1311EXPERF + 13 12CF0 + 
13k 1i98 YEAR, + E, 	 (7) 
k =1996 
90 	The only difference between models 6 and 7 versus models 4 and 5 is the dependent variable. 
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Where: 
DACC- 	= Income decreasing (negative) discretionary accruals 
Negative estimated coefficients for 132 and 134 support hypothesis la and a positive 
estimated coefficient for 133 is consistent with hypothesis 2a. 
For hypotheses 3 to 8, which test the association between discretionary accruals and 
types of institutional ownership conditional upon portfolio firms' earnings targets, 
the following two models are used. In particular, hypotheses 3 and 4 are tested 
within the "reversible decline" firms using models 8 and 9. Hypotheses 5 and 6 (7 
and 8) are tested within the "irreversible decline" ("increased") firms using models 8 
and 9. 
DACC =13o  +132TRA + I33LTPISH +13 5SIZE +136LEV + 13 7EQISS +138MKTBV + 
1998 
139AUD 1310AUDOP 1311EXPERF +1312CF0 + 13 k E YEARk + ei 	(8) 
k=1996 
DACC = 130 + 131PISH +13 4TRARELPISH + 13 5SIZE +136LEV +137EQISS + 
138MKTBV +139AUD +1310AUDOP + 13 11 EXPERF + 1312CF0 + 




DACC 	= Discretionary accruals 
Table 5.4 summarises the predictions for all the hypotheses developed in Chapters 2 
and 3. 
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Table 5.4: Summary Predictions of Hypotheses 








132 and 13 4 Positive Models (4) and (5); transient 
institutional ownership; income 




133 Negative Models (4) and (5); long-term oriented 
institutional ownership; income 




132  and I34 Negative Models (6) and (7); transient 
institutional ownership; income 




P3 Positive Models (6) and (7); long-term oriented 
institutional ownership; income 
decreasing discretionary accruals 
RD 12 and 134 Positive Models (8) and (9); transient 
institutional ownership; level of 
discretionary accruals 
4 RD P3 Negative Models (8) and (9); long-term oriented 
institutional ownership; level of 
discretionary accruals 
5 ID 132 and 134 Negative Models (8) and (9); transient 
institutional ownership; level of 
discretionary accruals; "big bath" 
6 ID P3 Negative Models (8) and (9); long-term oriented 
institutional ownership; level of 
discretionary accruals; "reverse" 
myopia 
7 IN 13 2  and 34 Negative Models (8) and (9); transient 
institutional ownership; level of 
discretionary accruals; income 
smoothing 
8 IN P3 Negative Models (8) and (9); long-term oriented 
institutional ownership; level of 
discretionary accruals; income 
smoothing 
RD — "Reversible Decline" firms. These are firms with current year non-discretionary earnings less 
than earnings targets but which meet their earnings targets via positive discretionary accruals. 
ID — "Irreversible Decline" firms. These are firms with current year non-discretionary earnings less 
than earnings targets but fail to meet earnings targets after exercising their accrual discretion. 
IN — "Increased" firms. These are firms with current year non-discretionary earnings greater than 
earnings targets. 
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Table 5.4 (cont'd): Summary Predictions of Hypotheses 
Models: 
DACC+ =130 + 13 2TRA + 0 3LTPISH + r3 5SIZE + 136LEV + 137EQISS + 138MKTBV + 13 9AUD + 
1998 
13 ioAUDOP + [3 11 EXPERF + 13 12CF0 + 13 k E YEARk + E j 	 (4) 
k=1996 
DACC+ = 130 + 13 1 PISH + 134TRARELPISH + 13 5SIZE + P6LEV +13 7EQISS + r3 8MKTBV +139AUD + 
1998 
RIGAuDop +13„ExpERF+ 0 12cFo + Pk E YEARk + 	 (5) 
k=1996 
DACC = 130 + 13 2TRA + 13 3LTPISH + 135S17F + 13 6LEV + 137EQISS + 138MKTB V + 13 9AUD + 
1998 
P IOAUDOP +13n EXPERF +13 12CF0 +13k E YEAR + 	 (6) 
k=1996 
DACC = 130 + 13 1 PISH + f34TRARELPISH + 13 5SIZE + 13 6LEV + 13 7EQISS + 138MKTBV + 139AUD + 
1998 
RioAuDop + p i I EXPERF + 13 12CF0 + I YEA Rk + 	 (7 ) 
k=1996 
DACC = 130 +13 2TRA + r3 3 L TP I S H + 5SIZE + 136LEV + 137EQISS + 13 8MKTBV + 139AUD + 
1998 
13 10AUDOP -I- 13 IIEXPERF +13 1 2CF0 +13 k E YEARk + 	 (8) 
k=1996 
DACC = 130 + 13 1 PISH + 134TRARELPISH + 5SIZE + 136LEV + 13 7EQISS + 13 8MKTBV + 13 9A1JD + 
1998 
1310AuDop + 3 II EXPERF + 13 12:CFO + Pk E YEA& + 	 (9) 
k=1996 
Where, 
DACC+ = Income increasing discretionary accruals; DACC = Income decreasing discretionary 
accruals; DACC = Discretionary accruals; PISH = Total institutional ownership as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding; TRA = Transient institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; LTPISH = Long-term oriented institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; TRARELPISH = Transient institutional ownership relative to total institutional 
ownership, measured as TRA/PISH; SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of equity (#25 * 
#199); LEV = Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6); EQISS = Amount of new equity issue 
(#108) divided by market value of equity (#25 *#199); MKTBV = Market-to-book ratio (#25 * 
#199)/(#216); AUD = Auditor dummy variable (1 if audited by Big-6 auditors, 0 otherwise); AUDOP 
= Auditor's opinion (0 if a firm received a clean unqualified report, 1 otherwise); EXPERF = Extreme 
earnings performance (1 if firm's ROA (#237/#6) is within the top decile, 0 otherwise; CFO = Cash 
flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#12); YEAR = dummy variables for years 1996-1998. 
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5.6 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter describes the research design for testing the hypotheses developed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. It begins by discussing the sample selection process. Section 5.3 
then discusses the model and process of estimating discretionary accruals. This is 
followed by a discussion of factors other than institutional ownership that affect 
discretionary accruals. General models used to test the hypotheses are then specified 
in Section 5.5. The next chapter analyses results derived from the hypothesis testing 
models described in this chapter. 
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6 AnalysiA of Results 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the results derived from testing the hypothesised relations 
between institutional ownership of portfolio firms and those firms' discretionary 
accruals. Section 6.2 reports the descriptive statistics while regression analyses of 
the associations between institutional ownership types and income increasing and 
income decreasing discretionary accruals are discussed in Section 6.3. 91 Analysis of 
the associations between institutional ownership types and discretionary accruals 
among "reversible decline", "irreversible decline" and "increased" firms is reported 
in Section 6.4. In addition to fitting the regression models 4 to 9 described in the 
preceding chapter, discretionary accruals are regressed on total institutional 
ownership (PISH) to provide descriptive comparisons examining the effects of not 
identifying the types of institutional ownership on discretionary accruals. Section 
6.5 discusses the various robustness tests performed on the findings of Sections 6.3 
and 6.4. This is followed by a summary and conclusion in Section 6.6. 
Overall, the results support most of the hypothesised relations between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and portfolio firms' discretionary accruals (H2, H2a, 
H4 and H6). However, there is no evidence suggesting that long-term oriented 
institutional ownership encourages income smoothing behaviour (H8). More 
specifically, the results show that long-term oriented institutional ownership is 
negatively (positively) associated with income increasing (decreasing) discretionary 
91 	All t-statistics from the regression analysis are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's 
(1980) heteroscedascity-consistent covariance matrix. 
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accruals, consistent with the contention that long-term oriented institutional investors 
actively involve in monitoring their portfolio firms, thus constraining portfolio firm 
managers' accruals discretion. This constraining effect is also evident among 
portfolio firms that have greatest incentives to manage their earnings aggressively 
(viz., "reversible decline" firms). In addition to the constraining effect long-term 
oriented institutional investors have on their portfolio firm managers, long-term 
oriented institutional ownership is associated with "reverse" myopic behaviour 
among portfolio firms that face an inevitable failure to meet their earnings targets 
(viz., "irreversible decline" firms). This suggests a potential conservative bias in 
long-term oriented institutional investors' constraints on portfolio firm managers' 
accruals discretion. The above findings are unlikely to be attributable to 
measurement error in discretionary accruals, and are robust to different measures of 
institutional ownership, different specifications of the relation between discretionary 
accruals and firm size, and the effects of accounting flexibility available to portfolio 
firm managers. 
The results concerning the relations between transient institutional ownership and 
portfolio firms' discretionary accruals are less conclusive. The predicted negative 
relation between transient institutional ownership and income decreasing 
discretionary accruals is robust and consistent with transitory institutional investment 
creating incentives for portfolio firm managers to engage in myopic accruals 
management to create accounting slack for future periods. However, the predicted 
positive relation between transient institutional ownership and income increasing 
discretionary accruals is not found in the main test. Additional tests reveal that 
portfolio firms with predominantly transient institutional ownership are positively 
associated with income increasing discretionary accruals. 
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When tested in an environment where myopic earnings management should be most 
pronounced (among "reversible decline" firms), the results supporting the transient 
investor hypothesis are not as robust. While the predicted relation is only significant 
at the 10% level in the main test, for "reversible decline" firms with a high 
proportion of ownership by transient institutions, the transient investor hypothesis is 
supported at the 5% level. When constraints on the accounting flexibility available 
to portfolio firm managers are considered, no support is found for the transient 
investor hypothesis. Similar. to Bushee (1998), overall evidence of the short-term 
effects of transient institutional investment is more consistent and robust when total 
institutional ownership is predominantly made up of transient institutional 
ownership. Therefore, the impact of transient institutional ownership on earnings 
management, in general, may not be as severe as has been criticised (e.g., Black 
1998, Black and Coffee, 1994; Coffee, 1991; Levitt, 1998). 
There is only limited evidence suggesting transient institutional investors encourage 
income smoothing behaviour among portfolio firms. Finally, there is insufficient 
evidence to conclude that transient institutional ownership is associated with "big 
bath" behaviour. However, this lack of evidence might be explained by the inherent 
characteristics of the sample firms. 
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6.2 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 tabulate the means and standard deviations for the variables used 
in this study.92 In particular, Table 6.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the 
complete sample as well as two sub-samples partitioned according to whether firms 
have income increasing (positive) or income decreasing (negative) discretionary 
accruals. Descriptive statistics for "reversible decline" (RD), "irreversible decline" 
(ID) and "increased" (IN) firms appear in Table 6.2. 
As shown in the first column of Table 6.1, the average discretionary accruals of the 
overall sample of firms are 3.26% of prior year total assets. Institutional investors 
own about 36% of portfolio firms' equity, with transient institutions and long-term 
oriented institutions owning around 10% and 26% of equity respectively. The 
average market capitalisation (MVE) of the sample firms is $2,375 million and there 
is an average market-to-book ratio (MKTBV) of 3.15. The average leverage ratio 
(LEV) is 0.22 and sample firms have an average return on assets (ROA) of 7.2%. 
The average of cash flows from operation to sales (CFO) is 11.7% and sample firms 
raised, on average, 3.9% of their market value as new equity (EQISS) during the test 
period. 
92 	Market value of equity (MVE) instead of natural logarithm of MVE (proxy for SIZE) is 
reported in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 as MVE is more descriptive for the purpose of descriptive analyses as 
compared to its logarithm transformation variable. The same applies to return on assets (ROA), 
where it is used to obtain the extreme earnings performance variable (EXPERF). 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics for Complete (All), Income Increasing 
Discretionary Accruals (DACC +) and Income Decreasing Discretionary 




Differences in Means 
(2-tail p-value) 
DACC - DACC - 
( 1 ) (2) (3 ) (4) 
DACC 	Mean 0.0326 0.1001 	-0.0692 0.1693 
Std. Dev. 0.1349 0.1190 	0.0840 0.0000 
PISH 	Mean 0.3576 0.3402 	0.3838 -0.0435 
Std. Dev. 0.2587 0.2574 	0.2585 0.0000 
TRA 	Mean 0.0989 0.0949 	0.1051 -0.0102 
Std. Dev. 0.0899 0.0888 	0.0912 0.0000 
TRARELPISH 	Mean 0.2962 0.3009 	0.2891 0.0118 
Std. Dev. 0.2162 0.2222 	0.2068 0.0493 
LTPISH 	Mean 0.2584 0.2452 	0.2784 -0.0332 
Std. Dev. 0.2010 0.2002 	0.2006 0.0000 
MVE 	Mean 2375.46 2282.07 	2516.20 -234.13 
Std. Dev. 6359.60 6268.01 	6494.15 0.1942 
LEV 	Mean 0.2219 0.2221 	0.2215 0.0006 
Std. Dev. 0.1896 0.1870 	0.1936 0.9132 
MKTBV 	Mean 3.1525 2.9790 	3.4140 -0.4350 
Std. Dev. 4.6646 4.2097 	5.2667 0.0015 
ROA 	Mean 0.0718 0.0746 	0.0675 0.0071 
Std. Dev. 0.0622 0.0676 	0.0528 0.0000 
CFO 	Mean 0.1171 0.0875 	0.1617 -0.0742 
Std. Dev. 0.1501 0.1495 	0.1397 0.0000 
EQISS 	Mean 0.0390 0.0408 	0.0362 0.0046 
Std. Dev. 0.0937 0.0962 	0.0896 0.0752 
Dichotomous Variables: 
AUD 	Mean 0.9061 0.8846 	0.9385 -0.0539 
Std. Dev. 0.2917 0.3196 	0.2402 0.0000 
AUDOP 	Mean 0.1334 0.1420 	0.1205 0.0215 
Std. Dev. 0.3400 0.3491 	0.3257 0.0233 
N 5262 3163 	2099 
t-tests. 
*DACC = Discretionary accruals; PISH = Percentage of institutional ownership as a whole; TRA = 
Percentage of transient institutional ownership; LTPISH = Percentage of long-term oriented 
institutional ownership; TRARELPISH = Relative institutional ownership measured as TRA/PISH; 
MVE = Market value of equity (#25 * #199); LEV = Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6); 
MKTBV = Market-to-book ratio (#25 * #199)/(#216); ROA = Return on assets (#2371#6); CFO = 
Cash flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#12); EQISS = Amount of new equity issue 
(#108) divided by market value of equity (#25 * #199); AUD = Auditor dummy variable (1 if audited 
by Big-6 auditors, 0 otherwise); AUDOP = Auditor's opinion (0 if a firm received a clean unqualified 
report, 1 otherwise) 
**Sample under the headings "All" is the complete sample, "DACC4-" is firms with positive 
discretionary accruals, "DACC" is firms with negative discretionary accruals. 
116 
As compared to a larger sample including firms reporting losses (not tabulated), it is 
not surprising that the sample firms selected for hypothesis testing on average have 
greater market capitalisation (MVE of $2,375m vs. $1,624m) and have better 
performance in terms of (a) their return on assets ratio (ROA of 7.2% vs. —9.1%) and 
(b) their cash flows from operation to sales ratio (CFO of 11.7% vs. —141.5%). 
Furthermore, the average discretionary accruals for the larger sample including loss-
making firms is 0.07% of prior year total assets (compared to hypothesis testing 
firms' average of 3.26%). The sample including firms reporting losses raise, on 
average, 7.7% of new equity which is greater than the hypothesis testing firms 
(3.9%). The leverage ratio (LEV) and market-to-book ratio (MKTBV) as well as 
institutional ownership levels (PISH, TRA, LTPISH) are comparable between the 
hypothesis testing sample firms and the sample including loss-making firms. 93 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6.1 report the means and standard deviations of the 
variables for sub-sample firms that engaged in income increasing (positive) and 
income decreasing (negative) discretionary accruals respectively. Sample firms that 
engaged in income increasing discretionary accruals have significantly less 
institutional ownership (PISH), as well as significantly less transient (IRA) and 
long-term oriented (LTPISH) institutional ownership, than firms that engaged in 
income decreasing discretionary accruals (column 4). However, firms engaged in 
positive discretionary accruals have significantly more transient institutional 
ownership relative to long-term oriented institutional ownership (TRARELPISH) 
than firms with negative discretionary accruals (30.1% versus 28.9%; p=0.0493). 
93 	The average leverage ratio, market-to-book ratio, total, transient, and long-term oriented 
institutional ownership for the sample including firms reporting losses are, respectively 0.25, 3.54, 
31%, 9% and 22%. 
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Firms with income increasing discretionary accruals also have a lower market-to-
book ratio (MKTBV, p=0.0015) and generate less cash flows from operations per 
every dollar of sales (CFO, p=0.0000) than firms with income decreasing 
discretionary accruals. Nonetheless, portfolio firms with income increasing 
discretionary accruals are able to generate higher returns on assets (ROA) than 
portfolio firms with income decreasing discretionary accruals (7.46% versus 6.75%; 
p=0.0000). The better returns on assets achieved by firms with positive discretionary 
accruals (relative to firms with negative decreasing discretionary accruals) may be 
the result of firms' accruals management. This is consistent with the observation 
that the difference in the average discretionary accruals levels between firms with 
positive discretionary accruals and negative discretionary accruals is about 17% of 
prior year total assets (see Table 6.1, column 4). Although not directly comparable, 
the difference in the level of discretionary accruals between the two types of firms is 
likely to be more than enough to explain the difference in an accounting measure of 
return on assets of 0.71%.94 
Firms reporting income increasing discretionary accruals are less likely to be audited 
by Big-6 auditors and are more likely to received qualified audit opinions than firms 
with income decreasing discretionary accruals (p=0.0000 and p=0.0233 
respectively). These results are consistent with empirical findings that firms with 
Big-6 auditors report less income increasing discretionary accruals (Becker et al., 
1998), and auditors are more likely to focus on earnings overstatement (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1991, 1993; Hirst, 1994, St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984). 
94 	The differences in discretionary accruals levels and return on assets are not directly 
comparable because discretionary accruals are expressed as a percentage of prior year total assets 
whilst return on assets is expressed as a percentage of current year total assets. 
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Table 6.2 reports the descriptive statistics for "reversible decline" (RD), "irreversible 
decline" (ID) and "increased" (1N) samples. "Reversible decline" (RD) firms on 
average have the most positive discretionary accruals, followed by "irreversible 
decline" (ID) firms and "increased" (IN) respectively. "Increased" (IN) firms have 
average negative discretionary accruals, suggesting that these firms might be 
smoothing their reported earnings. Among the three types of firms, "irreversible 
decline" (ID) firms have the least institutional ownership in terms of total, transient 
and long-term oriented institutional ownership (PISH, TRA and LTPISH 
respectively). However, the relative proportion of transient and long-term oriented 
institutional ownership (TRARELPISH) is comparable across the three types of 
firms. The market values of equity for all three types of firms are comparable, 
reducing the likelihood of size effects for later analyses. 
As compared to "irreversible decline" (ID) firms, "reversible decline" (RD) firms 
(Table 6.2 column 4) have significantly more positive discretionary• accruals 
(DACC; p=0.0000), greater total institutional ownership (PISH; p=0.0085), and 
transient institutional ownership (TRA; p=0.0002). "Reversible decline" (RD) firms 
have lower leverage ratios (LEV; p=0.0420), higher market-to-book ratios 
(MKTBV; p=0.0000), and raise more new equity (EQISS; p=0.0000) than 
"irreversible decline" (ID) firms. Although "reversible decline" (RD) firms achieve 
higher returns on assets (ROA; p=0.0000) than "irreversible decline" (ID) firms, they 
generate lower cash flows from operations (CFO; p=0.0000) than "irreversible 
decline" (ID) firms. 
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics for Reversible Decline (RD), Irreversible 




Differences in Means 
(2-tail p-value; 
RD-ID 	RD-IN 	ID-IN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6) 
DACC Mean 0.1256 0.0640 -0.0308 0.0616 0.1563 0.0948 
Std. Dev. 0.1237 0.1044 0.1159 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PISH Mean 0.3442 0.3175 0.3803 0.0267 -0.0361 -0.0628 
Std. Dev. 0.2609 0.2438 0.2607 0.0085 0.0000 0.0000 
TRA Mean 0.0950 0.0827 0.1073 0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0246 
Std. Dev. 0.0878 0.0746 0.0953 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
TRARELPISH Mean 0.3021 0.2879 0.2962 0.0143 0.0059 -0.0083 
Std. Dev. 0.2235 0.2162 0.2121 0.1087 0.3972 0.2859 
LTPISH Mean 0.2490 0.2347 0.2727 0.0144 -0.0237 -0.0380 
Std. Dev. 0.2039 0.1951 0.2005 0.0754 0.0003 0.0000 
MVE Mean 2439.56 2524.08 2283.21 -84.52 156.35 240.87 
Std. Dev. 6596.73 6645.07 6110.51 0.7515 0.4492 0.3099 
L,EV Mean 0.2224 0.2374 0.2156 -0.0150 0.0068 0.0218 
Std. Dev. 0.1844 0.1822 0.1949 0.0420 0.2636 0.0013 
MKTB V Mean 3.1103 2.3806 3.4707 0.7297 -0.3604 -1.0901 
Std. Dev. 3.8186 3.6613 5.3481 0.0000 0.0113 0.0000 
ROA Mean 0.0759 0.0510 0.0775 0.0249 -0.0016 -0.0265 
Std. Dev. 0.0538 0.0516 0.0683 0.0000 0.4139 0.0000 
CFO Mean 0.0759 0.1003 0.1464 -0.0244 -0.0705 -0.0461 
Std. Dev. 0.1501 0.1482 0.1445 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EQISS Mean 0.0440 0.0278 0.0405 0.0162 0.0035 -0.0127 
Std. Dev. 0.0979 0.0894 0.0925 0.0000 0.2621 0.0001 
Dichotomous Variables: 
D Mean 0.8830 0.8816 0.9283 0.0014 -0.0453 -0.0467 
Std. Dev. 0.3216 0.3232 0.2581 0.9166 0.0000 0.0000 
AUDOP Mean 0.1250 0.1492 0.1320 -0.0242 -0.0070 0.0171 
Std. Dev. 0.3308 0.3564 0.3386 0.0835 0.5146 0.1813 
1504 1039 2719 
t-tests. 
*DACC = Discretionary accruals; PISH = Percentage of institutional ownership as a whole; TRA = 
Percentage of transient institutional ownership; LTPISH = Percentage of long-term oriented 
institutional ownership; TRARELPISH = Relative institutional ownership measured as TRA/PISH; 
MVE = Market value of equity (#25 *#199); LEV = Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6); 
MKTBV = Market-to-book ratio (#25 *#199)/(#216); ROA = Return on assets (#237/#6); CFO = 
Cash flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#12); EQISS = Amount of new equity issue 
(#108) divided by market value of equity (#25 *#199); AUD = Auditor dummy variable (1 if audited 
by Big-6 auditors, 0 otherwise); AUDOP = Auditor's opinion (0 if a firm received a clean unqualified 
report, 1 otherwise) 
**Sample under the headings: 
RD - "Reversible Decline" firms. These are firms with current year non-discretionary earnings less 
than earnings targets but which meet their earnings targets via positive discretionary accruals. 
ID - "Irreversible Decline" firms. These are firms with current year non-discretionary earnings less 
than earnings targets but fail to meet earnings targets after exercising their accrual discretion. 
IN - "Increased" firms. These are firms with current year non-discretionary earnings greater than 
earnings targets. 
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Relative to "increased" (IN) firms, "reversible decline" (RD) firms (Table 6.2 
column 5) again have significantly more positive discretionary accruals (DACC; 
p=0.0000) but have less institutional ownership in general (PISH; p=0.0000), and 
less of both transient (TRA; p=0.0000) and long-term oriented (LTPISH; p=0.0003) 
institutional ownership. "Reversible decline" (RD) firms also have lower market-to-
book ratios (MKTBV; p=0.0113) and generate less cash flows from operations 
(CFO; p=0.0000) than "increased" (IN) firms. There are less "reversible decline" 
(RD) firms audited by Big-6 auditors (AUD; p=0.0000) than "increased" (IN) firms. 
Finally, "irreversible decline" (ID) firms have significantly more positive 
discretionary accruals (DACC; p=0.0000) than "increased" (IN) firms (Table 6.2 
column 6). "Irreversible decline" (ID) firms have lower institutional ownerships 
(total, transient and long-term oriented) than "increased" (IN) firms (p=0.0000 for 
all). "Irreversible decline" (ID) firms on average have higher leverage ratios (LEV;, 
p=0.0013), lower market-to-book ratios (MKTBV; p=0.0000), and returns on assets 
(ROA; p=0.0000). They generate less cash flows from operations (CFO; p=0.0000) 
and raise less new equity (EQISS; p=0.0001) than "increased" (IN) firms. 
The above descriptive comparisons among "reversible decline" (RD), "irreversible 
decline" (ID) and "increased" (IN) firms lead to the following inferences. First, the 
average discretionary accruals of "reversible decline" (RD) firms are the most 
income increasing, consistent with the manner in which they are classified. That is, 
"reversible decline" firms are firms that meet their earnings targets via positive 
discretionary accruals. The positive (negative) average discretionary accruals of 
"irreversible decline" ("increased") firms may indicate that these firms engaged in 
income smoothing strategies to move their reported earnings closer to their earnings 
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targets. Total, transient and long-term oriented institutional ownerships are lower 
among firms that failed to meet their earnings targets (i.e., "irreversible decline" (ID) 
firms). 95 This suggests that institutional investors, regardless of their investment 
strategies, are less interested in firms that do not meet earnings targets than in other 
firms. 
The other main characteristics distinguishing firms that fail to meet their earnings 
targets ("irreversible decline") and other firms ("reversible decline" and "increased") 
are leverage ratios (LEV), market-to-book ratios (MKTBV), return on assets (ROA), 
and new equity issues (EQISS). In particular, "irreversible decline" firms, on 
average, have higher leverage ratios (LEV), lower market-to-book ratios (MKTBV), 
lower returns on assets (ROA) and raise less new equity (EQISS) than "reversible 
decline" and "increased" firms. These differences suggest that, in general, firms that 
fail to meet their earnings targets ("irreversible decline" firms) are not performing as 
well as firms that meet their earnings targets ("reversible decline" and "increased"). 
This may in turn explain the lower institutional ownership among "irreversible 
decline" firms. 
The correlation matrix for independent variables is reported in Table 6.3. Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation coefficients are below (above) the diagonal. For the purpose 
of this discussion, Spearman correlation coefficients are used since they do not 
require the variables to be normally distributed. Institutional ownership (PISH) 
appears to be positively correlated with firm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratios 
(MKTBV), cash flows from operations (CFO), new equity issues (EQISS) and Big-6 
95 	One exception is that the average long-term oriented institutional ownership among 
"irreversible decline" (ID) firms is only marginally lower than "reversible decline" (RD) firms 
(p=0.0754). 
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auditors (AUD). The similarities between transient (TRA) and long-term oriented 
(LTPISH) institutional ownerships include that both types of institutional ownership 
are positively correlated with firm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratios (MKTBV), 
cash flows from operations (CFO), new equity issues (EQISS) and Big-6 auditors 
(AUD). 
However, they diverge in that while transient institutional ownership is positively 
correlated with extreme earnings performance (EXPERF) at the 5% level, long-term 
oriented institutional ownership is negatively correlated with extreme earnings 
performance at the 10% level. The positive correlation between transient ownership 
and extreme earnings performance is consistent with the view that transient 
institutions off-load portfolio firms with below par earnings performance, and invest 
or retain investment in portfolio firms reporting high earnings performance. Also, 
transient institutional ownership is negatively correlated with firms' leverage ratios 
(LEV), and no such correlation is found between long-term oriented institutional 
ownership and leverage ratios. In summary, earnings performance and leverage 
ratios are the key portfolio firm characteristics distinguishing between transient and 
long-term oriented institutional ownership, corroborating the analysis of Table 6.2 
above. 
Table 6.3: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables for Complete Sample - Pearson (Spearman) Correlation Coefficients are below 
(above) the diagonal 
PISH TRA TRARELPISH LTPISH SIZE LEV MKTBV EXPERF CFO EQISS AUD AUDOP 
PISH 0.8064 -0.0071 0.9623 0.4233 -0.0021 0.1824 -0.0083 0.0948 0.1085 0.2309 0.0100 
2-tail p-values <0.0001 0.6061 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.8807 <0.0001 0.5459 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.4667 
TRA 0.7427 0.4964 0.6387 0.3118 -0.0539 0.2055 0.0326 0.0477 0.1721 0.1697 -0.0470 
2-tail p-values <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0179 0.0005 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0006 
TRARELPISH -0.1248 0.3333 -0.2212 -0.0390 -0.0652 0.0941 0.0652 -0.0428 0.1311 -0.0249 -0.0728 
2-tail p-values <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0047 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0019 <0.0001 0.0705 <0.0001 
LTPISH 0.9539 0.5085 -0.3093 0.4356 0.0202 0.1519 -0.0261 0.1092 0.0688 0.2402 0.0317 
2-tail p-values <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1435 <0.0001 0.0587 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0214 
SIZE 0.4045 0.2273 -0.1170 0.4169 0.1171 0.4097 0.0085 0.3394 -0.0277 0.2385 0.0990 
2-tail p-values <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.5398 <0.0001 0.0444 <0.0001 <0.0001 
LEV -0.0009 -0.0604 -0.0406 0.0259 0.0737 -0.2026 -0.2566 0.0375 -0.1713 0.0242 0.1301 
2-tail p-values 0.9503 <0.0001 0.0032 0.0608 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0065 <0.0001 0.0788 <0.0001 
MKTBV 0.0634 0.1046 0.0378 0.0331 0.2256 -0.1178 0.2483 0.1153 0.1812 0.0859 -0.0762 
2-tail p-values <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0061 0.0164 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
EXPERF -0.0078 0.0440 0.0537 -0.0307 0.0049 -0.2187 0.1694 0.1078 0.0291 -0.0436 -0.0591 
2-tail p-values 0.5715 0.0014 <0.0001 0.0260 0.7252 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0345 0.0016 <0.0001 
CFO 0.0423 0.0149 -0.0430 0.0469 0.2445 0.0684 0.0528 0.0719 -0.0908 0.0865 0.0383 
2-tail p-values 0.0021 0.2789 0.0018 0.0007 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0055 
EQISS -0.0557 0.0181 0.0823 -0.0794 -0.1394 -0.0643 -0.0333 -0.0406 -0.0747 0.0580 -0.0688 
2-tail p-values <0.0001 0.1883 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0158 0.0032 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
AUD 0.2167 0.1309 -0.0704 0.2201 0.2464 0.0209 0.0393 -0.0436 0.0661 -0.0181 0.0190 
2-tail p-values <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1289 0.0044 0.0016 <0.0001 0.1900 0.1686 
AUDOP 0.0150 -0.0505 -0.0569 0.0422 0.0929 0.1226 -0.0633 -0.0591 0.0447 -0.0376 0.0190 
2-tail p-values 0.2757 0.0003 <0.0001 0.0022 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0012 0.0064 0.1686 
FISH = Total institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares outstanding; IRA = Transient institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares outstanding; LTPISH = Long-term oriented institutional 
ownership as a percentage of total shares outstanding; TRARELPISH = Transient institutional ownership relative to total institutional ownership, measured as TRA/PISH; SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of 
equity (#25 * #199); LEV = Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6); MKTBV = Market-to-book ratio (#25 * #I99)/(#216); EXPERF = Extreme earnings performance (1 if firm's ROA (#237/#6) is within the 
top decile, 0 otherwise; CFO = Cash flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#I2); EQISS = Amount of new equity issue (#108) divided by market value of equity (#25 * #199); AUD = Auditor dummy variable 
(1 if audited by Big-6 auditors, 0 otherwise); AUDOP = Auditor's opinion (0 if a firm received a clean unqualified report, 1 otherwise) 
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Transient institutional ownership is also negatively correlated with qualified audit 
opinion (AUDOP), contrasting with a positive correlation between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and qualified audit opinion. The positive 
correlation between long-term oriented institutional ownership and qualified audit 
opinion is consistent with the view that long-term oriented institutions stay with their 
portfolio firms for the long haul where during the period of their ownership, their 
portfolio firms might receive qualified audit opinions but the effects were not 
sufficient for them to withdraw their investments from those firms. In contrast, the 
"prudent man" law might have affected transient institutions to off-load portfolio 
firms that received a qualified audit opinion, thus leading to the negative correlation 
between transient ownership and qualified audit opinion. 
It. is obvious from Table 6.3 that many of the variables are significantly correlated 
with each other. However, only the variation of institutional ownership measures 
(specifically, PISH, TRA, and LTPISH) have correlation coefficients greater than 
0.5. Furthermore, collinearity diagnostics performed on all sample partitions using 
the condition index and VlF (variance inflation factors) are all within the 
conventional acceptable levels of 30 and 10 respectively (Kennedy, 1992). 
Therefore, multicollinearity should not be an issue for the OLS analyses performed 
in the later sections. 
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6.3 Regression results: Associations between institutional ownership type and 
income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals 
The next two subsections (viz., Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2) analyse the results from 
regression models examining the relations between institutional ownership type and 
income increasing and income decreasing discretionary accruals respectively. They 
provide empirical evidence to examine the predicted relations as per hypotheses 1, 
la, 2 and 2a. 
6.3.1 Effects of institutional ownership type on income increasing 
discretionary accruals 
The results for multiple regression analyses of the association between types of 
institutional ownership and income increasing discretionary accruals appear in Table 
6.4. Model 4 examines relations between income increasing discretionary accruals 
and (a) transient institutional ownership (TRA), and (b) long-term oriented 
institutional ownership (LTPISH). Model 5 examines the relation between income 
increasing discretionary accruals and transient institutional ownership relative to 
total institutional ownership (TRARELPISH). Hypothesis 1 predicts that transient 
institutional ownership is positively associated with income increasing discretionary 
accruals. This prediction is not supported in model 4 (p=0.1881 for TRA), indicating 
that transient institutional investors do not affect portfolio firms' income increasing 
discretionary accruals any differently from non-institutional investors. 
126 
Table 6.4: Regression Analyses for Sample Firms with Income Increasing 
Discretionary Accruals (Dependent Variable: DACC +) 
Variable** Expected Sign Model 4 Model 5 Comparative 
Intercept 0.1413 0.1329 0.1423 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PISH +/- -0.0415 -0.0440 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
TRA + 0.0258 
p-value 0.1881 
LTPISH - -0.0699 
p-value 0.0000 
TRARELPISH + 0.0287 
p-value - 0.0035 
SIZE +I- -0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0061 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LEV + 0.0143 0.0131 0.1260 
p-value 0.1021 0.1210 0.1324 
MKTBV + 0.0036 0.0036 0.0037 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EXPERF + 0.0766 0.0764 0.0779 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CFO -0.2339 -0.2322 -0.2351 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EQISS + 0.2432 0.2422 0.2492 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AUD -0.0203 -0.0201 -0.0207 
p-value 0.0017 0.0017 0.0013 
AUDOP + -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0018 
p-value 0.3936 0.3737 0.3551 
Adjusted R2 0.2586 0.2590 0.2566 
N 3163 3163 3163 
*p-values are derived from White (1980) corrected t-statistics. Reported p-values are one-tail if sign 
for the estimated coefficients is predicted, otherwise, two-tail p-values are reported. 
**DACC+ = Income increasing discretionary accruals; PISH = Total institutional ownership as a 
percentage of total shares outstanding; TRA = Transient institutional ownership as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding; LTPISH = Long-term oriented institutional ownership as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding; TRARELPISH = Transient institutional ownership relative to total 
institutional ownership, measured as TRA/PISH; SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of equity 
(#25 * #199); LEV = Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6); MKTBV = Market-to-book 
ratio (#25 * #199)/(#216); EXPERF = Extreme earnings performance (1 if firm's ROA (#237/#6) is 
within the top decile, 0 otherwise; CFO = Cash flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#12); 
EQISS = Amount of new equity issue (#108) divided by market value of equity (#25 *#199); AUD = 
Auditor dummy variable (1 if audited by Big-6 auditors, 0 otherwise); AUDOP = Auditor's opinion (0 
if a firm received a clean unqualified report, 1 otherwise) 
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Bushee (1998) finds that transient institutional ownership is associated with myopic 
earnings management (through cutting R&D expenditure) by portfolio firms when 
portfolio firms' institutional ownership is predominately made up of transient 
institutional ownership. In additional tests, an indicator variable, DQ5(TRA), which 
takes a value of 1 when TRARELPISH falls within the top quintile and 0 otherwise 
(Bushee, 1998), is used to replace TRA in the regression analysis. Consistent with 
Bushee (1998) findings, DQ5(TRA) is positively significant at the 5% level 
(p=0.0237; not tabled). Therefore, the positive association between portfolio firms' 
income increasing discretionary accruals and transient institutional ownership is 
stronger when the institutional ownership of portfolio firms is predominantly made 
up of transient institutional ownership. 
The results in model 5 support a positive association between income increasing 
discretionary accruals and transient institutional ownership relative to total 
institutional ownership (p=0.0035 for TRARELPISH). The difference in results 
between models 4 and 5 suggests the nature of the positive association between 
transient institutional ownership relative to total institutional ownership and income 
increasing discretionary accruals is dominated by the significant negative association 
between long-term oriented institutional ownership and income increasing 
discretionary accruals (p=0.0000 for LTPISH, discussed below). 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the constraining effects of long-term oriented institutional 
investors will lead to a negative association between long-term oriented institutional 
ownership and income increasing discretionary accruals. This prediction is 
supported (p=0.0000 for LTPISH in model 4), suggesting that as long-term oriented 
institutional ownership increases in portfolio firms with income increasing 
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discretionary accruals, the smaller are the portfolio firms' positive discretionary .  
accruals. This also indicates that firms with high levels of long-term oriented 
institutional ownership have lower income increasing discretionary accruals than 
firms with high levels of non-institutional ownership. 
In addition, institutional ownership in general (PISH) is significantly negatively 
associated with income increasing discretionary accruals. Given the findings in 
models 4 and 5, this negative association appears to be driven by long-term oriented 
institutional ownership. All the above results suggest that failure to consider the 
types of institutional ownership may lead researchers to prematurely conclude that 
institutional investors, in general, do not lead to portfolio firm managerial short-
termism. Such conclusion would have ignored the evidence that portfolio firms with 
high proportion of ownership by transient institutions are associated with more 
income increasing discretionary accruals. 
Other findings include that larger firms (SIZE) appear to engage in less income 
increasing discretionary accruals (p=0.0000), consistent with the political cost 
argument (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Furthermore, consistent with the "torpedo 
effects" suggested by Skinner and Sloan (1999), firms with higher market-to-book 
ratios (MKTBV) have more income increasing discretionary accruals (p=0.0000). 
The amount of new equity issues (EQISS) is associated with more income increasing 
discretionary accruals (p=0.0000). Also, firms that experienced extreme earnings 
performance (EXPERF) have more income increasing discretionary accruals 
(p=0.0000). Consistent with the findings in Becker et al. (1998), firms audited by 
Big-6 auditors (AUD) have less income increasing discretionary accruals. As 
expected, there is a significant negative association between cash flows from 
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operations (CFO) and discretionary accruals. The regression models explain around 
26% of the variation in discretionary accruals. 
6.3.2 Effects of institutional ownership type on income decreasing 
discretionary accruals 
Table 6.5 reports the regression results for the relation between institutional 
ownership types and income decreasing discretionary accruals. Transient 
institutional ownership (TRA) is significantly negatively associated with income 
decreasing discretionary accruals (DACC - ; p=0.0002). This supports hypothesis la 
that as transient institutional ownership increases in firms with income decreasing 
discretionary accruals, the more negative are the portfolio firms' discretionary 
accruals. This means that firms with high levels of transient institutional ownership 
have larger income decreasing discretionary accruals than firms with high levels of 
non-institutional ownership. The results from regression model 7 further support 
hypothesis la, where a significant negative relation is found between transient 
ownership relative to total institutional ownership (TRARELPISH) and income 
decreasing discretionary accruals (DACC - ; p=0.0002). These results are consistent 
with the big bath hypothesis and short-term incentives being provided by transient 
institutional investors. 
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Table 6.5: Regression Analyses for Sample Firms with Income Decreasing 
Discretionary Accruals (Dependent Variable: DACC) 
Variable** Expected Sign Model 6 Model 7 Comparative 
Intercept -0.0791 -0.0684 -0.0809 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PISH +/- -0.0035 -0.0008 
p-value 0.3016 0.4547 
TRA -0.0930 
p-value 0.0002 
LTPISH + 0.0329 
p-value 0.0005 
TRARELPISH - -0.0370 
p-value 0.0002 
SIZE +/- 0.0073 0.0076 0.0079 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LEV + 0.0395 0.0407 0.0426 
p-value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
MKTBV - -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0027 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EXPERF + 0.0009 0.0001 0.0005 
p-value 0.4525 0.4963 0.4757 
CFO -0.1330 -0.1330 -0.1271 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EQISS -0.1175 -0.1195 -0.1220 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AUD -0.0094 -0.0096 -0.0090 
p-value 0.0787 0.0717 0.0861 
AUDOP 0.0095 0.0103 0.0104 
p-value 0.0189 0.0131 0.0114 
Adjusted R2 0.1364 0.1362 0.1289 
2099 2099 2099 
*p-values are derived from White (1980) corrected t-statistics. Reported p-values are one-tail if sign 
for the estimated coefficients is predicted, otherwise, two-tail p-values are reported. 
**DACC - = Income decreasing discretionary accruals; PISH = Total institutional ownership as a 
percentage of total shares outstanding; TRA = Transient institutional ownership as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding; LTPISH = Long-term oriented institutional ownership as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding; TRARELPISH = Transient institutional ownership relative to total 
institutional ownership, measured as TRA/PISH; SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of equity 
(#25 *#199); LEV = Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6); MKTBV = Market-to-book 
ratio (#25 * #199)/(#216); EXPERF = Extreme earnings performance (1 if firm's ROA (#237/#6) is 
within the top decile, 0 otherwise; CFO = Cash flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#12); 
EQISS = Amount of new equity issue (#108) divided by market value of equity (#25 *#199); AUD = 
Auditor dummy variable (1 if audited by Big-6 auditors, 0 otherwise); AUDOP = Auditor's opinion (0 
if a firm received a clean unqualified report, 1 otherwise) 
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The results also support the argument that long-term oriented institutions constrain 
portfolio firm managers' accruals discretion, i.e., there is a positive association 
between long-term oriented institutional ownership and income decreasing 
discretionary accruals (H2a). As such, the greater the level of long-term oriented 
institutional ownership, the smaller are portfolio firms' negative discretionary 
accruals. The estimated coefficient for LTPISH is positive and significant at the 
0.1% level (p=0.0005). The results also mean firms with high levels of long-term 
oriented institutional ownership have smaller negative discretionary accruals than 
firms with high levels of non-institutional ownership. 
The comparative column results show that total institutional ownership (PISH) is not 
significantly related to income decreasing discretionary accruals. This is expected as 
transient and long-term oriented institutional ownership have opposing effects on 
income decreasing discretionary accruals. It also highlights the importance of 
considering the institutions' investment preferences when examining their 
association with portfolio firms' earnings management. 
In contrast to the finding in Table 6.4, firm size (SIZE) is positively associated with 
income decreasing discretionary accruals (p=0.0000). Explanations consistent with 
the political cost hypothesis may explain these two findings on firm size. First, when 
firms engage in income increasing discretionary accruals, managers of larger firms 
would prefer less positive discretionary accruals to avoid political attention by 
having high earnings levels. On the other hand, when firms engage in income 
decreasing discretionary accruals, managers of larger firms prefer less negative 
discretionary accruals. Managers of larger firms would prefer a smaller reduction to 
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their reported earnings via negative discretionary accruals, therefore avoiding 
unnecessary political attention, possibly as a result of poor earnings performance. 
Consistent with the debt hypothesis, leverage (LEV) is associated with less income 
decreasing discretionary accruals (p<0.001). Market-to-book ratios (MKTBV) are 
associated with more income decreasing discretionary accruals (p=0.0000). This can 
be explained by the argument that if growth stocks will be punished when they 
under-perform, they might as well take a bath to create accounting slack for future 
periods, an outcome similar to the traditional "big bath" argument although in this 
instance, the incentives come from the capital market. 96 The expected negative 
relation between cash flows (CFO) and accruals is supported. Firms that received a 
qualified audit opinion (AUDOP) have less negative discretionary accruals, 
suggesting that auditors disapproved some less income decreasing discretionary 
accruals adopted by firms. 
The amount of new equity issue (EQISS) is associated with more income decreasing 
discretionary accruals (p=0.0000), which means that the more new equity that is 
raised, the more negative are discretionary accruals. This is an interesting result as 
the existing literature predicts and finds that firms, on average, manage their 
discretionary accruals upward during the time of new equity issues (e.g., Rangan, 
1998; Teoh et al., 1998b). However, during the periods where Rangan (1998) finds 
significant positive accruals management, around 41% of his sample engaged in 
negative discretionary accruals.97 Rangan (1998) does not provide any explanation 
to this effect. It is likely that firms that issue new equity and engage in income 
96 	Skinner and Sloan (1999) find that growth stocks (as proxied by market-to-book ratio) 
experience a much large negative share price reaction to earnings disappointment. 
97 	There are no equivalent statistics provided by Teoh et al. (1998b) to perform any 
comparison. 
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decreasing discretionary accruals have other incentives to do so. 98 However, it is 
beyond the scope of this study to investigate the reasons for this negative association. 
The regression models explain around 13% of the variation in discretionary accruals. 
6.4 Regression results: Associations between institutional ownership type and 
discretionary accruals conditional upon earnings targets 
Section 6.3 above examines the relations between institutional ownership types and 
income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals. This section analyses the 
relation between institutional ownership types and discretionary accruals conditional 
upon portfolio firms' earnings targets. Specifically, Section 6.4.1 reports the results 
in relation to firms that exceeded their earnings targets via positive discretionary 
accruals, that is "reversible decline" (RD) firms. Section 6.4.2 presents the results 
for firms that did not meet their earnings targets through discretionary accruals 
("irreversible decline" (ID) firms) and finally results for firms with non-discretionary 
earnings that exceeded their earnings target ("increased" (IN) firms) are documented 
in Section 6.4.3. 
98 	As discussed in an earlier section, firms that engaged in income decreasing discretionary 
accruals, on average, had greater market-to-book ratio and cash flow performance, and lower return 
on assets than firms that engaged in income increasing discretionary accruals (see Table 6.1). These 
firm characteristics might provide some indications to the reasons underlying the negative relation 
between income decreasing discretionary accruals and new equity issues. 
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6.4.1 Effects of institutional ownership type on "reversible decline" (RD) 
firms' discretionary accruals 
Table 6.6 presents the regression results for the association between institutional 
ownership types and discretionary accruals among "reversible decline" (RD) firms, 
that is, firms that managed to meet their earnings targets via positive discretionary 
accruals. Hypothesis 3 predicts that transient institutional ownership is positively 
associated with "reversible decline" (RD) firms' discretionary accruals. The 
estimated coefficient for TRA is positive but is only significant at the 10% level 
(p=0.0527). 
Following Bushee (1998), the association between transient institutional ownership 
and discretionary accruals among "reversible decline" firms is further examined 
using an indicator variable, DQ5(TRA), to replace TR A in the regression analysis. 99 
The results (not tabled) indicate that DQ5(TRA) is positive and significant at the 5% 
level (p=0.0315), consistent with Bushee's (1998) findings. This suggests that 
portfolio firms with a high proportion of ownership by transient institutions are 
significantly more likely to manage earnings upwards than (1) firms with low 
transient institutional ownership; and (2) firms with high non-institutional 
ownership. Consistent with the findings in Section 6.3.1, the positive association 
between "reversible decline" firms' discretionary accruals and transient institutional 
ownership is stronger when the institutional ownership of portfolio firms is 
predominantly made up of transient institutional ownership. 
99 	DQ5(TRA) takes a value of 1 when TRARELPISH falls within the top quintile and 0 
otherwise, consistent with Bushee (1998). 
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Table 6.6: Regression Analyses for "Reversible Decline" Sample Firms * 
(Dependent Variable: DACC) 
Variable** Expected Sign Model 8 Model 9 Comparative 
Intercept 0.1717 0.1618 0.1732 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PISH +/- -0.0398 -0.0427 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
IRA + 0.0596 
p-value 0.0527 
LTPISH - -0.0791 
p-value 0.0000 
TRARELPISH + 0.0314 
p-value 0.0203 
SIZE +/- -0.0080 -0.0081 -0.0083 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LEV + 0.0116 0.0102 0.0095 
p-value 0.2401 0.2686 0.2845 
MKTBV + 0.0059 0.0059 0.0061 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EXPERF + 0.0862 0.0867 0.0864 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CFO - -0.2453 -0.2449 -0.2489 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EQISS + 0.2991 0.3016 0.3086 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AUD -0.0213 -0.0209 -0.0224 
p-value 0.0209 0.0231 0..0152 
AUDOP + -0.0030 -0.0034 -0.0042 
p-value 0.3351 0.3173 0.2735 
Adjusted R2 0.3309 0.3298 0.3274 
N 1504 1504 1504 
*p-values are derived from White (1980) corrected t-statistics. Reported p-values are one-tail if sign 
for the estimated coefficients is predicted, otherwise, two-tail p-values are reported. 
**DACC = Discretionary accruals; PISH = Total institutional ownership as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding; TRA = Transient institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; LTPISH = Long-term oriented institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; TRARELPISH = Transient institutional ownership relative to total institutional 
ownership, measured as TRA/PISH; SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of equity (#25 * 
#199); LEV = Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6); MKTBV = Market-to-book ratio (#25 
* #199)/(#216); EXPERF = Extreme earnings performance (1 if firm's ROA (#237/#6) is within the 
top decile, 0 otherwise; CFO = Cash flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#12); EQISS = 
Amount of new equity issue (#108) divided by market value of equity (#25 *#199); AUD = Auditor 
dummy variable (1 if audited by Big-6 auditors, 0 otherwise); AUDOP = Auditor's opinion (0 if a 
firm received a clean unqualified report, 1 otherwise) 
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The above results provide conditional support for the argument that transient 
institutional ownership creates incentives for portfolio firm managers to manage 
their discretionary accruals upward to meet their earnings targets (Hypothesis 3). In 
particular, transient institutional ownership is (1) positively associated with 
discretionary accruals among "reversible decline" firms at the 10% level; and (2) 
positively associated with discretionary accruals of "reversible decline" firms with 
predominantly transient institutional ownership at the 5% level. 
A stronger result is found when the proportion of total institutional ownership owned 
by transient institutions is considered. The estimated coefficient for TRARELPISH 
is positive and significant (p=0.0203). Given the marginal insignificance of the 
estimated coefficient for TRA and high significance of the estimated coefficient for 
LTPISH (p=0.0000 for LTPISH, discussed below), the nature of the positive 
association between transient institutional ownership relative to total institutional 
ownership and discretionary accruals of "reversible decline" firms is dominated by 
the significant negative association between long-term oriented institutional 
ownership and discretionary accruals. 
Hypothesis 4 assumes that long-term oriented institutional investors, through their 
monitoring of their portfolio firms, restrict portfolio firm managers' discretion over 
accruals management. Thus, it predicts a negative relation between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and "reversible decline" (RD) firms' discretionary 
accruals. This hypothesised negative relation is supported. The estimated 
coefficient for LTPISH is negative and significant at the 0.01% level (p=0.0000).loo 
loo 	Consistent with previous interpretations, the result also implies that "reversible decline" 
firms with high levels of long-term oriented institutional ownership have smaller income increasing 
discretionary accruals than firms with high levels of non-institutional ownership. 
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Institutional ownership as a whole (PISH) is negatively associated with "reversible 
decline" (RD) firms' discretionary accruals (p=0.0000) and is likely to be driven by 
the negative relation between long-term oriented institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals among "reversible decline" (RD) firms. 
Taken together, all the results above suggest that if the types of institutional 
ownership are not explicitly considered separately, researchers are likely to 
prematurely conclude that total institutional investment limits portfolio firm 
managers' accruals discretion, overlooking the potential concurrent opportunistic 
effects of transient institutional investment on portfolio firm managers, especially 
when portfolio firms' institutional ownership is predominantly comprised of 
transient institutions. 
"Reversible decline" (RD) firm size (SIZE) is negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals (p=0.0000), indicating that larger firms are less likely to incur 
:fic,ome increasing discretionary accruals beyond their earnings targets, after those 
earnings targets are met. The "torpedo effects" suggested by Skinner and Sloan 
(1999) appear to exist among "reversible decline" (RD) firms where the estimated 
coefficient for market-to-book ratio (MKTBV) is positive and significant at the 
0.01% level (p=0.0000). Extreme earnings performance (EXPERF) is also 
associated with more aggressive accruals management (p=0.0000). Similarly, the 
more new equity "reversible decline" firms issue (EQISS), the more likely they are 
to manage their reported earnings upward via discretionary accruals (p=0.0000) to 
meet their earnings targets, similar to findings by Teoh et al. (1998b) and Rangan 
(1998). Firms with Big-6 auditors (AUD) engage in less aggressive accruals 
management (p<0.05) consistent with the findings in Becker et al. (1998), and there 
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is a negative relation between accruals and cash flows (CFO; p=0.0000). The 
regression models for "reversible decline" (RD) firms are able to explain about 33% 
of the variation in discretionary accruals. 
6.4.2 Effects of institutional ownership type on "irreversible decline" (ID) 
firms' discretionary accruals 
Section 6.3.2 above reports a negative relation between transient ownership and 
income decreasing discretionary accruals (see Table 6.5), as predicted by hypothesis 
1 a. This preliminary evidence suggests that transient institutional investors create 
incentives for portfolio firm managers to engage in accruals management similar to 
"big bath" behaviour. However, an assumption implicit to hypothesis 1 a is that•
portfolio firms that engage in income decreasing discretionary accruals failed to 
meet their earnings targets, and therefore managers have incentive to take a.bath to 
create accounting slack for future periods. Examination of the relation between 
transient institutional ownership and discretionary accruals among "irreversible 
decline" (ID) firms enables a more accurate investigation of "big bath" effects by 
focusing only on firms that failed to meet their earnings targets. 
Table 6.7 presents regression results focusing on "irreversible decline" (ID) firms. 
The estimated coefficients for IRA and TRARELPISH are insignificant (p=0.3768 
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and 0.1821 respectively). 101 Thus, the results do not support the "big bath" 
prediction (H5). 
An interpretation of the combined results from Table 6.5 and Table 6.7 might be that 
transient institutions create incentives for portfolio firm managers to have more 
negative discretionary accruals in general when portfolio firm managers decided to 
engage in income decreasing discretionary accruals (Table 6.5). However, transient 
institutional ownership does not lead portfolio firm managers to take a bath when 
falling short of firms' earnings targets any more than other types of investors (Table 
6.7). Such behaviour is not surprising, given the sample selection criteria of this 
study and the use of prior year earnings levels as firms' earnings targets. In 
particular, although "irreversible decline" firms fail to meet their prior year earnings 
levels, there are strong capital market incentives for "irreversible decline" firm 
managers to avoid reporting losses (Degeorge et al., 1999). This is consistent with 
findings that avoiding losses is more important than meeting prior year earnings 
levels (Degeorge et al., 1999) and that the capital market punishes firms , reporting 
losses (Barth et al., 1999). Therefore, the incentives to avoid losses create a lower 
bound as to how far "irreversible decline" firms will manage accruals downwards. 
Given that all the sample firms have successfully avoided reporting losses, this lower 
bound might potentially explain the lack of association between "bath-taking" 
behaviour and transient institutional ownership. 
101 	This also implies that transient institutional investors do not affect "irreversible decline" 
firms' discretionary accruals any differently from firms with high levels of non-institutional 
ownership. 
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Table 6.7: Regression Analyses for "Irreversible Decline" Sample Firms * 
(Dependent Variable: DACC) 
Variable** Expected Sign Model 8 Model 9 Comparative 
Intercept 0.1070 0.1025 0.1079 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PISH -0.0426 -0.0450 
p-value 0.0014 0.0005 
TRA 0.0226 
p-value O. 3768 
LTPISH -0.0666 
p -value 0.0013 
TRARELPISH 0.0173 
p-value 0.1821 
SIZE +/- -0.0046 -0.0049 -0.0050 
p-value 0.0033 0.0020 0.0019 
LEV + 0.0220 0.0220 0.0217 
p-value 0.1086 0.1087 0.1120 
MKTBV 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 
p-value 0.2728 0.2741 0.2650 
EXPERF + 0.0746 0.0749 0.0750 
p-value 0.0012 0.0010 0.0011 
CFO -0.1344 -0.1323 -0.1337 
p-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
EQISS + 0.1219 0.1215 0.1232 
p -value 0.0362 0.0358 0.0349 
AUD -0.0268 -0.0270 -0.0270 
p-value 0.0047 0.0044 0.0044 
AUDOP + -0.0069 -0.0069 -0.0067 
p-value 0.1831 0.1834 O. 19 16 
Adjusted R2 0.1390 0.1383 0.1380 
N 1039 1039 1039 
*p-values are derived from White (1980) corrected t-statistics. Reported p-values are one-tail if sign 
for the estimated coefficients is predicted, otherwise, two-tail p-values are reported. 
**DACC = Discretionary accruals; PISH = Total institutional ownership as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding; TRA = Transient institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; LTPISH = Long-term oriented institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; TRARELPISH = Transient institutional ownership relative to total institutional 
ownership, measured as TRA/PISH; SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of equity (#25 * 
#199); LEV = Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6); MKTBV = Market-to-book ratio (#25 
* #199)/(#216); EXPERF = Extreme earnings performance (1 if firm's ROA (#237/#6) is within the 
top decile, 0 otherwise; CFO = Cash flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#12); EQISS = 
Amount of new equity issue (#108) divided by market value of equity (#25 * #199); AUD = Auditor 
dummy variable (1 if audited by Big-6 auditors, 0 otherwise); AUDOP = Auditor's opinion (0 if a 
firm received a clean unqualified report, 1 otherwise) 
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The insignificant estimated coefficients for TRA and TRARELPISH (Table 6.7) also 
do not support the competing hypothesis that transient institutional ownership lead to 
portfolio firm managers smoothing their reported earnings towards firms' earnings 
targets when portfolio firms fail to meet their targets. The income smoothing 
argument predicts significant positive estimated coefficients for both variables. 102 
"Irreversible decline" (ID) firms also provide a unique circumstance to examine 
potential alternative effects of long-term oriented institutional ownership on portfolio 
firms' discretionary accruals. Hypothesis 6 predicts a "reverse" myopic effect of 
long-term oriented institutional ownership among firms that fail to achieve their 
earnings targets. In particular, a negative association between long-term oriented 
institutional ownership and discretionary accruals among "irreversible decline" (ID) 
firms is predicted. From Table 6.7, the estimated coefficient for LTPISH is negative 
and significant at the 1% level (p=0.0013) supporting hypothesis 6. 103 This result 
suggests that there is a conservative bias in long-term oriented institutional investors' 
constraints on portfolio firm managers' accruals discretion. 
The combined results from Tables 6.4, 6.5 and Table 6.7 can be interpreted as: long-
term oriented institutional investors on average constrain portfolio firm managers' 
accruals management through their involvement in the portfolio firms (results from 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5). However, when portfolio firms fail to meet their earnings 
targets, the presence of long-term oriented institutional investors and their 
monitoring activities can lead managers of portfolio firms to engage in conservative 
102 	Although both estimated coefficients for TRA and TRARELPISH are insignificant, both of 
them are consistently positive indicating that when portfolio firms failed to meet their earnings 
targets, managers might have incentive to smooth reported earnings. 
103 	As noted in Chapter 3, "reverse" myopia and "big bath" arguments both lead to the same 
outcome and hence are empirically indistinguishable. The observed negative relation between long-
term oriented institutional ownership and discretionary accruals among ID firms can be attributable to 
either argument. However, it is beyond to scope of this study to distinguish the two. 
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("reverse" myopic) accruals management (Table 6.7). It is important to note, 
however, that even though long-term oriented institutional investors appear to be 
associated with "reverse" myopic accruals management among "irreversible decline" 
firms, the "irreversible decline" firms in this sample are still able to avoid reporting 
losses (Degeorge et al., 1999). 1°4 
Other factors that are significantly associated with "irreversible decline" (ID) firms' 
discretionary accruals include firm size (SIZE, negative and significant at the 1% 
level), extreme earnings performance (EXPERF, positive and significant at the 1% 
level), cash flows from operations (CFO, negative and significant at the 1% level), 
amount of new equity issues (EQISS, positive and significant at the 5% level), and 
Big-6 auditors designation (AUD, negative and significant at the 1% level). The 
regression models for "irreversible decline" (ID) firms explain around 14% of the 
variation in discretionary accruals. 
6.4.3 Effects of institutional ownership type on "increased" (IN) firms' 
discretionary accruals 
"Increased" (IN) firms are firms that meet or exceed their earnings targets prior to 
accruals management. That is, "increased" (IN) firms can meet their earnings targets 
without managing their accruals. In general, the different types of institutional 
ownership are not expected to affect discretionary accruals of "increased" (IN) firms. 
This expectation is consistent with the results reported in Table 6.8 where the 
estimated coefficients for all the institutional ownership variables TRA, 
104 	The sample selection criteria omit firms that report losses. 
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TRARELPISH, LTPISH and PISH are insignificant. 105 That is, institutional 
investors, regardless of type, do not affect "increased" firms' discretionary accruals 
any differently from firms with high levels of non-institutional investors. 
The estimated coefficient for auditor's opinion is significantly positive (p=0.0001) 
suggesting that "increased" (IN) firms that received a qualified audit opinion are 
overly aggressive in their accruals management strategies. 
However, a further partition of "increased" (IN) firms allows a closer examination of 
any potential incentives created by different types of institutional investors for their 
portfolio firm managers to engage in income smoothing behaviour (H7 and H8). 
The income smoothing argument predicts a negative relation between transient (and 
long-term oriented) institutional ownership and the discretionary accruals of 
"increased" (IN) firms with an increase in current year reported earnings. The 
results do not support the argument that institutional investors (regardless of which 
types of institutional investor they are) encourage portfolio firm managers to smooth 
reported earnings (Table 6.9). The estimated coefficients for all the institutional 
ownership measures TRA, TRARELPISH, LTPISH and PISH, are insignificant. 
105 The estimated coefficient for indicator variable, DQ5(TRA), is insignificant at the 
conventional levels. 
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Table 6.8: Regression Analyses for "Increased" Sample Firms * (Dependent 
Variable: DACC) 
Variable** Expected Sign Model 8 Model 9 Comparative 
Intercept -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0010 
p-value 0.9342 0.9136 0.9278 
PISH Insignificant -0.0105 -0.0106 
p-value 0.2074 0.2028 
IRA Insignificant -0.0147 
p-value 0.6296 
LTPISH Insignificant -0.0091 
p-value 0.4268 
TRARELPISH Insignificant 0.0006 
p-value 0.9593 
SIZE +/- 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 
p-value 0.0126 0.0116 0.0115 
LEV + 0.0332 0.0334 0.0334 
p-value 0.0024 0.0022 0.0022 
MKTB V + -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 
p-value 0.0200 0.0201 0.0201 
EXPERF + 0.0670 0.0670 0.0670 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CFO -0.2789 -0.2790 -0.2789 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EQISS + 0.0227 0.0223 0.0224 
p-value 0.2305 0.2352 0.2337 
AUD - -0.0183 -0.0183 -0.0183 
p-value 0.0224 0 0224 0.0224 
AUDOP + 0.0223 0.0224 0.0224 
p-value 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Adjusted R2 0.1444 0.1444 0.1447 
N 2719 2719 2719 
*p-values are derived from White (1980) corrected t-statistics. Reported p-values are one-tail if sign 
for the estimated coefficients is predicted, otherwise, two-tail p-values are reported. 
**DACC = Discretionary accruals; PISH = Total institutional ownership as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding; TRA = Transient institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; LTPISH = Long-term oriented institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; TRARELPISH = Transient institutional ownership relative to total institutional 
ownership, measured as TRA/PISH; SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of equity (#25 * 
#199); LEV = Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6); MKTBV = Market-to-book ratio (#25 
* #199)/(#216); EXPERF = Extreme earnings performance (1 if firm's ROA (#2371#6) is within the 
top decile, 0 otherwise; CFO = Cash flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#12); EQISS = 
Amount of new equity issue (#108) divided by market value of equity (#25 * #199); AUD = Auditor 
dummy variable (1 if audited by Big-6 auditors, 0 otherwise); AUDOP = Auditor's opinion (0 if a 
firm received a clean unqualified report, 1 otherwise) 
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Table 6.9: Regression Analyses for "Increased" Sample Firms Reporting an 
Increase in Earnings* (Dependent Variable: DACC) 
Variable** Expected Sign Model 8 Model 9 Comparative 
Intercept 0.0176 0.0164 0.0173 
p-value 0.1208 0.1565 0.1260 
PISH -0.0106 -0.0108 
p-value 0.2535 0.1225 
TRA -0.0246 
p-value 0.2297 
LTPISH - -0.0052 
p-value 0.3448 
TRARELPISH - 0.0029 
p-value 0.4135 
SIZE +/- 0.0020 0.0021 0.0020 
p-value 0.1419 0.1190 0.1213 
LEV + 0.0293 0.0298 0.0297 
p-value 0.0148 0.0131 0.0132 
MKTBV + -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 
p-value 0.0584 0.0550 0.0554 
EXPERF + 0.0638 0.0634 0.0636 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CFO - -0.3068 -0.3072 -0.3071 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
EQISS + 0.0315 0.0300 0.0305 
p-value 0.1613 0.1743 0.1693 
AUD - -0.0225 -0.0225 -0.0225 
p-value 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087 
AUDOP + 0.0275 0.0276 0.0276 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R2 0.1557 0.1556 0.1559 
N 2329 2329 2329 
*p-values are derived from White (1980) corrected t-statistics. Reported p-values are one-tail if sign 
for the estimated coefficients is predicted, otherwise, two-tail p-values are reported. 
**DACC = Discretionary accruals; PISH = Total institutional ownership as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding; IRA = Transient institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; LTPISH = Long-term oriented institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; TRARELPISH = Transient institutional ownership relative to total institutional 
ownership, measured as TRA/PISH; SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of equity (#25 * 
#199); LEV = Ratio of total debt (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6); MKTBV = Market-to-book ratio (#25 
* #199)/(#216); EXPERF = Extreme earnings performance (1 if firm's ROA (#237/#6) is within the 
top decile, 0 otherwise; CFO = Cash flows from operations (#308) divided by sales (#12); EQISS = 
Amount of new equity issue (#108) divided by market value of equity (#25 *#199); AUD = Auditor 
dummy variable (1 if audited by Big-6 auditors, 0 otherwise); AUDOP = Auditor's opinion (0 if a 
firm received a clean unqualified report, 1 otherwise) 
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As explained in Section 3.6.1, "increased" (IN) firms with an increase in current year 
reported earnings can include firms with positive, zero or negative discretionary 
accruals. The income smoothing hypothesis would predict that "increased" (IN) 
firms with an increase in reported earnings would engage in negative discretionary 
accruals. Additional tests are carried out to examine only "increased" (IN) firms 
with an increase in reported earnings that have negative discretionary accruals (not 
tabled). This creates a sub-sample of portfolio firms that include only "increased" 
firms that exhibited discretionary accrual behaviour consistent with income 
smoothing. The estimated coefficient for TRA and TRARELPISH are both negative 
and significant at the 0.1% level (p=0.0009, and 0.0006 respectively), thus providing 
some support for the income smoothing argument for transient institutional investors 
in a very restricted subset of firms. Total institutional ownership (PISH) is not 
significantly associated with negative discretionary accruals of these firms 
(p=0.3166). Therefore, these results provide only limited support for Carlson and 
Bathala's (1997) contention that transient institutional investment encourages 
income smoothing behaviour. 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficient for long-term oriented institutional ownership 
(LTPISH) is positive and significant at the 0.1% level (p=0.0002) for this very 
restricted sub-sample. This result is unexpected and opposite to the prediction of 
income smoothing behaviour. Further tests (not reported) on "increased" (IN) firms 
with an increase in reported earnings but with positive discretionary accruals reveal 
that the estimated coefficient for LTPISH is negative and significant at the 1% level 
(p=0.0028). Combining these two findings on the association between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and "increased" (IN) firms' (that reported an 
increase in earnings) positive and negative discretionary accruals, an interpretation 
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similar to Hla and H2a is possible. That is, long-term oriented institutional investors 
do not encourage income smoothing behaviour among "increased" (IN) firms that 
reported an increase in current year earnings; rather their presence restricts the 
accruals management exercised by managers of these firms. 
6.5 Robustness tests 
This section reports the various sensitivity tests conducted to ensure that the 
preceding results are robust. Specifically, Section 6.5.1 examines whether excluding 
observations with estimated discretionary accruals around zero affects the primary 
results found above. The effects of alternative institutional ownership measures-are 
then examined in Section 6.5.2. Section 6.5.3 reports the analysis performed to 
ensure• the preceding results are not driven by firm size. Finally, the .effects of 
accounting flexibility available to portfolio firm managers on the primary results are 
examined in Section 6.5.4. 
6.5.1 Excluding observations with estimated discretionary accruals around 
zero 
Given the nature of the hypotheses in this thesis, the robustness of the results 
reported above depends upon the direction of the estimated discretionary accruals. 
To ensure that the reported results are not a product of measurement errors arising 
out of the discretionary accruals estimation process, observations with estimated 
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discretionary accruals around zero are excluded. Three separate cut-off points are 
adopted since there is no existing literature to guide their selection. First, 
observations with estimated discretionary accruals that fall between -0.01% and 
0.01% of prior year total assets are omitted. The next cut-off criterion excludes 
observations with estimated discretionary accruals between -0.1% and 0.1% of prior 
year total assets. Finally, observations with estimated discretionary accruals that fall 
between -1% and 1% of prior year total assets are excluded. 106 
Trimming observations with estimated discretionary accruals around zero excludes 
observations that are most susceptible to misclassification (based on estimated 
discretionary accruals), thus enhancing the validity of the results reported in the 
above sections. The unreported results indicate that, regardless of the cut-off criteria 
used, all findings are consistent with those reported in Tables 6.4 to 6.9. Thus, the 
earlier results found are unlikely to be a product of measurement errors in estimated 
discretionary accruals. 
6.5.2 Alternative measure of institutional ownership 
In calculating their institutional ownership measures, Bushee (1998) and Majumdar 
and Nagarajan (1997) use the ownership measures at the end of the third quarter and 
at the beginning of the years, respectively. Bushee (1998) assumes that managers of 
investee firms would have a better knowledge of the expected earnings during the 
last quarter and begin to consider their earnings management strategies. Similarly, 
106 	The cut-off point stops at 1% of prior year total assets as it is considered economically 
significant and is unlikely to be solely due to measurement error in the discretionary accruals 
estimation process. Furthermore, the sample firms have average estimated discretionary accruals of 
around 3.3% of prior year total assets (see Table 6.1). 
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Majumdar and Nagarajan (1997, 48) argue that firms are expected to adjust their 
"long-term strategic predispositions as a result of the presence of [institutional] 
investors" during this period of time. This consideration is more relevant to both of 
the studies, which investigate institutional ownership effects on R&D spending, 
since the R&D investment decision process generally requires more time than the 
accruals management decision process. In contrast, when accruals manipulation is 
use as an earnings management technique, such lagging is unlikely to be 
necessarily. 107 
However, as a sensitivity test, all the tests are re-run using institutional ownership 
measured at the end of third quarter to ensure the robustness of the findings of this 
study. All the results (not reported) are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Tables 6.4 to 6.9 except that stronger results are found in . support of the transient 
institutional ownership association with aggressive discretionary accruals. 
management among "reversible decline" firms (H3). The significance of the 
estimated coefficient of TRA improves from p=0.0527 (Table 6.6) to p=0 11 ,12-(not 
reported), whilst the significance of the estimated coefficient of TRARELPISH 
improves from p=0.0203 (see Table 6.6) to p=0.0000 (not reported). Thus, 
conclusions reached in preceding sections hold, regardless of whether institutional 
ownership is measured at the end of third or fourth quarter. 
107 	In a similar study where discretionary accruals are used as a proxy for earnings management, 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1998) do not lag their institutional ownership measures when 
investigation the relation between institutional ownership and discretionary accruals. 
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6.5.3 Further examination of size effects 
Sloan (1996) finds evidence suggesting a non-linear (quadratic) relation between 
firm size and total accruals. To examine whether this non-linearity between firm 
size and accruals affects the findings on the relation between types of institutional 
ownership and discretionary accruals, all the models are re-estimated by including an 
additional variable, SIZE2 . The estimated coefficients of the relevant institutional 
ownership variables are qualitatively the same except for transient institutional 
ownership variables for the "reversible decline" sample (H3). In particular, the 
estimated coefficients for both TRA and TRARELPISH become more significant 
when the non-linearity relation between firm size and .discretionary accruals are 
considered. 
6.5.4 The effects of accounting flexibility available to managers 
Managers' accruals management strategies are likely to be affected by past earnings 
management decisions. Exercise of accounting discretion in prior years can limit the 
discretion available to managers in the current year. For example, Sweeney (1994) 
investigates whether managers' accounting responses to technical default are 
conditional upon the imposition of default costs by creditors and the availability of 
accounting flexibility. Sweeney's definition of accounting flexibility is, among other 
things, conditional upon the prior year's accounting procedure choice. Her results 
support her hypothesis that "managers of firms having accounting flexibility and 
bearing default costs are more likely to make income-increasing accounting changes 
in response to tightening debt-covenant constraints than managers of firms not 
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having accounting flexibility and/or not bearing default costs" (p.302). In addition, 
since accruals are mean-reverting (see Dechow, 1994; Sloan, 1996), the effects of 
prior periods' accruals management decisions can affect current period accruals 
management decisions. Sloan (1996) documents that firms with unusually large 
(small) accruals in the current period tend to have lower (higher) accruals in the 
following periods. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate the potential constraints imposed on current 
year accruals discretion as a result of prior year accrual decisions. In particular, if 
such constraints exist primarily among firms with high long-term oriented 
institutional ownership, then a negative (positive) relation between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and income increasing (decreasing) discretionary 
accruals may be alternatively explained by the lack of accruals discretion available to 
portfolio firm managers rather than explained by the constraining effects of long-
term oriented institutional ownership. In contrast, if a significant positive (negative) 
relation between transient institutional ownership and income increasing 
(decreasing) discretionary accruals is observed even when managers of portfolio 
firms have only limited discretion over accruals management, this will further 
enhance the transient institutional investor arguments. 
The effects of prior periods' accruals management on the level of discretion 
available to managers for current period accruals is captured by the prior year's 
current accruals (CACCLAG). Consistent with the cash flow approach to measuring 
total accruals, current accruals is measured as, (Increase in accounts receivable (item 
302) + Increase in inventory (item 303) + Decrease in accounts payable (item 304) + 
Decrease in income taxes accrued (item 305) + Increase (Decrease) in assets 
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(liabilities)-other (item 307)) scaled by prior year total assets. Current accruals are 
used because Sloan (1996) finds that variation in accruals is primarily attributable to 
the current asset component of accruals, and that current accruals can better capture 
the variation in accruals when the current asset and current liability components of 
accruals change disproportionately. Furthermore, Sloan (1996) and Bradshaw et al. 
(1999) find that the majority of the current accruals reverse themselves within the 
first year immediately after they were incurred. 108 The greater the prior year's 
current accruals, the more managers are constrained by the effects of prior year 
accruals management decisions in the current year. 
In addition to using the continuous measure of prior year current accruals 
(CACCLAG) to capture the effects of prior accrual decisions on current year 
discretionary accruals, two discrete variables are introduced. The first discrete 
variable aims to capture the lack of discretion over accruals in the current year as a 
result of prior year accounting decisions, LOWFLEX, which takes a value of 1 if 
CACCLAG is in the top decile and 0 otherwise. The second discrete variable aims 
at capturing the high accruals flexibility available to managers of portfolio firms, 
HIFLEX. It takes the value of 1 if CACCLAG is in the lowest decile and 0 
otherwise. 
All the tests are re-run by including these three variables individually as well as in 
combination to examine whether the impacts of types of institutional ownership on 
portfolio firms' discretionary accruals are affected by accruals flexibility available to 
portfolio firm managers. The results for long-term oriented institutional ownership 
108 	Sloan's (1996) study covers the pre-FAS 95 period while Bradshaw et al. (1999) cover the 
post-FAS 95 period. The results from Sloan (1996) and Bradshaw et al. (1999) indicate that the 
mean-reversion behaviour of accruals remains relatively constant between 1962 and 1997. 
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remain unchanged. While the results for transient institutional ownership are largely 
unchanged, the only difference is the findings among "reversible decline" firms 
(H3). When accounting flexibility is controlled for, transient institutional ownership 
does not appear to affect "reversible decline" firms' discretionary accruals. 
Therefore, there is only limited support for the arguments that transitory investment 
by institutional investors creates incentives for portfolio firm managers to manage 
their earnings for short-term gains. 
6.6 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter examines empirical evidence testing the hypothesised relations between 
institutional ownership types and discretionary accruals. The results of the analysis 
support the contention that long-term oriented institutional investors play an active 
role in portfolio firms' governance through their monitoring activities and constrain 
portfolio firm managers from engaging in excessive discretionary accruals. In 
particular, long-term oriented institutional ownership is found to be negatively 
(positively) associated with income increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals. 
This constraining effect is also evident among portfolio firms that have greatest 
incentives to manage their earnings aggressively (viz., "reversible decline" fimis) . 109 
These findings are unlikely to be an effect of measurement error in discretionary 
accruals, and are robust to different measures of institutional ownership, different 
specifications of the relation between discretionary accruals and firm size, and the 
effects of accounting flexibility available to portfolio firm managers. 
109 	This constraining effect of long-term oriented institutional investment is also apparent 
among "increased" firms that reported an increase in current year earnings and with positive 
discretionary accruals. 
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In addition to the constraining effects long-term oriented institutional ownership 
appear to have on portfolio firms' discretionary accruals, an alternative influence of 
long-term oriented institutional ownership on portfolio firm managers' accruals 
management is also found under specific circumstances. In particular, for portfolio 
firms that face an inevitable failure to meet their earnings target, long-term oriented 
institutional ownership is found to be negatively associated with discretionary 
accruals. This is consistent with the hypothesised "reverse" myopic behaviour 
induced by such institutional ownership. 11° 
The "reverse" myopia is consistently found in various robustness tests, and 
contradicts the existing understanding that long-term oriented institutional investors 
have a long time horizon orientation in relation to their investment in portfolio firms. 
The observed "reverse" myopic behaviour among portfolio firms may suggest there 
is a conservative bias in long-term oriented institutional investors' constraints on 
portfolio firm managers' accruals discretion. Given that the current literature has not 
specifically examined the "reverse" myopic effects of long-term oriented 
institutional ownership, further research into this observation is required to 
understand the reasons underlying such effects. It will be interesting for future 
studies to investigate whether this apparent association between long-term oriented 
institutional ownership and conservatism affects earnings quality, thus reducing the 
capacity of reported earnings to convey private information. 
There is no evidence indicating that long-term oriented institutional ownership 
encourages income smoothing behaviour among portfolio firms. 
110 	As discussed in previous chapter, "reverse" myopia and "big bath" arguments both lead to 
the same outcome and are impossible to distinguish empirically. This study does not attempt to 
distinguish the two as it is beyond its scope. 
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The evidence concerning the relations between transient institutional ownership and 
portfolio firm discretionary accruals is less conclusive. The negative relation 
between transient institutional ownership and income decreasing discretionary 
accruals is robust and consistent with transitory investment by institutional investors 
creating incentives for managers of portfolio firms to engage in myopic accruals 
management to create accounting slack for future periods. However, the 
hypothesised positive relation between transient institutional ownership and income 
increasing discretionary accruals is not evident. Similar to Bushee (1998), the 
association between transient institutional ownership and aggressive accruals 
management is more robust and consistent when transient institutional ownership 
dominates portfolio firms' institutional ownership 
When the transient investor hypothesis is tested in an environment where it should 
be most pronounced (among "reversible decline" firms), the predicted relation is 
only significant at the 10% level in the main test. However, for "reversible decline" 
firms with a high proportion of ownership b; transient institutions, the transient 
investor hypothesis is supported at the 5% level. When constraints on the accounting 
flexibility available to portfolio firm managers are considered, no support is found 
for the transient investor hypothesis. Similar to Bushee (1998), overall evidence of 
the short-term effects of transient institutional investment is more consistent and 
robust when total institutional ownership is predominantly made up of transient 
institutional ownership. Therefore, there is only limited support for the arguments 
that transient institutional investors encourage managerial myopia. 
Evidence on the association between transient institutional ownership and income 
smoothing by portfolio firm managers is very limited. Such association is only 
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found within a very restricted sub-sample. Finally, transient institutional ownership 
is not found to be associated with "big bath" behaviour although this might be 
alternatively explained by the inherent characteristics of the sample firms, since the 
sample excludes loss-making firms. 
The results of this study highlight the importance of examining different types of 
institutional ownership separately when investigating the effects of institutional 
ownership on firms' earnings management. The study also provides evidence 
indicating the alternative effects of institutional ownership types on firms' 
discretionary accruals, conditional upon the position of firms' non-discretionary 
e;arnings relative to their earnings targets. The overall results provide -evidence 
indicating the complexities implicit to the effects of institutional ownership types on 
portfolio firms' accruals management strategies. Also, the findings on the relation 
between transient institutional ownership and earnings management indicate-that 
transient institution-induced managerial myopia may not be as prevalent, on average, 
as posited by critics (e.g., Black 1998, Black and Coffee, 1994; Coffee, 1991; Levitt, 
1998; Porter, 1992). 
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7 Summary and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter reports the results for hypothesis tests and robustness tests. 
This chapter summaries and concludes the thesis. It begins with a brief review of the 
purpose and motivation of the study in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 outlines the structure 
of the thesis. Section 7.4 presents a summary of the major findings of this study 
while Section 7.5 discusses their implications. Section 7.6 details this study's 
limitations and is followed by Section 7.7, which suggests some future research 
avenues. Finally, Section 7.8 concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Purpose and motivation 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relations between institutional investor 
type and portfolio firms' accruals management. First, this study examines the 
relations between institutional investor type and portfolio firms' discretionary 
accruals separately for portfolio firms with income increasing and income decreasing 
discretionary accruals. The relations between institutional ownership type and 
accruals management are then examined to determine whether the nature of these 
relations depends upon the position of portfolio firms' pre-managed earnings relative 
to their earnings targets. Examining portfolio firm managers' earnings management 
conditional upon earnings targets allows tests for the different incentives created by 
the two types of institutional investors where these incentives are most likely to 
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present. As such, accruals management to achieve different objectives can be 
investigated (e.g., aggressive, "big bath", income smoothing). 
This study is motivated by several factors. First, there is heightened interest in the 
corporate governance role of institutional investors in their portfolio firms as a result 
of the surge in institutional ownership among public firms over the past decade. 
Depending on their investment horizon, prior research argues that institutional 
investors can either encourage myopic managerial behaviour among portfolio firm 
managers (e.g., Bhide, 1993; Froot, Perold and Stein, 1992; Porter, 1992) or actively 
monitor their portfolio firms, thus constraining portfolio firm managers' accruals 
discretion (e.g., Bange and De Bondt, 1998; Bushee, 1998; Majumdar and 
Nagarajan, 1997; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998). Therefore, the manner-in 
which different types of institutional investors affect portfolio firms' accruals 
management is an interesting empirical question. 
The rise of interests in the corporate governance role of institutional investors among 
their portfolio firms has led to a growing body of research examining the success of 
institutional activism (Black, 1998; and Karpoff, 1998 review the recent studies on 
this line of investigation). However, many of these studies use accounting-based 
performance measures as indicators of the success of institutional monitoring. If 
different types of institutional ownership affect portfolio firms' earnings 
management strategies, then accounting-based measures of performance are unlikely 
to be an accurate reflection of the success of institutional activism. This study can 
thus provide empirical evidence to indicate whether researchers should adjust 
accounting-based measures of performance when investigating the success of 
institutional activisms using these measures. 
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Most of the existing studies have used the overall level of institutional ownership 
when investigating the relations between institutional ownership and portfolio firms' 
earnings management, thus obscuring the potential differential effects of institutional 
ownership type on portfolio firms' earnings management decisions (see e.g., 
Majumdar and Nagarajan, 1997; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998). By explicitly 
modelling institutional investor type, this study is able to more accurately test the 
relations between institutional ownership types and accruals management. As such, 
it is able to provide more direct evidence on the influence of ownership by different 
types of institutional investors on portfolio firms' accruals management. 
Furthermore, the only known study that explicitly models different types of 
institutional investors examines the relation between inst . tu tional ownership type and 
earnings management in the context of earnings management through , real 
investment in R&D (Bushee, 1998). There has been very limited evidence on 
whether Bushee's (1998) findings are generalisable to firms without R&D activities 
and/or firms that manage their earnings via accruals. While two other studies 
investigate the relation between institutional ownership and earnings management 
through accounting choice (namely, discretionary accruals), they either use an 
overall institutional ownership measure with no distinction made between different 
types institutional investors (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1998), or a crude 
partition of blockholders versus non-blockholders (Cheng and Reitenga, 2000) to test 
the influence of different types of institutional investors on portfolio firms' 
discretionary accruals. 
Last but not least, Dechow and Skinner (2000), in an attempt to reconcile the 
differential views of earnings management between accounting academics, 
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practitioners and regulators, encourage academics' research efforts to focus more on 
capital market incentives for earnings management given the increased sensitivity of 
managers to the level of their firms' stock prices and stock price relation to key 
accounting numbers such as earnings. Consistent with their call, this study attempts 
to combine both the traditional contracting incentives and capital market incentives 
in investigating the relation between institutional ownership type and earnings 
management. 
7.3 Thesis organisation 
Chapter 1 introduces this thesis, with the next two chapters analysing the relations 
between different types of institutional investors and portfolio firms' accruals 
management. Chapter 2 begins by exploring the institutional investor's role in 
corporate governance. It then analyses and develops hypotheses predicting the 
general relations between different types of institutional investors and income 
increasing (decreasing) earnings management, without specific reference to earnings 
targets. Chapter 3 extends the analysis by explicitly examining portfolio firm 
managers' earnings management incentives conditional upon the portfolio firms' 
earnings targets. Therefore, Chapter 2 provides the general background for an 
understanding of the relation between types of institutional investors and income 
increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals; whereas analysis in Chapter 3 enables 
a more specific understanding of the potentially complex earnings management 
incentives created by different types of institutional investors. 
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Chapter 4 details the scheme and process of classifying institutional investors into 
transient and long-term oriented investors. Chapter 5 outlines the research design for 
testing the hypotheses of this study while Chapter 6 presents the results of the 
empirical tests. 
7.4 Summary of major findings 
Overall, the results support most of the hypothesised relations between long-term 
oriented institutional ownership and portfolio firms' discretionary accruals (H2, H2a, 
H4 and H6). However, there is no evidence suggesting that long-term oriented 
institutional ownership encourages income smoothing behaviour (H8). More 
specifically, the results show that long-term oriented institutional ownership is 
negatively (positively) associated with income increasing (decreasing) discretionary 
accruals, consistent with the contention that long-term oriented institutional investors 
actively involve in monitoring their portfolio firms, thus constraining portfolio firm 
managers' accruals discretions. This constraining effect is also evident among the 
portfolio firms that have greatest incentives to manage their earnings aggressively 
(viz., "reversible decline" firms). 
In addition to the constraining effect long-term oriented institutional investors have 
on their portfolio firm managers, long-term oriented institutional ownership is found 
to associate with "reverse" myopic behaviour among portfolio firms that face an 
inevitable failure to meet their earnings targets (viz., "irreversible decline" firms). 
These findings are unlikely to be an effect of measurement error in discretionary 
accruals, and are robust to different measures of institutional ownership and different 
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specification of the relation between discretionary accruals and firm size. The 
results on the relations between long-term oriented institutional ownership and 
discretionary accruals suggest there is a conservative bias in long-term oriented 
institutional investors' constraints on portfolio firm managers' accruals discretion. 
The results on the relations between transient institutional ownership and portfolio 
firms' discretionary accruals are less conclusive. The negative relation between 
transient institutional ownership and income decreasing discretionary accruals is 
robust and consistent with transitory investment by institutional investors creating 
incentives for managers of portfolio firms to engage in myopic accruals management 
to create accounting slack for future periods. However, the hypothesised positive 
relation between transient institutional ownership and income increasing 
discretionary accruals is not evident. Similar to Bushee (1998), the association 
between transient institutional ownership and aggressive accruals management is 
more robust and consistent if transient institutional ownership dominates portfolio 
firms' institutional ownership. 
When the transient investor hypothesis is tested in an environment where it should 
be most pronounced (among "reversible decline" firms), the predicted relation is 
only significant at the 10% level in the main test. However, for "reversible decline" 
firms with a high proportion of ownership by transient institutions, the transient 
investor hypothesis is supported at the 5% level. When constraints on the accounting 
flexibility available to portfolio firm managers are considered, no support is found 
for the transient investor hypothesis. Similar to Bushee (1998), overall evidence of 
the short-term effects of transient institutional investment is more consistent and 
robust when total institutional ownership is predominantly made up of transient 
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institutional ownership. Therefore, the impact of transient institutional ownership on 
earnings management, in general, may not be as severe as has been suggested (e.g., 
Black 1998, Black and Coffee, 1994; Coffee, 1991; Levitt, 1998). 
Evidence on the association between transient institutional ownership and income 
smoothing by portfolio firm managers is very limited. Such association is only 
found within a very restricted sub-sample. Finally, transient institutional ownership 
is not found to be associated with "big bath" behaviour although this might be 
alternatively explained by the inherent characteristics of the sample firms, where the 
sample excludes loss-making firms. 
7.5 Implications of the study 
This study has several implications. First, it provides empirical evidence ofLthe 
differential influence of institutional investors on portfolio :irms earnings 
management strategies. Since long-term oriented institutional investors have a 
conservative bias in influencing portfolio firms' earnings management, studies on 
the success of institutional activism that use accounting-based performance 
benchmarks without any adjustment are likely to suffer a downward bias on these 
performance benchmarks (see e.g., Black, 1998; Karpoff, 1998). This may explain 
the lack of evidence in the existing literature to indicate that institutional monitoring 
leads to an improved performance in target firms when accounting-based 
performance measures are used as performance benchmarks (Karpoff, 1998). 
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The empirical evidence of this study also suggests that studies that do not distinguish 
between the influences of different types of institutional investors on their portfolio 
firms are potentially over-simplified in design and are likely to be incapable of 
capturing these differential influences. This implication is not restricted to studies 
on the relation between institutional ownership type and earnings management. For 
example, transient and long-term oriented institutional ownership may have different 
influences on board composition, audit committee composition, strength of internal 
• control, or governance structure in genera1. 111 
By combining the traditional contracting incentives and capital market incentives in 
developing its hypotheses, this study is able to predict different portfolio firms' 
accruals management strategies associated within each type of inEtitutional 
ownership, namely transient and long-term oriented institutional ownership, 
conditioned upon portfolio firms' non-discretionary earnings levels relative to 
earnings targets. This approach provides richer contexts to examine the complex 
web of incentives faced by portfolio firm managers in making their earnings 
management decisions. 
While recent studies have found evidence of income smoothing in various contexts 
(e.g., Carlson and Bathala, 1997; DeFond and Park, 1997; Gayer et al., 1995), this 
study's empirical tests yields very little, if any, support for income smoothing being 
associated with institutional ownership types. The distinguishing factor between this 
study and previous income smoothing studies is that income smoothing behaviour is 
tested among sample firms that can be unambiguously attributed to income 
smoothing incentives, if such behaviour is found, rather than a combination of 
These aspects were not examined in this thesis partly because they fall outside its scope, but 
also because data constraints. 
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incentives which include income smoothing. 112  In particular, these sample firms 
exclude (a) those firms that may have been classified as income smoothers by 
existing income smoothing studies, but in fact can also be responding to capital 
market incentives to avoid missing their earnings targets (see e.g., Barth et al., 1999; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Levitt, 1998; Myer and 
Skinner, 1999); and (b) firms that appear to smooth earnings downwards to such an 
extent that they miss their earnings targets and defeat the purpose of income 
smoothing to enhance firm values (Ronen and Sadan, 1981). This raises the concern 
that existing evidence on income smoothing might be driven by including firms that 
behave like income smoothers but also consistently with other incentives such as 
capital market incentives. It might be appropriate for future income smoothing 
studies to create a sample that enable unambiguous attribution of the results, if 
•found, to income smoothing incentives. 
The results also suggest that the association between transient institutional investors 
and portfolio firms' managerial myopia is not restricted to firms with R&D activities 
(Bushee, 1998). Such myopia is manifested through real investment earnings 
management (Bushee, 1998) as well as through accounting choice earnings 
management. This study's results provide evidence that transient institutional 
ownership is associated with more aggressive accruals management by portfolio 
firms. However, this association is stronger among portfolio firms with ownership 
predominantly comprised of transient institutional ownership, consistent with 
Bushee's (1998) findings. Furthermore, long-term oriented institutional investors 
seem to dominate the overall accruals management of portfolio firms. Therefore, the 
alleged managerial myopia induced by transient institutional investors, while 
112 	See Section 3.4 for more details. 
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observable may not as prevalent or severe as previously suggested (e.g., Levitt, 
1998). 
The finding that long-term oriented institutional ownership is associated with 
"reverse" myopic accruals management behaviour also highlights the asymmetric 
influence of long-term oriented institutional ownership on portfolio firms' accruals 
management. In particular, although long-term oriented institutional ownership 
constrains portfolio firms' discretionary accruals in general, it appears that such 
constraint is conservatively biased under certain circumstances. "Reverse" myopia 
is inconsistent with traditional long-term oriented institutional investor arguments. 
As such, this finding opens up an interesting research avenue to investigate further 
the reasons for the long-term oriented institutional investor conservative bias effect 
on portfolio firms' accruals management. 
7.6 Limitations of the study 
As with all studies that use a modified Jones accruals model to proxy for 
discretionary accruals, this study inherits all the limitations of this estimation 
technique. This study uses the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model 
which has been shown to be more powerful and better specified than its time-series 
counterpart to mitigate some of the criticisms on the model (Bartov, et al., 2000; 
Peasnell, et al., 2000). In addition, this study also attempts to control for most of the 
factors that may bias the results by controlling for extreme performances, and cash 
flows from operations; and by eliminating firms with discretionary accruals around 
zero. Given that the sub-samples of this study are partitioned based on discretionary 
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accruals, firms with discretionary accruals around zero are most likely to affect the 
empirical test results if the discretionary accruals of these firms are measured with 
error by the cross-sectional modified Jones model. After controlling for all these 
factors, the results of this study are qualitatively the same, thus suggesting the 
findings of this study are unlikely to be an artefact of measurement errors. 
Another limitation of this study is that only one earnings target is examined by this 
study, namely the prior year earnings levels. Degeorge et al. (1999) find that firms 
have three main earnings targets to meet, namely (in order of importance), to avoid 
losses, to meet prior earnings levels and to meet analysts' forecasts. As a result, the 
findings of this study may• not be generalisable tc the whole-population of firms in 
the economy. However, given that the sample firms are partitioned based on their 
relative non-discretionary earnings and earnings target positions, it is likely that the 
theoretical arguments of this study are also applicable to the other two earnings 
targets, except there may be variations in the strength of the association between 
institutional ownership type and accruals management. 
The theories and interpretations of the empirical results of this study are framed in 
terms of institutional investors' influence on portfolio firm managers' earnings 
management decisions. A potential alternative explanation of the results relating to 
H1-H4 is that different types of institutional investors invest in firms based on firms' 
characteristics that are associated with discretionary accruals. As such, the levels of 
discretionary accruals may be one of the determinants of the levels of institutional 
ownership by transient and long-term oriented institutional investors. Given that no 
specific step has been taken to test the actual causal relations between institutional 
ownership type and discretionary accruals, this study cannot rule out this alternative 
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explanation to the results of H 1 -H4. 113 However, it may be conjectured that by 
replacing year-end institutional ownership with the third quarter institutional 
ownership (as per one of the robustness tests described in Section 6.5.2), there is 
some support for the hypothesised causal relations between institutional ownership 
types and discretionary accruals. 
Another caveat is that this study's sample is drawn from a recent period (1995-1998) 
where there is a growth in transient institutional ownership as well as growth in the 
stock markets. Therefore, the results of this study may be specific to this period of 
time and not be generalisable to other time periods. Data constraints prevent 
investigating that potential in this thesis. 
In relation to the tests for income smoothing, although income smoothing behaviour 
is tested among sample firms that, if such behaviour is found, can be unambiguously 
attributed to income smoothing incentives, the tests remain single period tests. 
Given that income smoothing is an inter-temporal (i.e., multiple period) earnings 
management strategy, (absence of) evidence regarding income smoothing may be an 
artefact of the tests used in this study. 
7.7 Future research avenues 
There are several future research avenues that may flow from this study. First, this 
study can be extended to examine the market reactions to portfolio firms that failed 
to meet their earnings targets. Several facets of this extension are possible. Future 
113 	The alternative causal relation would predict opposite associations to that hypothesised by 
H5-H8. 
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research can examine whether the stock market indeed punishes, and the extent to 
which the stock market punishes, specific firms that failed to meet or beat their 
earnings targets, especially if these firms have predominantly transient institutional 
ownership. Also, investigation can be carried out on the flow of transient 
institutional ownership away from firms that failed to meet their earnings targets to 
further triangulate the argument that transient institutional investors buy "winners" 
and sell "losers". 
The "reverse" myopia behaviour associated with long-term oriented institutional 
ownership is not well documented in the existing literature. Therefore, it represents 
a fertile ground for further research to examine, among other things, why such 
behaviour might have taken place, and whethei such association (a) persists in -other 
settings; (b) manifests in other forms; (c) has any resource allocation implications; 
and (d) has any (adverse) capital market reaction, regulatory reaction, or auditor 
reaction. 
Future research can extend this study by examining three related issues on the 
associations between institutional ownership type and earnings management. First, 
the associations can be investigated using other earnings targets, such as analysts' 
forecasts, management forecasts and loss avoidance. Next, the associations can be 
examined in the context of multiple earnings targets, taking into consideration the 
relative importance and levels of those targets. Finally, the associations between 
institutional investor type and earnings management, both in the context of single 
earnings target and multiple earnings targets, can be investigated using other 
earnings management tools such as accounting policy choices and real investment 
decisions (e.g., R&D expenditure). 
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Another extension may be along the line of El-Gazzar's (1998) investigation. For 
example, if long-term oriented institutional investors are indeed active investors, 
then this type of institutional investor may affect the level of predisclosure 
information differently from transient institutional investors. 
Future research can also investigate the differential effects that different types of 
institutional investors have on portfolio firms' earnings management (both real 
investment and accounting choice) across two different periods. In particular, an 
inter-temporal comparison between the periods before (early to mid 1980s) and after 
(mid to late 1990s) institutional activism became popular would enable examinations 
of• the inter-temporal changes in the role of institutional investors in the portfolio 
firms' corporate governance and how this change affects portfolio firms' earnings 
management. Other research avenues include examining the relation between 
institutional ownership type and earnings management (a) within specific industries, 
including finance related industries (Fields et al., 2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999); 
(b) focusing on specific accrual items (Fields et al., 2001; Healy and Wahlen, 1999); 
and/or (c) among loss-making firms. 
7,8 Conclusion 
This chapter summarises and concludes the thesis by reviewing the purpose and 
motivation of the study. It also summarises the major findings and implications. 
Limitations are discussed and future research avenues suggested. 
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The study provides evidence indicating that long-term oriented institutional investors 
constrain portfolio firms' accruals management. It also provides evidence that under 
certain circumstances they also associate with "reverse" myopic behaviour among 
portfolio firm managers. On the other hand, transient institutional investors appear 
to encourage managerial myopia although the results are more consistent for 
portfolio firms with predominantly transient institutional ownership, and these 
results are not very robust when the accounting flexibility of portfolio firm managers 
is considered. 
The evidence of this study suggests that managerial myopia induced by transient 
institutional investors is not• restricted to firms with R&D activities, or to real 
investment choice as an earnings management vehicle. However, the results also 




American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 1971. Accounting Principles 
Board Opinion No. 20: Accounting changes. Accounting Principles Board. 
Baber, W.R., P.M. Fairfield, and J.A. Haggard. 1991. The effect of concern about 
reported income on discretionary spending decisions: The case of research 
and development. The Accounting Review 66(4): 818-829. 
Badrinath, S.G., G.D. Gay, and J.R. Kale. 1989. Patterns of institutional 
investment, prudence, and the managerial "safety-net" hypothesis. Journal of 
Risk and Insurance 56(4): 605-629. 
Ball, R. and G. Foster. 1982. Corporate financial reporting: A methodological 
review of empirical research. Journal of Accounting Research 
20(Supplement): 161-234. 
Bange, M.M, and W.F.M. De Bondt. 1998. R&D budgets and corporate earnings 
targets. Journal of Corporate Finance 4(2): 153-184. 
Barth, M.E., J.A. Elliott, and M.W. Finn 1999. Market.rewards associated with 
patterns of increasing earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 37(2): 387- 
414. 
Bartov, E., F.A. Gul, and J.S.L. Tsui. 2000. Discretionary-accruals models and 
audit qualifications. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30(3): 421-452. 
Bartov, E., S. Radhalcrishnan, and I. Krinsky. 2000. Investor sophistication and 
patterns in stock returns after earnings announcements. The Accounting 
Review 75(1): 43-63. 
Basu, S. 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(1): 3-37. 
Becker, C.L., M.L. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo, and K.R. Subramanyam. 1998. The 
effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 15(1): 1-24. 
Beneish, M., and E. Press. 1993. Costs of technical violation of accounting-based 
debt covenants. The Accounting Review 68(2): 233-257. 
Beneish, M., and E. Press. 1995. The resolution of technical default. The 
Accounting Review 70(2): 337-353. 
173 
Berle, A.A., and G.C. Means. 1968. The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property. Revised Edition. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York. 
Bernard, V.L. and D.J. Skinner. 1996. What motivates managers' choice of 
discretionary accruals? Journal of Accounting and Economics 22(1-3): 313- 
325. 
Bhide, A. 1993. The hidden costs of stock market liquidity. Journal of Financial 
Economics 34(1): 31-51. 
Black, B.S. 1992. Institutional investors and corporate governance: The case for 
institutional voice. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 5(3): 19-32. 
Black, B.S. 1998. Shareholder activism and corporate governance in the United 
States, P. Newman, ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law. 
Black, B.S., and J.C. Coffee. 1994. Hail Britannia? Institutional investor behaviour 
under limited regulation. Michigan Law Review 92(7): 1997-2087. 
Bradshaw, M.T., S.A. Richardson, and R.G. Sloan. 1999. Earnings quality and 
financial reporting credibility: An empirical investigation. Working Paper. 
University of Michigan. 
Brickley, J.A., R.C. Lease, and C.W. Smith, Jr. 1988. Ownership structure and 
voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 
267-291. 
Brown, K., and B. Brooke. 1993. Institutional demand and security price pressure: 
the case of corporate spinoffs. Financial Analysts Journal 39(5): 53-62. 
Burgstahler, D., and I. Dichev. 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(1): 99-126. 
Bushee, B. 2001. Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run 
value? Contemporary Accounting Research 18(2): forthcoming. 
Bushee, B. 1997. Institutional investors, long-term investment, and earnings 
management. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan. 
Bushee, B. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D 
investment behavior. The Accounting Review 73(3): 305-333. 
Carleton, W.T., J.M. Nelson, and M.S. Weisbach. 1998. The influence of 
institutions on corporate governance through private negotiations: Evidence 
from TIAA-CREF. Journal of Finance 53(4): 1355-1362. 
174 
Carlson, S.J., and C.T. Bathala. 1997. Ownership differences and firms' income 
smoothing behaviour. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 24(2): 
179-196. 
Cheng, C.A., and A. Reitenga. 2000. Institutional investors and discretionary 
accruals. Paper presented at the 2' d Globalisation Conference, Cambridge, 
UK. 
Coffee, J.C. 1991. Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor as corporate 
monitor. Columbia Law Review 91(6): 1277-1368. 
Collins, D.W., and P. Hribar. 1999. Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for 
empirical research. Working Paper. University of Iowa. 
Davies, P.L. 1993. Institutional investors in the United Kingdom, in D.D. Prentice 
and P.R.J. Holland, eds., Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford) 69-96. 
Dechow, P.M. 1994. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm 
performance: The Role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 18(1): 3-42. 
Dechow, P.M., S.A. Richardson, and A. hem Tuna. 2000. Are benchmark beaters 
doing anything wrong? Working Paper. University of Michigan. 
Dechow, P.M. and D.J. Skinner. 2000. Earnings management: Reconciling the 
views of accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators. Accounting 
Horizon 14(2): 235-250. 
Dechow, P.M., R.G. Sloan, and A.P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings 
management. The Accounting Review 70(2): 193-225. 
Dechow, P.M., R.G. Sloan, and A.P. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and consequences of 
earnings manipulations: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions 
by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13(Spring): 1-36. 
DeFond, M.L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violation and manipulation 
of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17(1-2): 145-176. 
DeFond, M.L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1991. Incidence and circumstances of accounting 
errors. The Accounting Review 66(3): 643-655. 
DeFond, M.L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1993. Factors related to auditor-client 
disagreements over income-increasing accounting methods. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 9(Spring): 415-431. 
175 
DeFond, M.L., and C.W. Park. 1997. Smoothing income in anticipation of future 
earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23(2): 115-139. 
Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser. 1999. Earnings management to exceed 
thresholds. Journal of Business 72(1): 1-33. 
Del Guercio, D. 1996. The distorting effect of the prudent-man laws on institutional 
equity investments. Journal of Financial Economics 40(1): 31-62. 
Del Guercio, D., and J. Hawkins. 1999. The motivation and impact of pension fund 
activism. Journal of Financial Economics 52(3): 293-340. 
Dobrzynski, J. 1993. Relationship investing: A new shareholder is emerging — 
patient and involved. Business Week 3309(March 15): 68-75. 
Eakins, S.G., S.R. Stansell, and P.E. Wertheim. 1998. Institutional portfolio 
composition: An examination of the prudent investment hypothesis. 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 38(1): 93-110. 
Eames, M.J. 1998. Institutional investors myopia, ownership, earnings, and returns. 
Working Paper, Santa Clara University. 
El-Gazzar, S.M. 1998, Predisclosure information and institutional ownership: A 
cross-sectional examination of market revaluation during earnings 
announcement periods. The Accounting Review 73(1): 119-129. 
Fama, E. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy 88(21): 288-307. 
Fields, T., T. Lys, and L. Vincent. 2001. Empirical research on accounting choice. 
Working Paper, Harvard University and Northwestern University. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 1980. Statement of financial accounting 
concepts No. 2: Qualitative characteristics of accounting information. FASB, 
Stamford, CT. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. 1987. Statement of financial accounting 
standards No. 95: Statement of cash flows. FASB, Stamford, CT. 
Fox, J. 1997. Learn to play the earnings game (and Wall Street will love you). 
Fortune, March 31, 77-80. 
Francis, J. 2000. Discussion of empirical research on accounting choice. Working 
Paper, Duke University. 
176 
Froot, K.A., A.F. Perold, and J.C. Stein. 1992. Shareholder trading and corporate 
investment horizons. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 5(2): 42-58. 
Gayer, J.J., K.M. Gayer, and J.R. Austin. 1995. Additional evidence on bonus plans 
and income management. Journal of Accounting and Economic 19(1): 3-28. 
Godfrey, J.M., and K.L. Jones. 1999. Political cost influences on income smoothing 
via extraordinary item classification. Accounting and Finance 39(3): 229- 
254. 
Gompers, P.A., and A. Metrick. 1998. How are large institutions different from 
other investors? Why do these differences matter? Working Paper, Harvard 
University. 
Graves, S.B. and S.A. Waddock. 1990. Institutional ownership and control: 
Implications for long-term • corporate strategy. Academy of Management 
Executive 4(1): 75-83. 
Quay, W.R., S.P. Kothari, and R.L. Watts. 1996. A market-based evaluation of 
discretionary accrual models. Journal of Accounting Research 
34(Supplement): 83-105. 
Hand, J. 1990. A test of extended functional fixation hypothesis. The Accounting 
Review 65(4): 740-763. 
Hansen, G.A. 1998. Do discretionary accrual proxies measure manipulations? 
Working Paper. Pennsylvania State University. 
Hansen, G.A. 1999. Bias and measurement error in discretionary accrual models. 
Working Paper. Pennsylvania State University. 
Hawley, J.P. 	1995. Political voice, fiduciary activism, and the institutional 
ownership of U.S. corporations: The role of public and noncorporate pension 
funds. Sociological Perspectives 38(3): 415-435. 
Healy, P. 1996. Discussion of a market-based evaluation of discretionary accrual 
models. Journal of Accounting Research 34(Supplement): 107-115. 
Healy, P. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 7(April): 85-107. 
Healy, P., and J.M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature 
and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizon 13(4): 365-383. 
177 
Hessel, C.A., and M. Norman. 1992. Financial characteristics of neglected and 
institutionally held stocks. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 
7(3): 313-330. 
Hirst, D.E. 1994. Auditor sensitivity to earnings management. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 11(Fall): 405-422. 
Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meekling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 
305-360. 
Jiambalvo, J., S. Rajgopal, and M. Venkatachalam. 1999. Is institutional ownership 
associated with earnings management and the extent to which stock prices 
reflect future earnings? Working Paper. University of Washington and 
Stanford University. 
John, K., and L.W. Senbet. 1998. Corporate governance and board effectiveness. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 22(4): 371-403. 
Jones, J.J. 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal 
of Accounting Research 29(Autumn): 193-228. 
Karpoff, J.M. 1998. The impact of shareholder activism on target 'companies: A 
survey of empirical findings Working Paper. University of Washington. 
Kasznik, R. 1999. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting Research 37(1): 57-81. 
Kennedy, P. 1992. A Guide to Econometrics. 3rd edition. Oxford, UK: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd. 
Kim, J I. Krinsky, and J. Lee. 1997. Institutional holdings and trading volume 
reactions to quarterly earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Finance 12(1): 1-14. 
Lang, M., and M. McNichols. 	1997. 	Institutional trading and corporate 
performance. Research Paper, Stanford University. 
Lev, B., and T. Sougiannis. 1996. The capitalization, amortization, and value-
relevance of R&D. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21(1): 107-138. 
Levitt, A. 1998. The 'Numbers Game' — Remarks of Chairman Arthur Levitt at the 
N.Y.U. Center for Law and Business, New York, N.Y. 28 September. 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch220.txt  
178 
Loomis, C.J. 1999. Lies, damned lies, and managed earnings: The crack down is 
here. Fortune, August 2, 75-92. 
Majumdar, S.K., and A. Nagarajan. 1997. The impact of changing stock ownership 
patterns in the United States: Theoretical implications and some evidence. 
Revue D'Economie IndustrieIle 82(4): 39-54. 
Matsunaga, S.R., and C.W. Park. 2000. Does the CEO bear a cost from missing an 
earnings target? Working Paper. University of Oregon and Hong Kong 
University of Science and Technology. 
McNichols, M.F. 2000. Research design issues in earnings management studies. 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 19(4-5): 313-345. 
Moses, O.D. 1987. Income smoothing and incentives: Empirical tests using 
accounting changes. The Accounting Review 57(2): 358-377. 
Murphy, K.J. 1999. Executive Compensation, in 0., Ashenfelte, and D. Card, eds., 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3B (North-Holland, Amsterdam) 
2485-2563. 
Myers, L.A., and D.J. Skinner. 	1999. Earnings momentum and earnings 
management. Working Paper. University of Michigan. 
Nussbaum, B. 1987. The changing role of the CEO. Business Week October 23: 
13-28. 
Opler, T., and J. Sokobin. 1995. Does coordinated institutional shareholding 
activism work? An analysis of the activities of the Council of Institutional 
Investors. Working Paper. Ohio State University. 
Peasnell, K.V., P.F. Pope, and S. Young. 2000. Detecting earnings management 
using cross-sectional abnormal accruals models. Accounting and Business 
Research 30(4): 313-326. 
Porter, M.E. 1992. Capital Choices: Changing the way America invests in industry. 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 5(2): 4-16. 
Potter, G. 	1992. Accounting earnings announcement, institutional investor 
concentration, and common stock returns. Journal of Accounting Research 
30(1): 146-155. 
Pound, J. 1992. Beyond takeovers: Politics comes to corporate control. Harvard 
Business Review Mar/Apr: 83-93. 
179 
Pound, J., and R.J. Shiller. 1987. Are institutional investors speculators? The 
Journal of Portfolio Management 13(Spring): 46-52. 
Pozen, R.C. 1994. Institutional investors: The reluctant activists. Harvard Business 
Review Jan/Feb: 140-149. 
Prentice, D.D., and P.R.J. Holland, eds. 1993. Contemporary Issues in Corporate 
Governance. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Press, E.G., and J.B. Weintrop. 1990. Accounting-based constraints in public and 
private debt agreements: Their association with leverage and impact on 
accounting choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 12(1-3): 65-95. 
Puffer, S.M., and J.B. Weintrop. 1991. Corporate performance and CEO turnover: 
The role of performance expectations. Administrative Science Quarterly 
36(March): 1-19. 
Rajgopal, S., and M. Venkatachalam. 1998. The role of institutional investors in 
corporate governance: An empirical investigation. Working Paper. Stanford 
University. 
Ramsay, I.M., and M. Blair. 	1993. 	Ownership concentration, institutional 
investment and corporate governance: An empirical investigation of 100 
Australian companies. Melbourne University Law Review 19(1): 153-194. 
Rangan, S. 1998. Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity 
offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 50(1): 101-122. • 
Richardson, V.J. 1998. Information asymmetry and earnings management: some 
evidence. Working Paper. University of Kansas. 
Ronen, J., and S. Sadan. 1981. Smoothing Income Numbers: Objectives, Means, 
and Implications. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA. 
Schipper, K. 1989. Commentary on Earnings Management. Accounting Horizons 
3(4): 91-102. 
Shleifer, A., and R.W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. 
Journal of Political Economy 94(3): 461-488. 
Shleifer, A., and R.W. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of 
Finance 52(2): 737-783. 
Sias, R., L.T. Stark, and S. Titman. 2000. The price impact of institutional trading. 
Working Paper. Washington State University and University of Texas at 
Austin. 
180 
Skinner, D.J., and R.G. Sloan. 1999. Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and 
stock returns, or Don't let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Working 
Paper. University of Michigan. 
Sloan, R.G. 1996. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash 
flows about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71(3): 289-315. 
Smith, M.P. 1996. Shareholder activism by institutional investors: Evidence from 
CalPERS. Journal of Finance 51(1): 227-252. 
St. Pierre, K., and J.A. Anderson. 1984. An analysis of the factors associated with 
lawsuits against public accountants. The Accounting Review 59(2): 242-263. 
Stapledon, G.P. 1996a. Disincentive to activism by institutional investors in listed 
Australian companies. Sydney Law Review 18(2): 152-192. 
Stapledon, G.P. 1996b. Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Stein, J. 1989. Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: a model of myopic 
corporate behaviour. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 104(4). 655-669. 
Subramanyam, K.R. 1996. The pricing of discretionary accruals. Journal of 
Accountmg and Economics 22(1-3): 249-281. 
Sweeney, A.P. 	1994. Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting 
responses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17(3): 281-308. 
Teoh, S.H., I. Welch and T.J. Wong. 1998a. Earnings management and the long-
term market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 
52(6): 1935-1974. 
Teoh, S.H., I. Welch and T.J. Wong. 1998b. Earnings management and the 
underperformance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial 
Economics 50(1): 63-99. 
Teoh, S.H., T.J. Wong and G.R. Rao. 1998. Are accruals during initial public 
offerings opportunistic? Review of Accounting Studies 3(1-2): 175-208. 
Trueman, B., and S. Titman. 1988. An explanation for accounting income 
smoothing. Journal of Accounting Research 26(Supplement): 127-139. 
Utama, S., and W.M. Cready. 1997. Institutional ownership, differential 
predisclosure precision and trading volume at announcement dates. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 24(2): 129-150. 
181 
Wahal, S. 1996. Pension fund activism and firm performance. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 31(1): 1-23. 
Wahal, S., and J. McConnell. 1997. Do institutional investors exacerbate 
managerial myopia? Working Paper. Emory University. 
Watts, R.L., and J.L. Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 
Watts, R.L., and J.L. Zimmerman. 1990. Positive accounting theory: A ten year 
perspective. The Accounting Review 65(1): 131-156. 
Watts, R.L., and J.L. Zimmerman. 1978. Towards a positive theory of the 
determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review 53(1): 112- 
134 
White, H. 1980. A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a 
direct test for heteroscedasticity. Econometrica 48(May): 817-838. 
